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THE ORIGINS OF THE GODDESS IN THE RELIGION OF THE RIG-VEDA*

ANNIE TEIXEIRA-BARBARO

SINCE MAN HAS A GENERAL TENDENCY to assume that all beings are like himself, it is natural that, in his progress from rudimentary idolatry to the concept of intelligent and higher divinities, he should have sought to invest his gods with qualities and vicissitudes analogous to his own. This explains why the Indo-European invaders of the Panjāb, organized on the basis of a rigidly patriarchal civilization, created a pantheon in which feminine divinities shared in nonactive form and had, therefore, only a secondary importance.

The Vedas present to us a picture of the Indian world before the Upaniṣads, Jainism, and Buddhism had brought new elements to the primitive religion, and before the cults and customs of the aboriginal peoples had contaminated the temples and the social structure of the Aryans. It is a well-known fact that, in the clans of the conquering tribes, woman, the guardian of the domestic hearth, was honored and exalted solely in her capacity of mother, and that, consequently, this social status finds, so to speak, a distant reflection in the picture of the Vedic goddess.

In the hymns of the *ṛṣis,* the goddesses have no share in either the creation or the governance of the world. Mothers *par excellence* and maternal powers of fertility and abundance, in this aspect only are they true goddesses, the celestial *mulieres.* But beside the *mothers,* we see another type of feminine divinity arise, the *divinized abstraction,* which sometimes has its origin in an inanimate form of neuter gender, which undergoes a process of evolution toward the feminine, while, in certain other cases, it is transformed into a masculine according to the qualities which were attributed to the inanimate form at a later period.

This phenomenon is found also in other ancient religions of the Indo-European group (except the Hittite, which, as we shall see, did

* For suggestions as to the purely linguistic portions of my study, especially as regards Indo-European, Avesta, Greek, and Celtic, as well as for help in the translation of this article, I am indebted to the courtesy of Louis H. Gray, Professor Emeritus of Comparative Linguistics in Columbia University. Because of war conditions, it has been impossible to obtain certain characters, so we are compelled to omit the following diacritical marks: upturned *e* (long and short), *i* and *u* with a circumflex below and *g* with a circumflex above, O with a circumflex, all accented long vowels, and accented *r̥*.

not possess the feminine gender). A very striking example is that of the Roman goddess Venus, a word of the same family as *venustus,* "lovely, beautiful," and akin to the Sanskrit neuter *vánas,* "loveliness."[1]

Meillet, followed by Gray, has emphasized the importance of the category of gender in language at the Pre-Indo-European period, maintaining that the source of grammatical gender is to be found in animism, a type of primitive thought which holds that sentient life and will exist in many things which we term lifeless, but which act, instead, with purpose and intent.[2] Originally, in Indo-European, the masculine-feminine (animate gender) was grammatically opposed to the neuter (inanimate gender). Two important facts seem to support this thesis. First come the Hittite texts, among the earliest written sources known. Hittite, now accepted as forming part of the Indo-European group, shows a morphology which has only two genders, personal and impersonal, while the feminine is totally lacking.[3] A second proof for this hypothesis is found by analyzing certain words of primitive formation which have survived into the historic period.

It is clear, for example, that Latin adjectives of the third declension like *levis,* "light," have only animate and inanimate forms, the masculine-feminine *levis* and the neuter *leve.*[4] In early Greek, likewise, we find no grammatical distinction of the sexes in certain words of ancient origin, as when Homer speaks of ὁ θεός, "the god," beside ἡ θεός, "the goddess." There is a trace of this primitive usage, moreover, in Latin poetry, where Vergil employs *deus* to denote Venus and Alecto *(Aeneid* II, 632; VII, 498), and Catulus (quoted by Cicero, *De Natura deorum,* I, 79) to designate Aurora. It is evident, therefore, that the feminine termination in ἡ θεά, "the goddess," is of later date. To strengthen the hypothesis that in primitive Indo-European feminine and masculine were grammatically fused into the single animate gender, one may cite ancient nouns of identical termination, like Sanskrit *pitár-, mātár-;*

1. K. Brugmann, *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*[2] (Strasbourg, 1897-1916), II, ii, 90; B. Delbrück, *Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen,* I (Strasbourg, 1893), 120.

2. A. Meillet, *Mémoires de la société de linguistique de Paris,* XXI (1920), 254; and *Linguistique historique et linguistique générale,* I[2] (Paris, 1926), 216-17; L. H. Gray, *Foundations of Language* (New York, 1939), p. 184.

3. E. H. Sturtevant, *A Comparative Grammar of the Hittite Language* (Philadelphia, 1933), p. 162.

4. Gray, p. 185.

Greek πατήρ, μήτηρ; Latin *pater, māter.* In Latin, the feminine word *fagus,* "beech-tree," has the same termination as the masculine *lupus,* "wolf,"[5] and it is solely by means of attributive adjectives that one can determine whether the gender is masculine or feminine; accordingly, one finds in Archaic Latin *lupu' femina feta* (Ennius, *Annales,* 58). Reminiscences survive, moreover, of the period of vacillation when the feminine was barely commencing to assert itself as a grammatical gender, as in the Homeric ῥοδοδάκτυλος ἠώς, "rosy-fingered dawn," where the noun is feminine, but the adjective masculine, and also in Archaic Latin texts like *Fortunae Iouis puero primigeniae* (*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* XIV, 2862), *prima incedit Cereri' puer Proserpna* (Cnaeus Naevius, *Bellum Poenicum* 30).

It may, then, be established that the grammatical feminine formations are late, and are derived, for the most part, from the masculine (animate) gender; but, on the other hand, the neuter (inanimate) gender also contributed largely to the origin of the feminine. One should also note that in Indo-European the termination of the nominative feminine singular of the demonstrative pronoun indicating that sex is identical in form with the nominative neuter plural, so that a pronoun like *ista* means either "that woman" or "those things." Again, Latin *opera* is either a neuter plural, "works," or a feminine singular, "work, labor" (French *œuvre,* Italian *opera,* etc.); and a number of Latin neuter plurals have become feminine singulars in Romance, as Latin *folia,* "leaves": French *feuille,* Italian *foglia,* Spanish *hoja,* Portuguese *folha,* "leaf", etc.

In certain instances, the neuter plural, as in the original use of the feminine singular, denotes a vague plurality of impersonal things, e.g., Latin *loca,* "places generally," as contrasted with *loci,* "individual places." One may suppose that these neuter plurals which had a collective sense gradually began to be expressed syntactically with a singular verb earlier than with a plural, quite as the Italian says, *la moltitudine* (the collectivity of *molti*) *è,* and not *la moltitudine sono,* "the multitude is (not, are)." In various languages a neuter plural subject governs a singular verb, as Greek τὰ οἰκήματα ἔπεσεν, "the buildings fell"; Avesta *saxʷāre yā zī vāverezōi,* "plans which *has* been carried out" (Yasna XXIX, 4); Modern Persian *karhā bi-ṣabr bar-āyad,* "affairs *succeeds* through patience"; and, much more rarely, in Vedic Sanskrit, as *ákāri ta*

5. Meillet, I, 212.

indra gótamebhir bráhmāṇi, "prayers *was* made to thee, O Indra, by the Gotamas" (Rig-Veda I, lxiii, 9); and (probably through Greek influence) Vulgar Latin, *ea vitia difficiliter vincitur,* "those faults *is* overcome with difficulty."[6]

Accepting the hypothesis, then, that, from the grammatical point of view, Indo-European, in the first dawn of its civilization, knew but two genders, animate and inanimate, and that the feminine was formed only subsequently, one must bear in mind that this morphological evolution was closely connected with the development and metamorphoses of the mythological figures of the Aryan peoples. Thus, before the goddesses were enthroned beside the gods in various pantheons, to the eyes of semi-civilized man only impersonal (non-active) divinities existed beside personal (active).

It is well known that in the Roman religion, one of the most primitive before the Greek period, the neuter word *numen* meant "divinity" in the wide sense of the term. Etymologically, it signifies "nod of the head," its usual connotation of "divine power or will" probably being suggested by the belief that divinity manifested itself by a nod (cf. *Pauli excerpta ex Festo,* ed. W. M. Lindsay [Leipzig, 1913], p. 179. 3: *numen quasi nutus dei et potestas).*[7] For the Latins, then, the term represented celestial force, supernatural and amorphous power, with neither myth nor genealogy to identify it with all the gods generally. Similarly, the Anglo-Saxon *god,* German *Gott,* etc., find their origin in the neuter passive participle **ghutóm* from the base **ghaue-,* "to call, invoke," so that **ghutóm* denotes *invocatum,* "that which is invoked," not *invocatus,* "he who is invoked."[8]

The Iranian religion, which, prior to the Zoroastrian reform, was perhaps more primitive than the Vedic, even though its attestations and its written form date from a later period, knows several neuter deities: Hvare, "Sun," equivalent to the Sanskrit *svàr-,* a personification of the sun; X^{v}arenah (cf. Sanskrit *svàrṇaram,* "bright space, ether"), a personification of the divine glory; Hadiš, "Abode" (Sanskrit *sádas-,* Greek ἕδος, "seat, abode, dwelling"), presiding over the welfare of the home; Dāta, the apotheosis of the divine law; Rāman, "Rest," the peace of ma-

6. Gray, p. 176.

7. A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine,* new ed. (Paris, 1939), p. 688.

8. Gray, p. 100.

terial prosperity; Savah, "Profit," a divinity of worldly gain; Θwāša, (Celestial) Space"; and Vayah, "Ether, Celestial Space."[9]

Over against the abstract divinity, the *numen,* stands the *deus* (Archaic Latin *deivos,* Sanskrit *devá-,* from the base **deie-ue-,* "bright"), i.e., the active god in whom is expressed the concept of supernatural being, dwelling in the celestial sphere, acting and terrible, and, therefore, to be placated and conciliated.

These two aspects of divinity as an inactive potency and as a being who acts are extremely important, since they explain, in part, why the goddesses came to play a role inferior to that of the gods. In fact, the concept which expresses feminality possesses, in general, a passive character which approximates it to the neuter. Thus we shall see that, in all the Indo-European religions, the divinities who control the universe are male, while those who are charged with less essential tasks are female. This general tendency appears to receive special confirmation in Vedic literature, where the *devīs,* "goddesses," must be interpreted solely as *numina,* i.e., as divine potencies.

In the Vedic Pantheon, the goddesses who are the wives of the great gods (*devānām pátnīḥ*) lack all real personality, and are seldom mentioned. Their names are frequently formed from those of the gods plus the suffix *-ānī,* as Índra, Indrāṇī; Váruṇa, Varuṇānī, etc.[10] It is evident that the formation of names like Indrāṇī, derived from masculines, must be late, just as in the case of the Greek ἡ θεά, "the goddess." Only a few Vedic goddesses emerge with an independent aspect, and even these are restricted to symbolizing the quintessence of fertility or to personifying abstractions. Frequently, however, these two categories of feminine divinities are fused and confounded in the religious literature of early India, thus following a trait which characterizes all the Vedic deities generally, i.e., a lack of individuality and of well-defined lineaments.[11]

The oldest Vedic divinities are clearly those whose names and cults find counterparts in other Indo-European religions, and among these we must place first the goddess Uṣás, "Dawn."

In addition to the primal importance of her origin, Uṣás is certainly the most lyrically sublime creation of Vedic vision. She belongs to the

9. Gray, *Foundations of the Iranian Religions* (Bombay [1929]), pp. 85-86, 120-23, 143-44, 147, 156-57, 160, 162, 169.

10. A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* (Strasbourg, 1897), p. 125.

11. *Ibid.,* p. 15.

deities of the celestial sphere; her form is light and embraces the heavens. Constantly called the daughter of Dyaús, "Sky", and sister of the Ādityās (the divine artificers of the universe), her birth is imagined as occurring upon a shining car. Nevertheless, other gods are also named as the fathers of Dawn; thus Indra is praised for having created and kindled Dawn, even though in certain other passages of the Veda he appears as hostile to her, even to the point of shattering her car. Uṣás, divine and immortal, cannot fade with age; eternally youthful, she smiles on mankind and brings them riches. She is celebrated in some twenty hymns and is named more than three hundred times in the Rig-Veda. Her epithets are "resplendent, bright," etc., but her special characteristic is "bountiful" *(maghónī)*.[12]

Naturally the Vedic poets could not do less, in their exaltation of so important a goddess, than to ascribe to her the additional quality of mother, and, therefore, Uṣás, since the dawn precedes the sun, is occasionally hymned as the mother of Sūrya, the Sun (*svàr jánantī*, III, lxi, 4), or of the gods (*mātā devānām*, I, cxiii, 14). We must, therefore, always bear in mind that Uṣás is, above all, a cosmic reality, since her name has a double character, that of the natural phenomenon and that of the being who possesses it; in fact, the vision of the dawn as a phenomenon (*uṣás*) is never absent from the thought of the Vedic bards, and her delineation is not complicated by sacerdotal speculation.

The cult of Uṣás appears likewise in the Iranian religion. Although the Avesta exalts her in very minor tones as compared with the Vedic literature, and terms her merely a "worshipful being," nevertheless, technically speaking, the figure of the Iranian Ušah is not materially different from that of the Vedic goddess.[13]

Both the Indian Uṣás and the Iranian Ušah are derived from the Indo-European base **auese-*, "bright." Sanskrit derivatives of this base are *usrá-*, "daybreak, brightness"; *uṣā*, "dawn"; *vástu-*, "morning"; *vāsará-*, "matutinal"; *vivásvan-*, "shining, matutinal," etc.; and among kindred words are Homeric ἠώς; Aeolic αὔως <*αυσως; Latin *aurōra*, "dawn" <**ausōs-ā*, Anglo-Saxon *Éastre*, "goddess of the rising sun," whose festivities were in April; *Éaster*, Old High German *Ostra*, "Easter," etc.[14]

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-49.

13. Gray, *Religions*, p. 164.

14. Walde-Pokorny, *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der indogermanischen Sprachen* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1927-33), I, 26-27.

It seems highly probable that the Indo-Iranian mythological figure of the dawn had its origin in a celestial phenomenon which was at first irrational, but which came to be divinized and personified; and thus from a neuter form **uṣás-*, "light, lumen" was developed the feminine Sanskrit Uṣás, "Aurora." In Sanskrit, the overwhelming majority of nouns in *-as* are neuter, although there are a few masculines and at least a couple of feminines (for the latter, e.g., *uṣás-* and *jarás-*, "old age" [but Greek neuter γῆρας], cf. also the Latin masculines *angor*, "anguish," *tepor*, "warmth," corresponding to the Sanskrit neuters *áṁhas-*, *tápas-;* masculines of this type are frequent only in Latin; *honōr*, "honor," is feminine).[15]

The hypothesis here advanced seems to agree with the psychological development of semi-civilized man, who, after having long regarded the first light of day as an inanimate phenomenon, began to speculate on the nature of the bright vision that returned unceasingly day after day. Thus, little by little, from the background of the morning's lustre, another figure began to take form and to be transmuted into a shining divinity. Then man venerated Uṣás, "Dawn," no longer as a blind and impersonal force, but as an intelligent power which he commenced to invoke, ascribing womanly characteristics to her, characteristics which later came to stabilize the feminine gender of the goddess Uṣás, exactly as was the case of the Roman Venus as contrasted with the Sanskrit neuter *vánas-*.

Beside a single goddess Uṣás derived from a neuter noun, we find in the Rig-Veda masculine mythological figures which have evolved in like manner from neuters: (1) Áṅgirasas, "Divine Messengers," from a neuter **áṅgiras-*, "message,"[16] and (2) Rakṣásas, "Harmers," from a neuter *rákṣas-*, "harm, injury, damage."[17]

The feminine Apsarás would belong to the same formation in *-as-* if we might suppose that the name was developed from a neuter as in the case of Uṣás, but there is no evidence to prove it. The Avesta shows no trace of the Apsarás, so that her cult was evolved in India and does not date from the Indo-Iranian period. The Indian etymology of her name

15. Delbrück, I, 120; Brugmann, II, i, 529-31, and *Kuhns Zeitschrift*, XXIV (1879), 50; A. Debrunner and J. Wackernagel, *Altindische Grammatik*, III (Göttingen, 1930), 281-82.

16. Macdonell, pp. 142-43; cf. Greek ἄγγελος and Walde-Pokorny, I, 65.

17. Macdonell, pp. 162-64.

is *ap-sarás-*, "water-going," but is more probably *a-psarás-*, "formless."[18] The Atharva-Veda has the form Apsarā, and other conjectures have been made concerning the meaning of the term.[19] The Apsarásas are mentioned only five times in the Rig-Veda, though they are important and beautiful figures in the Epic. In the Rig-Veda, they appear as water-nymphs, and their male companions are the Gandharvás.

Reverting now to goddesses evolved from abstractions, an origin which the Indo-European feminine shares with the neuter, mention may first be made of Púraṁdhi, who is named nine times in the Rig-Veda. This deity is evidently a divinity of abundance, although Hillebrandt is of the opinion that she is, rather, a goddess of activity. Etymologically, the name apparently means "he or she who has abundance," and is akin to the Pārendi of the Avesta, a goddess of riches and abundance. Indologists are not agreed as to the sex of Púraṁdhi. According to Grassmann, the name is masculine; according to Hillebrandt, Oldenberg, and Pischel, feminine. It is impossible to determine the gender in the Rig-Veda, so that no affirmation can be made as to whether Púraṁdhi is a god or a goddess.[20]

The function of Arámati, "Devotion, Piety," whose name is variously interpreted, is not wholly clear in the Rig-Veda, where she is usually regarded as a deity of devotion and swift prayer. According to Gray, Arámati would be identical with the Iranian Ārmaiti,[21] whose name, which, as the metre shows, is to be read Āramaiti, is interpreted by J. H. Moulton[22] as for **arā mātā*, "earth-mother" (cf. Greek ἔρα, "earth"). In any case, identification of the Vedic Arámati with the Avesta Ārmaiti would clearly seem to rest on a purely superficial resemblance of the two names, and the differing lengths of the initial vowels raises a further difficulty, so that Macdonell is doubtless right in expressing the opinion that the Vedic Arámati does not date from the Indo-Iranian period.[23] Arámati's name is most probably compôsed of Sanskrit *áram*, "readily,

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-35; H. Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda* (Berlin, 1894), pp. 251-54; R. Pischel, *Vedische Studien* (Stuttgart, 1889-1901), III, 195-98.

19. E.g., H. Grassmann, *Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda* (Leipzig, 1873), col. 80.

20. Macdonell, p. 124; Gray, *Religions*, p. 155; A. Hillebrandt, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, III (1889), 188-94, 259-73; Grassmann, coll. 824-25; Oldenberg, p. 63; Pischel, I, 202-16.

21. Gray, *Religions*, p. 50.

22. J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism* (London, 1913), p. 112, note 3.

23. Macdonell, pp. 119-20.

suitably, fitly," and *matí-*, "devotion, thought, wish," so that she is a divinity of abstract character. Excluding her, therefore, for the reasons set forth above, and Púraṁdhi, because it is impossible to determine whether this deity is really a goddess, it would seem that Uṣás is the sole divinized feminine abstraction dating from the Indo-Iranian period.

The name of Sūryā, "Sun-Light," is formed from Sūrya, "Sun," whose daughter she seems to be in myth. She is also called Aśvínī, as being the spouse and companion of the Aśvíns, the two male divinities of morning light. In a hymn of later date, however, Sūryā appears as the promised wife of Sóma, while the Aśvíns act as wooers; and another passage states, instead, that the gods gave her to Pūṣán as a wife.[24]

Sarámā, "Dawn-Light," a color-abstraction, is personified as the "messenger of Índra." Hillebrandt queries whether she be not a synonym of Uṣás, and her name is apparently derived from the Indo-European base **sere-*, "red, reddish."[25]

Vāc, "Speech, Word" (cognate with Latin *vōx*), personifies speech, and is celebrated in a hymn of the Rig-Veda (x, cxxv) in which she describes herself, saying (verse 5): "Whom I love I make mighty, a Brāhman, a Ṛṣi, wise"; she accompanies the gods and aims Rudrá's bow against the unbeliever; and her place is in the waters, the sea. The position of Vāc is important in Vedic literature since she is the divinization of the Word, which has always possessed magic power among primitive peoples. It is of interest to note that, beside the feminine Vāc, we repeatedly find in the Vedas the unpersonified neuter *vácas*, "speech," and, in the plural, "songs, incantations," by which the gods cleave the rocks, conquer the demons, etc.[26]

Íḍā, "Libation," the personification of the offering of milk and clarified butter (*ghṛtá*, "ghee"), is sometimes considered as a cow.[27]

Rātrī, "Night," probably became a goddess by antithesis to Uṣás, "Dawn," with whom she is invoked in several verses as a dual divinity, while in one passage she is also called the sister of Uṣás and, like her, a daughter of Heaven. Vedic interpretation does not regard her as black-

24. Oldenberg, p. 241, and *Rgveda: Textkritische und exegetische Noten*, II (Berlin, 1912), 53; Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie* (Breslau, 1891-1902), II, 41-42; III, 125; Macdonell, pp. 50, 51, 112, 125.

25. Macdonell, pp. 63, 151; Hillebrandt, II, 48-50; for other cognates, see Walde-Pokorny, II, 499 (with no mention of Sarámā).

26. Oldenberg, p. 63; Hillebrandt, III, 403; Macdonell, pp. 87, 124.

27. Macdonell, pp. 139, 150; Oldenberg, pp. 72, 326.

ness, but as the starry night, and thus she banishes darkness with the light of the stars. Originally, however, she must have signified darkness, since her name is derived from the Indo-European base **lā-*, "hidden."[28]

Ásunīti, "Spirit-Life," guiding the soul to the future world, is invoked to give nourishment and physical force, as well as to prolong existence in the terrestrial world.[29]

Ánumati, "(Divine) Favor," is twice personified as a goddess of longevity in the Rig-Veda, and is entreated to be kind and to let her faithful long see the sun.[30]

Nírṛti, "Dissolution," is named twelve times in the Rig-Veda as the goddess of death.[31]

Śraddhā, "Faith," is celebrated in a hymn of the Rig-Veda (x, cli), in which it is said that "through Faith is the fire enkindled, through Faith the oblation is poured . . . through Faith wealth is found." She finds a parallel in the Roman goddess Fides, "Faith," who had a temple dedicated to her on the Capitol at Rome; and it is interesting to note that Śraddhā is one of the few demonstrable Indo-European compounds (Latin *crēdō*, Old Irish *cretim*, "I believe").[32]

Sūnṛtā, "Gladness, Joy," is personified two or three times in the Rig-Veda.[33]

Hótrā, "Invocation," is sometimes associated with the river goddess Sárasvatī.[34]

Pāviravī, "Daughter of Lightning," is invoked together with other deities, e.g., Ajá Ékapād, the "Waters of Ocean," and Sárasvatī.[35]

Although Áditi, "Infinity, Boundlessness," has no special hymn devoted to her, she is named eighty times in the Rig-Veda and is constantly invoked together with her sons the Ādityás, the creator gods of the universe. Macdonell emphasizes the fact that, besides her important function as a mother, the goddess is a divinity who, in the strict sense of the term, expresses a purely abstract concept. She has no physically delim-

28. Macdonell, p. 124; Walde-Pokorny, II, 377-78.
29. Macdonell, p. 120; Oldenberg, p. 528.
30. Macdonell, p. 119; Oldenberg, p. 239.
31. Macdonell, p. 172; Oldenberg, p. 288.
32. Macdonell, p. 119; Walde-Pokorny, I, 424; G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*[2] (Munich, 1912), p. 54.
33. Macdonell, p. 120.
34. Macdonell, p. 87; Oldenberg, p. 243.
35. Macdonell, p. 73.

ited features, and her name is often found as an adjective meaning "boundless" (*á-diti-*; cf. *a-dita-*, from the past passive participle of *dā-*, "bind").[36]

It may be said that, quite unlike Uṣás, the goddess Áditi is the abstruse expression of the philosophical speculation of the Vedic priests and, therefore, of late date. She is, in fact, a purely Indian development, and finds no counterpart in any other religion of the Indo-European group. She is the chief of the Vedic goddesses not merely because of her importance in the Veda, but also because she mirrors the ideal figure of the goddess according to the exclusive concept of the Indians when they had already separated from the other Indo-European peoples, and at last possessed an autonomous civilization. Thus we see that Áditi combines equally the traits of the two great categories into which the feminine Vedic divinities seem to be divided: the divinized abstraction on the one hand, and, on the other, the fecund force of the essentially feminine quality of mother. We may say, then, that in her we have both the aspect of formless infinity from which the world and all things arise and the aspect of the mother as parent of the Ādityás. The synthesis of the concepts of Áditi appears, moreover, in a late hymn of the Rig-Veda (I, lxxxix, 10): "Áditi is the sky; Áditi is the air; Áditi is the mother, the father, the son, all the gods; Áditi is the five tribes; Áditi is what hath been born; Áditi is what shall be born." In a word, it may be said that she symbolizes the limitless expanse of the universe (infinity) and, at the same time, the expansion of creation in its endless renewal.

The cosmic deity Ródasī, "World," is frequently associated with the Marúts, "Winds," whose wife she seems to be, although, in the Rig-Veda, it is said that she accompanies them on their car, bringing joy. In more than a hundred passages in the Rig-Veda Heaven and Earth are called Ródasī in the dual, interpreted as sisters.[37]

Finally, we may consider the fertility-goddesses and the divine mothers.

Araṇyānī, the goddess of trees and forests *(áraṇya-)*, plays an insignificant role in the Rig-Veda, although the plants *(óṣadhi-)* are personified as divine; but an entire hymn (X, cxlvi) honors her with special reference to her healing powers.[38]

36. Macdonell, pp. 120-23; Hillebrandt, III, 105-10.
37. Macdonell, p. 78.
38. Macdonell, p. 154; Oldenberg, p. 258.

An interesting group of deities is formed by the Āpas, "Waters," who are always mentioned in the plural, and are to be identified with the Āpō of the Avesta, so that they belong to that class of deities who date from the Indo-Iranian period.[39] The Āpas, or active waters, are contrasted with the neuter *udán-*, which designates water as an inanimate thing, and this distinction appears clearly in the Rig-Veda (v, xlv, 10):

udnā ná nāvam anayanta dhīrā
āśṛṇvatīr āpo arvāg atiṣṭhan

"As a boat through water *(udnā)*, the sages drew [the sun]; the waters *(āpo)*, obedient, hitherward stood."[40]

Unlike Uṣás, then, originally an abstraction arising from a neuter form, the Āpas (the fertile element) were regarded from the first as animate, and so as belonging to the animate gender; and because of their attributes, they subsequently came to assume feminine gender, thus following a development already noted (p. 229). Mythologically, they are pictured in the Rig-Veda as very maternal, mingling their milk with honey, and are called the authoresses of all that is fixed and that moves. They are also regarded by the Indians as lustral waters, since in the Rig-Veda they are invoked to cleanse from moral guilt.[41]

Like the adoration of the waters, the personification of rivers dates from the Indo-European period, and we find river goddesses also among the Celts, e.g., Clota (Clyde), Sabrina (Severn), Abona (Avon), and Sequana (Seine). On the other hand, the concept of fertility and maternity, and, hence, of mother goddess, is shown in the designation of certain European rivers, such as, from *deva*, "goddess," two Spanish rivers, Deva and Deba, as well as the Dee in Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, and the Duis in France; from *devona*, "goddess," the Divonne (Ain); and from *matrona*, "mother," the Marne and the Meyronne (the latter in the Département of Var).[42]

Vedic literature likewise knows divinities of rivers, of whom the most important is Sárasvatī, a possessive formed from *sáras-*, "anything flowing or liquid," and identical (doubtless in name only) with the Old Per-

39. Gray, *Religions*, p. 136.
40. Meillet, I, 216.
41. Macdonell, pp. 7, 85-86.
42. J. A. MacCulloch, *Religion of the Ancient Celts* (Edinburgh, 1911), pp. 43, 46, 182-83; A. Holder, *Alt-Celtischer Sprachschatz* (Leipzig, 1896, sqq.), I, 9, 1046, 1273-74, 1276; II, 468-69, 1272-73, 1510-11.

sian Harahuvatī, Avesta Haraxvaitī, "Arachosia." In the Rig-Veda she appears as a river goddess, but it is very difficult to identify her with any modern Indian river, although she clearly was the holy river par excellence in the Vedic period, as the Ganges is today.

In the Rig-Veda, Sárasvatī is regarded as the best of mothers, rivers, and goddesses, and she grants long life and offspring.[43]

Other river goddesses of minor importance are Rasā, "Wetness," identical (although again only in name) with the Avesta Ranhā (to be read Rahā) and the personification of a mythical stream; Marúdvṛdhā, "Rejoicing in the Maruts" (the Winds); Yamúnā (the modern Jamnu); Gáṅgā (the Ganges); Śutudri; Páruṣṇī; etc. In all, twenty-one divinized rivers are recorded in the Rig-Veda, and two hymns (III, xxxiii; X, lxxv) are devoted to their honor.[44]

Pṛśni, "Speckled (Cow)," the apotheosis of the mottled storm cloud which accompanies the seasonal rains, figures in the Rig-Veda as the mother of the Maruts (the Winds); by implication, therefore, she is the mother of the rains which revive earth's vegetation.[45]

Sītā, "Furrow," is the protectress of growing grain. She appears as the wife of Indra, perhaps because he is regarded as the monsoon god and, accordingly, causes the periodical rains to fall in the furrows.[46]

Sinivālī, mentioned in two hymns of the Rig-Veda (II, xxxii, 6-8; X, clxxxiv, 2), is the sister of the gods, mistress of the house, and is implored by the faithful to grant them many offspring. She is invoked together with Sárasvatī, Rākā, and Gungū.[47]

A special characteristic of Vedic mythology is celebration of about a score of divinities in pairs, uniting their names in a dual compound in which each member is in the dual, and each sometimes accented separately, e.g., Indrāgnī (also Indrā-Agnī), Índrā-Váruṇā, Agnī-Ṣómā, Uṣāsā-Náktā, etc. According to Macdonell,[48] it seems certain that the analogy for this formation was given by Dyāvā-Pṛthivī, "Heaven and

43. Macdonell, pp. 86-88; Oldenberg, p. 243; Hillebrandt, I, 99-100, 115, 380-83; F. Spiegel, *Arische Periode* (Leipzig, 1887), pp. 105-6; W. Geiger, *Ostīrānische Kultur im Altertum* (Erlangen, 1882), pp. 102-4.

44. E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India* (Boston, 1895), pp. 30-33, 137; Macdonell, p. 86. For the Avesta river, Spiegel, pp. 106-7; Geiger, pp. 34-41.

45. Macdonell, pp. 78, 125, 150; Oldenberg, pp. 73, 224.

46. Macdonell, p. 138; Oldenberg, p. 255.

47. Macdonell, p. 125; Oldenberg, p. 239.

48. Macdonell, p. 126.

Earth," a concept certainly earlier than the period immediately preceding the separation of the Indo-European peoples. In the Rig-Veda, the last-named pair are so closely associated that Dyáus is never invoked alone, nor is Pṛthivī, except in a single hymn of three stanzas (v, lxxxiv). The two deities are absolutely co-ordinate, and one does not, as in other cases, predominate over the other.

Heaven and Earth are parents, often described as *pitárā* ("two fathers," i.e., mother and father), *mātárā, jánitrī* ("two mothers").[49] They are the primeval pair and have the epithet *deváputre*, "possessing the gods for sons," while other adjectives applied to them are suggested by their physical characteristics, the one being a prolific bull, and the other a speckled cow.

Etymologically, Pṛthivī is derived from the base *prath-*, "extend," so that it means "the broad (female)," and not "length, breadth" (Vedic *práthas-*), since the divinity is the personification of the outstretched mass of the physical earth, passive and broad, who unites with the active god Dyáus, "Sky." She is the Indian equivalent of the Avesta Zam ("Earth"), the Roman Terra Mater, the Lithuanian Žemyna ("Terrestris [Dea]"), and the German Nerthus ("Terra Mater");[50] and her attributes are, in general, those of the physical earth which supports the burden of the mountains, forests, and the world *(kṣmā)*. She revives the ground by the water which she makes descend from the sky, and the rains of heaven are poured from the lightning of her clouds, etc. She is great *(mahī)*, firm *(dṛḍhā)*, and white or clear *(árjunā)*; but is invoked, above all, as "kindly Mother Earth."[51]

After having thus briefly surveyed the chief Vedic goddesses, the question arises whether the abstract or the concrete was the earlier. In other words, were the oldest objects of worship divinized abstractions, or personifications of fertile and productive elements? From a morphological examination of the names, we have two examples of feminine Vedic deities which date, with fair certainty, from the Indo-Iranian period: Uṣás, of abstract character and originating in a neuter; and Āpas, the fertilizing waters, regarded from the first as of animate gender. One may venture to say, then, that, in the prehistoric period, the two evolutions,

49. For "elliptical duals" of this type, e.g., Old Icelandic *fedhgar*, "father and son" (literally, "fathers"), see Brugmann, II, ii, 458.

50. Gray, *Religions*, p. 172.

51. Macdonell, pp. 9, 88, 126-27.

the one from the neuter (inanimate) to the feminine, and the other from the animate to the feminine, proceeded side by side.

In any event, from the point of view of religion, it is Áditi who presents the perfect picture of the feminine Vedic deity, since she is the result of a civilization already evolved, the creation of a theocracy already stable. Though her primitive form was clearly abstract, nevertheless she came to assume the character of fertilizing power as the mother of the "creator gods," and thus in her these two aspects are of equal potency, neither outweighing the other.

On the other hand, from the point of view of age, it is Pṛthivī who must be regarded as the most primitive of the Vedic goddesses, not because of the etymology of her name, which finds no cognate in any deity of the other Indo-European religions, but because the myth of Heaven and Earth, as a divine pair, is widely diffused among semi-civilized peoples. Pṛthivī is the "kindly Mother Earth," from whose fertile womb, fecundated by the sun, the air, and the rains, all of which come from the sky, the entire vegetable world is constantly reproduced. We must, accordingly, interpret the dual Dyāvā-Pṛthivī as the reflex of the family as it was constituted in the society of the first Aryan invaders of the Panjāb. They are none other than the pastoral pair apotheosized, and, therefore, Pṛthivī is the celestial analogue of the earthly wife-mother. Like her, she is not active, but fertile, the necessary counterpart of the sky as woman is of man, mistress of the world on whom all depends, even as the woman is the mistress of the domestic hearth, the foundation of family life.

Although Andrew Lang has said:[52] "Nothing in all mythology is more difficult than the attempt to get a clear view of the gods of Vedic India," the present writer holds that it is, above all, in the non-active position of woman in Vedic society that we find the true key that explains why the goddesses lack a more exalted status in the pantheon of the Veda.

52. *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*[2] (London, 1899), II, 125.

GREGORY OF TATHEV AGAINST THE MANICHEES

Translated by Archimandrite Terenig Poladian, of the Armenian Church, with a Foreword by Arthur Jeffery, Professor of Semitic Languages, Columbia University.

I

FOREWORD

The Armenian Church no less than the other Eastern Churches came into contact with the Manichaean propaganda in the Near East, and at various times Armenian ecclesiastical authorities had occasion to defend their flocks against the insidious preaching of the Manichaean teachers. It is a little surprising, therefore, to find how meagre is the amount of information about Manichaeism to be gleaned from the Armenian writers.

Eznik of Kolb, in the fifth century, in dealing with the Persians in his *Corruptions of Heresies,* has some account of the Manichaean dualism, and brackets Mani with Marcion and the Mesallians. Another fifth century historian, Lazar of Pharb, speaks of certain monks possessing the writings of various heretics who have been anathematized by the Church, among them the "slave Goumbrik (Curbicius) who changed his name to Mani." The Catholicos Hovhan Ostnetzi (d.728), writing against the Paulicians, charges them with having followed the seductions of Mani and Simon Magus, and in his writings against the Docetists brackets Mani with Valentinian and Marcion. Theodorus Kerthenavor, of much the same date, in controversy with certain contemporary Armenian theologians, brings in Mani's Docetic view of the incarnation. Grigor of Narek, in the tenth century, and St. Nerses Shnorhali, towards the end of the eleventh century, refer in passing to Mani as among the heretics.

Grigor Magistros, in the eleventh century, in several of his works connects heretical movements in the Armenian Church, rightly or wrongly, with Manichaean influences working in the community, and he knows that Manichees who had been driven from Greece and Asia Minor had settled at Amida.

The most famous of all the Armenian writers against the heretics, however, is Gregory of Tathev (Grigor Tathewatsi) of the fourteenth

century, who devoted a whole section of his *Book of Questions* to refuting the Manichees. This refutation is often referred to (cf. C. F. Neumann, *Versuch einer Geschichte der armenischen Literatur,* pp. 215, 216), but neither the 1729 nor the amended 1730 folios are easily available. With commendable zeal Terenig Poladian has sent to Jerusalem to the Library of the Armenian Monastery and had one of the clergy there copy out the relevant passages, which he has now translated into English and presents to interested students as a sample of what the polemic against the Manichees had become in the hands of the Armenians.

A. J.

II

AGAINST THE MANICHAEANS*

The Manichaeans say that there are two principles, Good and Evil: we answer them briefly as follows:

Firstly, the binary cannot be the origin, for in counting, the binary is composed out of the One. Therefore, the Creator exists before the creature.

Secondly, the binary is compounded, whereas the one is simple. All compounds are formed from the simple. Therefore, the binary, which is compounded, is not the Origin, but the One, which is simple.

Thirdly, if there were two principles opposed to each other, one would destroy the creations of the other, and thus there would not be any beings.

Fourthly, if there were two principles opposed to each other, they would war with one another at their very beginning, and nothing would be left in peace.

Fifthly, if there were two principles opposed to each other, their offspring would have been without order and in opposition. But, as it is, all beings are affectionately united together and are in proper order.

Sixthly, if there were any dissention among them, they would not be apart from our [nature], but would be in difficulty and opposition, as it is with us.

Seventhly, if there were two principles, they would be separate and

* Taken from Gregory of Tathev's *Book of Questions* (Constantinople, 1729), pp. 20-24.

simultaneous, or one would exist after the other. But they could not have been simultaneous, because two opponents cannot live together. If, however, one came to exist after the other, then it is evident that the former is the original.

Eighthly, if there are two principles, either they rule over each other or do not. If they do not rule, neither of them is God; but if they rule, then the one who rules is God.

Ninthly, if there are two principles, good and evil, they either communicate with each other or do not. If they do not communicate, then one of them is a being, and so there cannot be two origins. But, if they do communicate, evil cannot exist, because evil is the absence of good; and, therefore, One is the origin.

Tenthly, if there are two principles, the supreme good and the foremost evil, they either exist of themselves or do not. If they do not so exist, they are not principles; if they exist of themselves, then neither of them is evil, for existence of itself is good.

CONCERNING THE GOOD AND THE EVIL

First Question: How are the Good and the Evil in opposition?

Answer: There are four opposites: The *relative,* e.g., large and small; the *defective,* e.g., perfect and imperfect; the *anti-thetical,* e.g., hot and cold; and the *contradictory,* e.g., affirmative and negative.

Good and evil are not opposites as correlatives, because correlatives are co-existing and are composed of one another. But the good and the evil are not co-existent. The evil is not created by the good, nor the good from the evil. Nor are they like the affirmatives and the negatives, which are in opposition only in words, as true and false. Good and evil occur in words and deeds, but not antithetically, as warm and cold, white and black, for these are qualitative; whereas the good is an existence and the evil is not. They seem to be like perfection and imperfection, for the good is perfectness and the evil is the absence of it, as blindness of eyes and darkness are due to the absence of light; thus, they are distinguished. Imperfection is caused by the lack of perfection, but perfection is never caused by imperfection. However, one may turn from good to evil, or from evil to good.

And if someone says that the opposites change each other but not perfection and imperfection, we answer to this that the good and the evil are against each other as to the subject, but as to themselves, they are like perfection and imperfection, as we have pointed out.

Second Question: What is the function of good and evil?

Answer: The good is creative and providential, whereas the evil is destructive and corruptive. If the evil is corruptive, it corrupts wherever it is found and it also corrupts itself, which is evil. Therefore, it is not a being, and it cannot exist [of itself].

If someone says that evil is like the heat which transforms the cold and yet still persists, we answer to this that, although heat transforms the cold, yet it stays in the substance, for it is existence and quality. But the evil cannot so persist, because it is not existence, but imperfection.

Third Question: How can evil both exist and not exist, for it opposes the good, as in wickedness and virtue? Evil is in existence also, as, e.g., sickness in health, and corruption in the body.

We answer as follows: If evil is not existence, then it is not in beings, nor from beings, nor the origin of beings. Firstly, as has been pointed, evil is not existence and does not exist [of itself], for it is corruptive and destructive. In corrupting creatures it corrupts itself also, and so does not remain in existence. Likewise, evil is not in beings. We can prove this by division. There are things that exist and are good, as all beings. There are also things that do not exist but are good, as unqualitative substance. There are things that are not good, as the evil will, which does not exist, and is not good. Thus evil is outside of existence and outside of good.

Moreover, evil is not from the beings, for whatever is, exists and is good, and vice versa. "For every good tree bringeth forth good fruit," says the Lord. Matt. 7:17. Likewise, everything that is from beings has a beginning and a cause; whereas evil has neither a beginning nor a cause. Therefore, it is not from beings.

Furthermore, it is not the origin of beings, for there cannot be good from evil.

Secondly, evil is to be understood as twofold: The one, which is explicitly and totally evil of itself, is beyond good and existence; it is at no place and at no time; it was not, it is not, and cannot be, for it is nothing. This kind of evil has no place in existence; it is not in beings either; it has no beginning or cause, and it is not the origin of, or the cause of, other beings. This is evil in itself. Moreover, there is also evil intermingled with the good, which is created by beings; as, e.g., sickness in health, and corruption in the body; for when health declines, sickness appears, and when the body weakens, corruption occurs. And know

this, that in like measure, as the health declines, the illness increases; and, in like measure, as the body weakens, the corruption increases. But when the health is altogether impaired, illness disappears. Likewise, is corruption too. When life declines altogether, death disappears, for existence exists adversely. Such is the good also. There is the pure and the exclusive good, e.g., God, Who is unchangeable and always good, for He is naturally good, and Goodness is the essence of God. There is also the mixed good, as that which befalls us and which is habit, for our nature differs and the good differs in our nature. This sort of good is unchangeable and abundant in the angels, but it is changeable in us, for our souls are changeable, sometimes they are good and sometimes bad. But this varies too, for the good is our natural condition and we are created in good; while the evil is something intruded and is the absence of good. The good is One and is from one cause, which is God, although we have several kinds thereof. But the evil is many and originates from many causes.

Now let us answer to the question how evil opposes virtue, and injustice, justice, as darkness to the light. Light is existence, but darkness is not. The air is susceptible to light and darkness. The soul, likewise, is an existence and susceptible to good and evil, that is, to virtue and wickedness. As light is always light, although it diminishes in the air, but it is evident that it again gives out light; so the good is always good, although it diminishes in spirit, but nevertheless it is in existence, for the good is existence and it exists, and its nature does not perish. The evil, on the other hand, perishes when it is removed from the spirit, for the evil is not existence and does not exist [of itself]. Therefore, it is evident that the good is an existence in subject and in itself, while the evil appears and takes existence according to the subject and it perishes and corrupts by itself, for it is not an existence and does not exist [of itself].

Fourth Question: Since the evil is not an existence and does not exist, how does it differ from the non-being which is altogether nothing?

Answer: The non-existing evil which opposes the good, and the nothing which opposes being, are on a level. But they differ as follows:

First, non-being desires to be and to exist. But evil does not desire to be good.

Second, non-being communicates with the being and becomes a being. But evil does not communicate with the good, and does not become good.

Third, non-being in itself is neither good nor evil; evil in itself is evil, though good also.

Fourth, non-being when it comes into existence, does not change into nothingness; but evil appearing in existence is again transformed into nothingness and non-existence.

Fifth, non-being, as it is in substance, does not oppose being, though in itself it is in opposition. Evil appearing in substance, opposes and destroys the good, though in itself it is nothing and does not exist.

Fifth Question: How is the evil infinite and unlimited, and how also does it not have either beginning or cause?

Answer: We say that existence has beginning and cause. Likewise, nature has measure and limit. But evil is outside of existence and nature, and therefore it is infinite and causeless. Again, measure and limit are considered to be at the last end of existence, while beginning and cause are at the first. But the evil is nothingness and does not have any beginning or end. Therefore, evil is limitless and causeless, as was pointed out above.

Sixth Question: Since God is infinite and causeless, and evil in itself is causeless and infinite, how do they differ?

Answer: The attributes which refer to God as infinite and ineffable do not refer to imperfection but to transcendence, for God is more transcendent, causeless, and infinite than anything else. This is the first distinction.

Second, God is infinite, and He predestines us. He is without beginning, and originates us; He is also the cause [and possesses] all the other [attributes]. But evil is infinite in itself and does not predestine other creatures. This also holds true for the attributes of having no cause and having no beginning, and all other [attributes of God].

All other descriptions concerning good and evil you will find in four chapters "On the Divine Names" by Dionysius [the Areopagite], and in his "Predications on Antithetical Discourses," and also at the end of "Interpretations of David the Invincible," which is (Every evil is subject to suffering). So much for this.

TO THOSE WHO BELIEVE IN TWO GODS*

After these things we speak against those who say that there are many gods. Now let us speak to those who say that there are two gods, as the

* By Gregory of Tathev. From the seventh chapter of the book called *Oskeporik*, i.e., "a book of golden covering."

Manichaeans and those like them who are friends and neighbors of idolators, and even worse than them. However, the idolators worshipped many gods, but many of them professed one God, and said that all the other gods were born from Him. But the Manichaeans set forth Two Principles: one good, the other evil, neither one created by the other, but both eternal. First, it is necessary to indicate their testimony and answer them, and then show how empty their heresy is. They affirm their heresy in two ways: first, by logical contradiction; second, by the Biblical writings. Their contradictions are five:

First, they say that God was either able to make the corruptible incorruptible, but did not will to do so, or He was not able to make [the corruptible] incurruptible. If He could but did not will to do so, then He is envious. If He could not, then He is unable. Therefore, there is no good in that which is corruptible, and it is of the evil. The doctors [of the Church] answer that God was able to make [creatures] incorruptible but did not will it, not because of envy, but because of His wisdom. For he who does whatever he may will to do is foolish and a squanderer; but he who regulates his abilities is good.

It should be noted here that he who acts according to nature works as much as he can, as fire which heats as much as it can. But in the case of him who acts by free will, it is not necessary that he should work according to his power. So is the case with God, for goodness is from God who created all beings; but He created them corruptible according to His own wisdom for three causes: *first*, to reveal that they have an end and also a beginning, and that they are not created of themselves but by the Creator. Thus they make us know man.

Second cause: the world is very beautiful, for the creatures are different. This is to be explained in two ways. Firstly, the lyre has various strings, for if all the strings were the same, they would not produce beauty of sound. Secondly, the body has members; if the foot were as pretty as the eye, it would be beautiful, but it would not be good for the body. As Paul says, "If the whole body were an eye, where were the body?" (1 Cor. 12:17). Anything so noble, from the point of view of the world, as angels and heaven, is good for them, but would not be for the world. God, who provides in general for the world, first takes care of that which is common [to all], rather than of the particular. *Third cause*; whatever is upon the earth was created for man, and if these things were incorruptible, the heart of man would be closely bound to

them, and thus it would deviate from God. For this reason the doctors say: "O unclean world, despite the fact that thou art corruptible and transitory I still love thee; if thou wert lasting and eternal, what then would we do?" Now, we can overcome the Manichaeans with their own sword, for they say that the light and incorruptible [beings] are from the good God. We say that those things which were incorruptible, God was able to increase and make better, or He was not able; and if He were able and did not will it, then He was envious; and if He could not, then He was unable. Therefore, it is evident that their objection is void.

Third, many useless things are seen in the world which are not necessary to man and are harmful, such as the poisonous snakes and worms and other filthy animals. These, they say, are not created by the beneficent God, but by the evil and the harmful god. The doctors answer that there is nothing in the world that has no usefulness, though its utility may not be known. For example, from the snakes and harmful reptiles the physicians prepare useful medicines. If someone immoderately eats of that which is useful, such as wine and food, he will cause harm to himself. So in all things there is usefulness when moderation is maintained; on the other hand, the immoderate causes harm. The heat is necessary against the cold when it is moderately used; but it burns and causes harm when it is not properly used. Thus all things are useful to the world, though we do not know this, for three reasons. First, we believe that the Creator has not created anything useless. Second, we exercise our minds and pursue learning. Third, we retreat from our pride. For if we are weak in the knowledge of the creatures, how can we then comprehend God the Creator? The doctors say that all created things and beings are for different uses to man; some are for food, some for carrying loads, some for instructing us, as, for instance, the ants and the bees. Some are to punish us, and some are to humble us, such as the lice, the fleas and the flies which people cannot get rid of. If someone says something disagreeable to you, you get hurt and angry; why then can you not resist the fleas and the flies which keep you always restless? Thus, some are useful in odor, some in taste, some in appearance, some in color, some in voice. Therefore, it is evident that there is nothing useless in the world.

Fourth, in the world a great many things are seen which are full of sin and evil; for this reason [the Manichaeans] say that all creatures are evil. The doctors answer: All creatures are orderly. Plato says that there

is nothing in the world whose origin does not precede the very cause. Job writes, There is nothing upon the world which is without a cause. Even the small birds do not fall without the foreknowledge of God, says the Lord. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father" (Matt. 10:29). In like manner, Ecclesiastes says, "Neither say Thou before God, that it *was* an error, lest God be angry" (Eccles. 5:6). He also says, "If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and Justice in a province, marvel not at the matter: for he that is higher than the highest regardeth; and there be higher than they" (Eccles. 5:8). Therefore, whatever is good in the world God makes it according to His own will, and whatever is evil He allows it with justice and wisdom. But God regulates the existing evil in three appropriate ways: First, He punishes the sins of the wicked in order that the stain of sin might not be without proper revenge. Thus Judas is justly suffering in hell. Second, as the precious stone is obscure when in a golden ring, so when goodness is placed alongside of wickedness, it shows itself up beautifully. Just as the black color in itself is inornate, but in the art of painting it looks fine when it is placed at the proper place, in like manner evil in itself is filthy, but when placed in the world at the proper place, the world appears beautiful. Third, the evil of the wicked is for the advantage of the good. As Paul says, "We know that all things work together for good to them that love God" (Rom. 8:28). For this reason God created the demons, but they became malicious of their own will. God appointed them for the advantage of good, and before their creation God knew that much good would result from their evil. For this reason God creates evil from men and from demons. Therefore, the objection of the Manichaeans is vain, because whatever evil and disorder God allows upon the earth He brings all to order and limitation.

Fifth, they say that the cause is unchangeable; it is necessary then that the causer should be unchangeable, that God being unchangeable, we mortals are changeable and, therefore, they are not from the good God but from the evil. We say that these arguments are very weak, because, in general, it is not necessary that the causer in all things should be similar to the cause, which operates by a free will. For we see that the immoral artist paints a good picture, and the decent one, sometimes, paints a disagreeable picture. Again, their argument is against them,

for they say that the evil god is eternal and is the cause of the corruptibles which are temporal; therefore, the causer is not like the cause.

Sixth, they say that the causers are opposed to each other; it is necessary, then, that their causes be opposed. But the good and the evil are opposed to each other and, therefore, it is necessary that their causes be opposed. The good God is the cause of the good, and, therefore, the cause of the evil should be the evil god. Then they bring the testimony of Aristotle, who says that the principles necessarily should be opposed to each other. The doctors answer that this objection is greatly deficient, for their first reasoning does not hold true everywhere, because Aristotle understands cause in two ways: First, that which operates by its own nature without will and knowledge, as fire and water; in this way it is true when the causers are opposed to each other, as in making anything grow warm and cold; for in this it is necessary that the fire and the water should be opposed to each other.

The second refers to the operation with knowledge and will, which is, of course, not true; for one rational power rules over two opposed ones, as for example, an artist can paint a beautiful and an ugly picture, a black and a white one. For this reason St. Paul writes in Romans (9:21), "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?" This is the reason that by nature the cause operates, according to the kind of nature, and it is impossible that in one thing two kinds according to nature would be opposed to each other; in the same manner, two opposites cannot become the cause. But the intelligent cause operates through the mediation of spiritual ones; but the two natural opposites which the mind receives are not opposites. For example, the black and white by nature are opposed; therefore, if the good and the evil are opposed, it is not necessary that the first cause of these should be in opposition, but the two are possible from one cause. The statement of Aristotle does not help them, for Aristotle does not speak about the beginning of the first beings but about the beginning of nature, for he proves that there are three sources for our nature: Matter, Energeia, and Form. When matter loses one form, it receives another form. But for the first principle Aristotle affirms that there is one principle. Averroes says, He who considers the origin of the first beings in opposition is ignorant. So then Mani, who professes two first principles, has been very foolish.

But the second thing which they say, that the good and the evil are opposed, is not true, because the good and the evil are not two opposites, that is, like the black and white, but like perfection and imperfection. And this is the reason the two opposites have nature, as hotness and coldness, blackness and whiteness. But perfection and imperfection are not as such, for only perfection has nature, but imperfection does not; it is the absence of nature. Thus the good has nature; but the evil is not a nature but the absence of good. And if someone says that Aristotle in the ten categories says that the evil is the opposite of good, we say that Aristotle considers the opposites in a larger sense, in the place of perfection and imperfection. Since evil is nothing but the absence of good, it is not necessary to determine two first causes, one for the good and one for the evil. It is foolishness, then, to say that evil, which is imperfection, is a creator and first principle, for from good creatures it is possible for evil ones to arise; that is, through the free will of the rational creatures. The free will, which has been created by God, can do good and evil. For accordingly, being created by God, it is able to do good; but also, being created out of nothing, it can decrease and do evil, which is the absence of good.

The Manichaeans, because of wickedness, believed in two gods, for they did not understand what evil is. They thought that evil has nature in itself. But Dionysius writes that evil is not a nature, but absence of good. It should be noted that evil is twofold, one part is punishment and the other sin.

The first evil is from God, for it is assuredly not an evil to punish the sinner and the crime, though this work is of justice. Second, the evil is not created by sin, but by the creature who was created good, but became evil by its own will; in the same manner, the evil is caused by him. We can prove by example that it is possible to bring forth good and evil from all creatures. Walking upright and limping have one cause; they are the change from lying prone. But one can walk upright when he is healthy and has no defect, whereas limping is due to defect and sprain. Thus, the good and the evil are of free will; for this reason Isaiah (5:2) said, "And made a winepress therein: and he looked that it should bring forth grapes, and it brought forth wild grapes." Jeremiah (2:21) said, "I had planted thee a noble vine, wholly a right seed; how then art thou turned into the degenerate plant of a strange vine unto me?"

Once more we nullify in five brief judgments the arguments of the Manichaeans, who believe in two principles and in two gods: First, the binary cannot be the origin, for, in counting, the binary is composed of the One. Therefore, the Creator exists before the creature. Second, the binary is compounded, whereas the one is simple; all the compounds are formed from the simple. Therefore, the binary, which is compounded, is not the Origin, but the One is, which is simple. Third, if there were two principles against one another, they would war with one another from their very beginning, and nothing would be left in peace. Fourth, if there were two gods opposed to one another, one would destroy the creations of the other, and thus there would not be any beings. Fifth, if there are two gods, they either recognize each other or do not. If they do not recognize each other, then both are false. If they recognize each other, they do so either by the Form which they have (thus they are compounded in substance) and by the Form which they receive (which is contingency); or they do so by heavenly provision and its nature which approaches to it and fulfills it; and thus they are incomplete. For example, the eye sees the color and it also sees the light, but in another way; for it sees the color through the Form, because it takes the color from it. But it sees the light present by nature, for the essence of light is present in the eyes which perform the action. Thus, the eye which needs light and sight is imperfect. If, then, one god recognizes the other in a spiritual way or in a manner representing the essence, it is imperfect. Therefore, it is not God. So much against the Manichaeans. In this manner you will find the answers in the Book of Questions.

SCIENTIFIC WISH-THINKING

H. Heath Bawden

I

INTRODUCTION

The "loss" of a friend (if I really have lost him), together with reflections on some of the recent discoveries of science concerning the constitution of the universe, has set me thinking, and, in an attempt to communicate my thoughts, to writing this article. By a semanticist, this probably would be called an adventure with words or a semantic extrapolation, since it deals with our changed attitude toward change. I call it *scientific* wish-thinking because I have sought to make its presumptuous triangulations structurally conformable to the findings of 1945.

In this discussion I am trying to keep within the range of and-so-forth meanings. Semantics has shown us that meaning is much wider, deeper, and richer than the symbols which stand for it. The symbol is an articulate form, visible, audible, or tactual, which rarely, if ever, adequately represents the inarticulate content it seeks to communicate. It usually expresses some salient feature, often exaggerating one aspect of the content. The meaning of most words is more in the context than in the word itself. The meaning overflows the mere word or, rather, it flows in and out, around, above and below; it engulfs the word. The word swims out of the stream of the meaning to rest on the shore for a moment. Without the context the word is just a noise. It follows that words have as many meanings as there are contexts. They never have the same meaning twice; they can have only similar meanings.

A word is merely a hint, a clue. The meaning lies in the operations, the events, the facts, in a context of relationships. A symbol is a partial expression of this meaning, the adequacy of the expression depending upon the pictorial, the onomatopoetic or scientific character of the symbol. Reality is always richer than our knowledge of it. We feel it, experience it, in more immediate ways, long before we succeed in stating it in verbalized terms; and, even then, the statement always falls short of adequately representing what is stated. Meaning is a colloidal matrix within which words are transient crystalline precipitates. It envelops the word which seeks to express it, just as the processes of nature sur-

round and engulf our puny perceptions in the restricted area of our senses. It is with such considerations and in such a temper that I approach this subject.

Alfred Korzybski, in his *Science and Sanity,* distinguishes three levels of reality: the macroscopic level of our ordinary sense-perception; the microscopic, which is, of course, an extension of this same field by means of the magnifying power of lenses; and the sub-microscopic, which is a level or region of reality inferred from indubitable facts but not directly experienced. There is reason to suppose that it is this third realm that holds the solution of many mysteries that, so far, have baffled inquiry. Because the realities we do experience are continuous with those beyond our perception, we find the symbols which have their origin in the perceptive field inadequate when we seek to describe those other realities. Thus, when we seek to describe the activities of the spectrum outside the visual field, we have had to resort to such expressions as ultra-violet, infra-red, X-rays, etc., the inadequacy of which is obvious. The multi-ordinal abstractions of mathematics are serving the purposes of technical designation, but are far from satisfying the semantic demands for a meaningful description. Our efforts to grasp the activities of the sub-microscopic realm with the linguistic tools of our macroscopic world is a good deal like trying to dip up water with a sieve. Our words are too crude to express subtleties which even a mathematical symbolism finds it difficult to convey. The best we can do, therefore, is to so twist and tease our verbal symbols that at least some meaning may filter through to suggest what this world beyond is like. The words I shall be using here inevitably will seem inadequate, since the activities they seek to express are beyond the sphere of our ordinary apprehension. But this makes the inquiry truly an adventure in which, in spite of the linguistic rigidities and finalities, we seek to state certain facts in a dynamic instead of a static context.

II

CHANGE

For the ancient Greek philosophers and the medieval theologians the real was the immutable and eternal; change was a mark of unreality, illusion, and error. For modern science change is the fundamental fact we confront in nature. An object is a dynamic process, not a static substance. Even in mathematics invariables are postulates only. We were wisely told in medieval times that *ex nihilo nihil fit.* This was a negative

way of stating the modern doctrine that anything may undergo transformation, but it cannot be annihilated.

One of the difficulties we encounter in our effort to solve problems is that we regard some meanings as plastic, fluent, and transitive, whereas others we treat as fixed, final, and absolute. Illustrative are the two meanings: life and death. We recognize that the very nature of life is to be continually changing; life is growth. But death is treated, not as a process, like life, but as an event, indeed as a concluding event of the process of living.

The physiologists tell us that death is a process of dying, just as life is a process of living. The curve of vitality is highest in infancy and gradually declines throughout the life period. In other words, dying is a lifelong process coextensive with living. Dead cells are daily sloughed from the epidermis or discarded through the eliminative outlets; we clip away horny tips from our toe and finger nails; we get a haircut. Internally as well as externally, living cells are crowding out the dying cells; that is, dying is a continual concomitant of living. Watch a wound heal. See the cicatricial tissue throw bridges across the raw surface, while the dead and dying cells are shoved aside or eaten up by the fighting phagocytes. Life moves forward as the scavenger microbes help the sulfa powders clear away the dead.

One might conjecture that, since in living we are always in the process of becoming something different, and since dying is a lifelong process—the obverse side of living—then dying also is a phase of becoming something different, the so-called natural death (from disease or old age), death by accident or bomb explosion, and the funeral rites of interment or cremation, being but dramatic macroscopic moments in the total sub-atomic world-process involved.

III

ORGANISM AND ENVIRONMENT

A great biologist has said: "The organism is inexplicable without environment. Every characteristic of it has some relation to environmental factors. And particularly the organism-as-a-whole, i.e., the unity and order, the physiological differences, relations, and harmonies between its parts, are entirely meaningless except in relation to an external world."[1]

1. C. M. Child, quoted by Stuart Chase in *Tyranny of Words*, p. 30.

If the organism and the environment cannot be separated structurally, neither can they be separated functionally. A misconception of the nature of the individual is largely responsible for our confusion when we face the facts of that transformation we call dying. As Clarence Luther Herrick once remarked: "It is said that nature cares naught for the individual, but only for the species. Then identify yourself with the species." In other words, by a semantic clarification of the meaning of the term "individual organism" we find that we have to include the very things we have been excluding from our conception of it.

We call the death of the organism the moment when breathing, the heartbeat, and other bodily movements cease. But this does not mean that all interactions with the environment cease. On the contrary, processes of chemical change, oxidation, evaporation, decomposition, dessication, continue to take place. A lifeless organism is soon taken over by countless bacteria and other microscopic creatures which hasten the process of decay—and all this, of course, continues to be an interplay of energies of the outside environment with those within the disintegrating protoplasm of what we once called the living creature. Change, transformation, interaction does not cease; it never ceases, so far as we know. It only takes place on a different level or in accordance with a different chemical-physical formula. We are accustomed to say that, in the case of the death of an organism, the transformations take place on a lower level. But, as semantics would say, we must not be misled by such terms. For science there is no higher and lower—only simple and complex, mechanical, chemical, electronic, crystalline, colloidal, magnetic, radionic, etc. The simple is not necessarily on a lower plane, nor is the complex necessarily on a higher plane. Lower and higher, like other valuations, for science always go back to the facts. Death is not the end of anything, except as you arbitrarily set a limit to the process of change we call living and dying. It is natural, of course, because of our absorption in the immediate organic activities of our loved ones, that the cessation of these macroscopic activities in that episode we call death, should have a finality for us which obscures their deeper ramifications in the invisible and impalpable world. Furthermore, we must remember that function or behavior is not restricted to the movements and attitudes of the organism itself, but includes the extra-organic extensions of these, and that these extensions certainly survive the death of the body. Obviously, therefore, personality survival is not dependent upon the

particular physiological configuration we have come to associate with the identity of the "dead" person. "Where, then, is the limit of the self?" asked Clarence Luther Herrick. He replied:

> It is not for me to draw it. I will not cut the narrow isthmus of flesh which connects me with my twin—the universe. The ancients believed that the eye shot out rays to grasp the objects of the visual world. What tentacula has not modern science produced extending from all our organs to the phenomenal world! But if we may not define the outer limits of the individual life, do we not destroy individuality? Only seemingly, for we need not despair of locating its center because the periphery of its sphere of activity is indeterminate. . . . In so far as our life as a whole fits into the complicated pattern of the universal life it will be imperishable. Maimed and crippled, it may be, we crawl over the threshold of one world into the fresh glory of another, but if the life be really there, it will have no difficulty in assimilating to itself a body fit for its use.[2]

IV

FUNCTIONAL PATTERNS

A study of evolution suggests that useful structural patterns do not perish. They are incorporated into the progressive organization of an unfinished world. Human personality is the most complex product of evolution to date. Because of the structural complexity involved in extra-organic evolution, this pattern of activity is registered somewhere in the sub-microscopic world, in some kink or twist of the space-time continuum, some wave-packet or beknottedness of the encompassing plenum. Even science knows so little about this Hinterland that these words suggest rather barren and sketchy concepts, but someday it will have more to say on this subject. Meanwhile, we know of the existence of this world every time we snap on the electric light, turn on the radio, look upon our internal organs by means of the X-ray. The electric eye, radar, infra-red and ultra-violet rays, cosmic rays, are ample evidence of a world of energies we are only beginning to understand.

Anything that survives the death of an individual which can be attributed to what we call the influence of that individual upon his environment (especially upon his fellow humans) is properly conceived as a manifestation of the functional pattern that is his personality. We must not be misled by the misuse of words into supposing that such

2. Cited from an unpublished manuscript written shortly before his untimely death.

influence is not as genuine a fact as, say, a painting, a bridge, or a book which he produced. If what we call his "influence" in the social environment continues to exist, then the functional pattern has not ceased. And since function is the persistent realization of a particular type of structure, then that structure must exist also—if no longer visibly and palpably in the macroscopic world, then invisibly and impalpably in the world beyond even the electron microscope.

The ordinary assumption is that the most complex organizations are the most unstable and therefore transient. But the very opposite may be true. The more complex an organization, the greater is the range of its relationships and, consequently, the less dependent is it upon any single relation for its continued existence. The very complexity of the human individual may be one of the best arguments for believing in his survival of what is called bodily death.

V

SUB-MICROSCOPIC STRUCTURE

The implication of what has been said so far, is that a sub-microscopic structure remains, even when the macroscopic and microscopic phenomena visible to the naked eye and under the magnifying lens collapse. In other words, there is very much more to our structure and function than the small part which is visible to us. When, accordingly, the visible structure and function disintegrate in what we call death, it is legitimate for us to suppose that the larger part of our structure and function continues on the invisible plane as before.

When a person dies this means that the partial view we have had of him through our limited senses is no longer possible; but it does not mean that the vastly greater part that we never have been able to see is not still there. What we know through our senses about any object, event, act, or person is always a very small part of what is there to be known. Science at last has found this out for us. It has shown us that of the world of activities about us we get only partial glimpses, because of the limitations of our sense organs. We hear only a certain range of sound vibrations; the skin is sensitive to distinct mechanical vibrations to only a limited extent; the eye is responsive to only a narrow band of electro-magnetic vibrations in the spectrum, missing completely ultra-violet, infra-red, X-rays, gamma rays, and cosmic rays.

Each event, each object, each act, has its roots in a sub-microscopic realm of world energies, and is the synthetic product of interactive forces operating in accordance with laws we are only beginning to understand. The ultimate elements which enter into their structure science describes in two ways: as quanta or discrete units, and as waves or pulsations in a continuum or plenum which, to avoid metaphysical implications, is called Space-Time. This space-time is not a void with a few objects and events scattered about in it, but a plenim replete with whatever it is that constitutes reality, operations taking place by contact, not by a mysterious action-at-a-distance, as Isaac Newton conceived it.

Events, objects, acts, in a world thus conceived are the product of the interaction of quanta or pulsations at what are called the intersections of world-lines. What all this means in detail the mathematical physicist someday, no doubt, will tell us, but what is important for our present consideration is the fact that these events, objects, acts, consist and subsist in this dynamic continuum of the sub-microscopic world. Whatever we are in this macroscopic and microscopic world, is but a partial glimpse of what we really are in the world beyond our sense-perception which science is beginning to construct for us inferentially from facts we cannot see, but of which we have indubitable proof. Each one of us is an iceberg floating in an ocean of nature's energies, with nine-tenths of our structure submerged and only conjecturally known. Or, to change the figure, we are island-peaks of a submerged mountain chain whose invisible subterranean connections are the most important fact of our structure.

In the absence of our ability to perceive the underlying structure of our being, it is perhaps natural that we should mistake the partial view disclosed by our senses for the whole truth, in spite of the fact that, upon the mere sense plane, the mysteries of the emergence and disappearance of the individual human personality remain unexplained. We know that at death the macroscopic and microscopic aspects of the self are transformed, but there is no reason to believe that the sub-microscopic reality is affected thereby. It is even possible that this sub-microscopic self may take on new forms unperceivable in the range of our sense-perception, but, to creatures with a different gamut of senses, as objectively real as we are to each other in our five or twenty sense world. Doubtless the sub-microscopic energies that flow in upon us from the surrounding universe are laden not only with the knowledge but with the feel and

thrill of the personalities of our ancestors, if we only had the technique for translating it into terms of our restricted perceptions.

It would take more than a stick of dynamite or a TNT bomb to destroy a personality pattern of this sort. When one of those invisible wind-twisters comes gyrating over the desert, it gathers up the leaves and even sucks the sand and soil into its vortex until it becomes as visible as a waterspout on the ocean. But soon it lifts again; the sand and leaves drop out, and it passes away, still a vortex, but no longer visible. So in the case of what we call death: the functional pattern passes on into invisibility, but the fugitive protoplasm, like the leaves, is left behind.

VI

RECONSTRUCTION

Thirty years ago a medical expert put a fragment of chicken-heart in a nutritive solution to discover how long it could be kept alive. It is still pulsating. Is it too much to hope that some day science will develop a technique whereby life in an organism may be sustained at any age the individual prefers, or even run the gamut of the seven ages of man? Then he will have a future life based in fact. And, in the light of our present knowledge of electronics, radionics, and sub-atomic physics, it does not seem impossible that some day we will be able to reconstruct the personalities of those we speak of as dead.

Science tells us that every happening is registered somewhere in the sub-microscopic cosmos. Not a sparrow falleth to the ground but the sub-atomic mechanism makes a note of it. A mnemic causation in nature makes certain that nothing of value is lost. It enters into the structure of an evolving universe. Pithecanthropus erectus, homo Pekinesis, Aristotle, Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, are all there, imperishable personality patterns, engraven not merely in the memories of men, but in the very structure of the world itself. And someday, when a biological technology arrives, we may shake hands with all of them.

How this will take place is no more of a mystery than our present sciences of electronics and radionics. If we can invoke the electro-magnetic pulsations of our solar system to send symphonies and news bulletins around the world and, by means of the cinema and television, see the President addressing Congress and hear the words from his lips even before they reach the ears of his audience, it is not beyond the range of possibility that someday we will reawaken into life the sleeping

potentialities we call our dead ancestors. No disease, no accident, no bomb-shell, has destroyed the patterns they have imprinted upon a dynamic system of four-dimensional co-ordinates. Structurally a dynamic system can absorb an indefinite number of impressions without their conflicting with one another, and, on occasion, reproduce them in perfect detail. It is merely a matter of the technique of handling electro-colloidal complexes, which will be as familiar to us as our present knowledge of electro-magnetic motorization. We may share again in the lives of our departed when, through science, we shall have risen to the level of their present existence. Hypnosis, hyperaesthesia, dreams, visions, hunches, and what has been called telepathy and clairvoyance, may possibly be the presages of an electronic-coloidal technology that will enable us, not perhaps to hear the angels sing, but to touch again the vanished hand and hear again the voice that is still.

This isn't merely the fanciful idea of a wish-thinker. There is evidence that every past experience has been registered somewhere in some way. When I can't remember the zoological term for the classification of the turtles, along with the other groups of reptiles, I try hard to recall the name of the turtle class as I once knew it when I taught zoology. I keep rummaging around in my memory for the word. I go over the other groups of the reptiles: the Ophidia, the Lacertilia, the Crocodilia, but my mind is a blank when it comes to the Latin term for the turtles. I look it up in my abridged dictionary. It isn't there. I can't find it in my Latin lexicon. I have no zoology book at hand. At last I just postpone the whole matter until I can go to the library and consult a technical treatise on the subject. I retire for the night and fall asleep. But during the night I wake up and, to my astonishment, the word is there before me as if it had been there all the while. Chelonia, of course, the turtle group. I am reminded of what William James said: One worries and worries trying to remember until one gives up trying and reconciles one's self to the disappointment of having forgotten when, all at once, "it comes sauntering in as if it had never been sent for."

It was registered there in the structure of the organism all the time. It only required certain changes of conditions to release it, reproduce it, reconstruct it in consciousness, as we say. Now, of course, this registering of a past impression is not a matter merely of a nerve-current, a permeable cell-membrane, a vasomotor reflex, a vitamin or a hormone. It goes deeper than that, involving the electronic, the radionic, the

dynamic sub-microscopic world of energy of which we are but transitory manifestations. Everything that has ever happened is registered in that cosmic Hinterland and someday, when mankind spends its billions on scientific research instead of on destructive warfare, we will discover the technique of reconstruction and reincarnation of these allegedly past events. For they are not gone forever; every so-called past event is a part of the organized background of present experience.

The things we do and feel and think--these are activities which spring from sources that root deep in the sub-atomic realm and, probably, like other activities in the dynamic system, go on endlessly into the future playing their part in evolution. The same, of course, must be true of the doings, feelings, and thinkings of our ancestors from the remotest beginnings of our race. They and we never die; we go on forever, in a universe that is ever present in all times and places.

VII

THE TIME CATEGORY

In addition to all that has been said, there is the consideration of the time category. For this one perhaps should have the background of an Einsteinian physicist, and all that I write here is subject, of course, to the corrections of such an expert.

What seems to be happening out there in the stellar depths tonight, as I gaze upon the galaxies scattered about in the heavens, really happened a million or more years ago, because it has taken that long for the light rays carrying the information to reach our eyes. If there are star-gazers out there looking at the star we call our sun, what they see tonight also happened a million years ago in our solar system. What we call Here and Now for them is a remote There and Then, and their million-year old Then is what we see now in the heavens. In other words, as Einstein has shown us, everything is constantly changing--even space and time. Any particular place or time I call Here and Now is itself undergoing transformation from moment to moment, not only because I myself am continually changing, but because the very spot I stand on is in motion, because of the daily turning of the earth on its axis, its yearly revolution about the sun, and the cosmic drift of the solar system toward the constellation Hercules.

The Einsteinians tell us, also, that simultaneity is a meaningless concept, since we do not know just when the impulse started by a stimulus

reaches the cortical center by the devious pathways and sub-stations of the human nervous system. Everything that happens to us is the past becoming present, since every stimulus originated at least a moment ago and, according to science, in an indefinite series of other stimulations which preceded it. Every perception is the awareness of something that either has just happened or that, as in the case of the star, happened sometime in the more or less remote past. We never experience the present. What we call the present is really a little piece of the past. It takes an appreciable time for a stimulus to reach our experiencing center in the cortex, and by the time it has reached that point it is already a past event. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as the present so far as our experience goes. The so-called present in which we live is the past pouring in upon us in touch, taste, odor, sound waves, and the electro-magnetic pulsations that make visual perception possible. Electronic, radionic, thermal, actinic, chemical, cosmic rays, rain in upon us constantly out of a dynamic scintillating universe.

If there is no such thing in exact science as the present, made up as it is of bits of the past, we can only approximate its meaning when we say that our present is a million years in the future for the star-gazer out there, and that the light which reaches us from there started on its journey a million years ago. And all the intervening stars are sending their messages at intermediate time rates out of a past of multitudinous events beyond our imagination to conceive.

Moses, Confucius, Akbar, Socrates, the mother of Jesus, Florence Nightingale, Susan B. Anthony, the Unknown Soldier, we say, have passed away, but not for those star-gazers who are just now receiving the informing rays that started thousands, hundreds, or scores of years ago. For them these leaders of mankind are in their prime, making their great contributions to humanity. If we could only read the contents of the pulsations that reach us from the stellar depths, we too might be living in a past teeming with events of untold significance. All we need to incorporate the past into our present is to learn to read the rays that rain in upon us from an environing cosmos. Sickness and death, final farewells, and the loneliness of separation from our loved ones, would no longer sadden our lives, for the dear departed would always be with us. Their lives and ours would be one—in a space-time which carries the whole of the past as its present content.

Somewhere in this universe everything that has ever happened is now

happening, because of the relativity of space-time. All that is necessary to recover the past is to go to the point where that past is present. This is a problem for science to solve. It is a question of method, which is the intentional redirection of action, of change, of transformation. Einstein has shown us that space-time is not an irreversible series. Any space is here or there, any time is now or then, depending on the frame of reference. All we need to bring the past into our present is to redirect the interactions we call nature in a new frame of reference. By means of the spectroscope we learn something about the temperature and the mineral constituents of the stars. Maybe to a science of the future these rays from the cosmic depths will pour forth into a stricken, war-torn world unthinkable riches from other worlds which use their science for other purposes than to bomb their civilization into ruins.

This is wish-thinking, yes. But it is scientific wish-thinking, grounded in facts—not primitive magic, anthropomorphic folk-lore, or emotional compensation. It is speculation grounded in scientific principles. If the doctrine of relativity teaches us anything, it teaches us that the past is not dead; it is not gone forever; it is present with us, if we could only learn to use it. Nothing is dead. Death, semantically, is a term like "empty space," or "mere duration," or an "absolutely absolute absolute." There is no such thing. There is only change, transformation. And it is within our power by scientific method to reconstruct the past so that it becomes an integral part of the living present. As R. B. Haldane has put it in his *Pathway to Reality,* "It is not by setting up a beyond, but by breaking down the false and hard-and-fast semblance of reality in the present, that we solve the problem that confronts us."

VIII

CONCLUSION

I recognize that I have been handling some abstractions of a high order in a rather adventurous fashion, but life itself is an adventure, and when, as in this World War Number Two, we confront death on every hand, nothing is too adventurous if it throws any light on a fact that has baffled even the religionists and the will-to-believers. The referents in the case of these abstractions are rather tenuous—not because they are not objectively real, but because man, even with his age-long experiments with words has not yet succeeded in making a vocal gesture that will serve as an adequate symbol for the elusive happenings of a sub-

microscopic realm. But it is just these tenuous but powerful referents which, from the depths of a cosmic space-time plenum, operate our technological civilization.

Bryant, the poet, did not have our scientific background when he wrote "Thanatopsis," but what thrilling new meaning we can read into "that mysterious realm."

> "So live, that when thy summons comes to join
> The innumerable caravan, which moves
> To that mysterious realm, . . . sustained and soothed
> By an unfaltering trust, approach thy grave
> Like one who wraps the drapery of his couch
> About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams."

DIVINE KINGSHIP IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST: A REVIEW ARTICLE

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ONE OF THE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES which confronts students of ancient religion, and especially of ancient Oriental religion, is that of recapturing the categories of thought which inform ancient and primitive myth and ritual. We are apt to squeeze them into modern molds, or to view them through the prism of extraneous cultures and experiences. We substitute translation for penetration. We turn the *ilu* of the Semite into a "god," and thereby unload upon him the accumulated weight of our own alien theologies; or, as anthropologists, we blithely squeeze the practices of Assyrian, Canaanite, and Hittite into patterns derived from observation of Hottentot, Blackfoot, and Bantu.

Nowhere, perhaps, is this tendency more apparent than in recent studies of divine kingship in the Ancient Near East—a subject all the more important because so much of ancient Oriental religion revolves around the person and function of the tribal chief. We speak nonchalantly of "divine kingship," without for a moment realizing that by so doing we are committing the initial error of petitio principii, if not of positive distortion. For we are not really operating with either kingship or divinity, but with entities and categories of another and peculiar order; and instead of understanding and explaining them, we are trying, albeit unconsciously, to accommodate their real essence and character to the implications of our own inadequate translations or approximations. It is this basic error of method that appears to invalidate the general thesis of Dr. Ivan Engnell's recent work on divine kingship in the Ancient Near East;[1] and since his work exemplifies a common trend and tendency, a detailed examination of it may perhaps provide a useful opportunity for criticism and re-evaluation of standard approaches to the problem.

1. *Studies in Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East.* By Ivan Engnell. Uppsala: Almquist och Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1943. xvi, 249 pp.

Dr. Engnell's main contention in this book is, that in the civilizations of the Ancient Near East, the king was a duplicate or replica of the god, and, as such, embraced in his character and functions the twin aspects of a remote, celestial high god, and of a more immediate vegetative force. He possessed, that is to say, the characteristics of Ra' or Shamash on the one hand, and of Osiris or Tammuz on the other. If he was an embodiment of supernal majesty and power, he was also the agent and vehicle of communal life, the transmitter and steward of his people's corporate existence. Qua king, he was of divine descent or adoption, and his functions fell into a standard pattern designed both to ensure succession and to maintain the continuance of his group. Dominant elements of this pattern were the periodic celebration of a "sacred marriage" (the offspring of which became the heir to the divine kingship); the waging of an annual or periodic combat against the forces of death and blight; the suffering of an annual or periodic passion and resurrection. Some of these elements underwent transformations and transmutations in the course of time; the periodic combat might become historicized and be construed as the commemorative re-enactment of an actual victory in the past, while, in the performance of the passion, the role of the king might be filled by an inferior "stand-in," by an animal substitute, or even by such symbolic acts as the felling of a tree.

In support of this thesis Dr. Engnell examines in detail the literature and religious usages of the Egyptians, Hittites, Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Canaanites, paying special attention to the poetic texts discovered at Ras Shamra (ancient Ugarit) in North Syria. He finds that the king is everywhere described in terms also used of the god; that the ceremonies at his installation and the regalia with which he is invested are intended to symbolize his divine character; that he exercises ritual functions which correspond to those of the god; and that many of the so-called "myths" of the ancient Near East (notably the Ras Shamra documents) are really cult-texts reflecting elements in the pattern of ritual acts ceremonially performed by the king, principally at the celebration of festivals. The demonstration of this last point forms the main theme of the volume.

There can be no doubt that Dr. Engnell has produced a careful and well-documented review of the existent material, and that he has pressed into service almost everything that might tend to support or illustrate

his hypothesis. But the basic contention seems to this reviewer to rest upon several fundamental errors of method. In the first place, Dr. Engnell fails to realize that the reason why the characters of king and god run parallel is not because the former reproduces, or is patterned after, the latter, but because both belong to the common category of the numinous, and are not clearly differentiated. To the ancient Semite, for instance, the term *ilu* comprehended far more than we understand by the term "god"; it included *genius* as well as *deus*—such numinous beings as spirits, demons, jinns, afrits, the dead, etc., besides cosmic, supernal powers ("gods") like Hadad, lord of the storm, Shamash, 'Anat or 'Ashtareth. Accordingly, since the king was a numinous being (as the vessel and steward of communal life), there was no such sharp dichotomy between *ilu* and king as there is today between god and king; both were of the same class, and such similarity as they manifest should not be explained as due to transference of traits from one category to the other. This does not mean, of course, that there was no distinction between the various species of the genus *ilu;* it means only that all of those species shared certain generic traits in common, and that these are often sufficient to account for similarities.

The second general weakness of Dr. Engnell's thesis likewise results from the assumption that similarities between god and king are due to transference or "conferment." He implies consistently that when the king functions in the capacity of a Shamash or a Tammuz, this is because the characteristics of a distinct supernal god—Shamash or Tammuz—have been conferred upon him by divine adoption, consecration, or the like. In the reviewer's opinion, this is a serious error. What we have in such cases is a genuine duplication, not a transference. The king —as the English word implies (*kyn-ig, könig, king*)—is the "type-man" of the group, the focus and quintessence of its corporate life and existence. But he symbolizes, or incarnates, only the living entity of his contemporaries—the milieu of the immediate here and now. The group, however, is (at least, theoretically) perpetual and continuous; not only does it live in the present, but it has lived in the past and will live in the future. That continuum likewise possesses its focus and quintessence, and this is the local *genius*—the god. The king is therefore but an avatar of a continuous, perpetual being; but as such he is its real incarnation, and his divine qualities are inherent, not conferred. In other words, the

king is not merely exercising the functions of the god; he *is* the god in his immediate, as distinct from his continuous aspect.

The conception may seem rarefied, but that is only because the modern student of religion has perforce to squeeze primitive ideologies into contemporary categories of expression, and in so doing he must needs have recourse to patterns and concepts which are really inappropriate and misleading. However, once the basic idea is seized, the reviewer believes that it will help considerably to clarify many aspects of ancient religious thought and practice, and not least those discussed by Dr. Engnell. It will then be appreciated that the relationship between the king and the local type of god set the pattern for that between the king and the cosmic type of god. If, as his immediate avatar, the king could incarnate the perpetual local *genius*, he could in the same way incarnate any of the perpetual cosmic powers, e.g., the sun. Hence, when he is described as a Shamash or Ra'—and where this is not purely honorific exaggeration—what we have is simply a relic of the primitive notion that he is the contemporary embodiment of the perpetual deity. There is no question of actual "transference" or "conferment" of divinity.

A third objection to Dr. Engnell's thesis lies in his failure to realize sufficiently that the conception of kingship in the Ancient Near East was neither monolithic nor consistent in all its parts. If in some aspects the king was the bestower or transmitter of life, in others he was the representative, "type" or epitome of those who received it. It is, therefore, a serious error of method to explain all of the functions and ceremonies in which he was involved as orientated from the former standpoint; many in fact reflected the latter, *and were really nothing more than ceremonial "typifications" of rites which were being performed at the same time by the entire community which he represented.* It is, for instance, unnecessary—if not definitely wrong—to assume, with the majority of modern scholars, that when the king performed the rite of the "sacred marriage" he was functioning as the bestower of life upon his people, or seeking to perpetuate his divine dynasty. An equally valid (if not better) explanation is that the ceremony in question merely "typified" that ritual mass-mating in which whole communities so commonly indulge at harvest festivals in order to promote fertility. Similarly, when the king suffered an annual or periodic "passion," he should not be regarded as having died and been revived *for* his people, but

with them. The corporate life, being vouchsafed in a series of annual or periodic leases, passes through a regular cycle of eclipse and renewal. At the end of each lease, the entire community is in a state of death (symbolized by pre-harvest "Lents" and periods of quasi-mortification); subsequently it revives and is re-invigorated. The "passion" of the king merely typifies this communal experience, and it is therefore a mistake to cite it as evidence of the king's function as life-bringer. For several years the reviewer has been collecting material to prove that the part played by the king in the seasonal festivals largely duplicates that played by the entire community; and on the strength of that material (drawn from many cultures) it seems safe to assert that in such ceremonies the king functions, to a major extent, as a typification of the community and not as its superior benefactor. Dr. Engnell's deductions from this type of material are, therefore, open to serious question.

A fourth objection to Dr. Engnell's argument derives from his unfortunate tendency to confuse comparison with identification. Rarely does he look for the obvious tertium quid. Thus, when the Sumerian king Shulgi is likened to "a date-palm planted by the water-ditch," the expression is adduced (p. 28) as evidence that the king was regarded "as possessor and giver of the water of life"! But, surely, the tertium quid of the comparison is simply the notion of thriving luxuriance, of *flourishing,* the image being the same as in Psalm 1:3: "He shall be as a tree planted by streams of water," etc. Similarly, such a name as the Sumerian *Lugal-u-še-me,* "the-king-is-an-aromatic-plant," is scarcely an affirmation of the fact that he was regarded as the personified tree of life! (If my love is like the red, red rose, she is surely not a divinized personification of *Rosa vulgaris.*) Again, when the reign of Adad Nirari III is described as being "like a plant of life to the people of Asshur," does this imply that "the king is here identified with the herb of life"? Might we not say analogously in English that "his rule was *a tonic*"? It is no doubt true that poetic metaphor often enshrines relics of more primitive thinking, but Dr. Engnell is scarcely justified in forcing a literal, "cultic" meaning upon all such verbal imagery. And it is to be feared that, by so doing, he weakens rather than strengthens his case. At best, the factor of otiose survival cannot be so completely ignored; every time we used the word "tawdry" we are not thinking of St. Audrey!

Dr. Engnell's over-enthusiasm also leads him, at times, to take for

granted the very thing he ought to be proving. Thus, in discussing the fact that Hittite sources nowhere indicate that "the aim or the result of the installation [of the crown prince] is a divinisation or the renewal thereof," he immediately adds:

> But we need on the other hand not doubt the direction into which the comprehensive comparative material concerning this rite points. Considering the Hittite conditions in the light of their Near Eastern environment, it can scarcely be too hazardous, then, to assume such a divinisation (pp. 58 f.).

It can scarcely be too hazardous to assume that rarely has there been so glaring an example of petitio principii.

Half of Dr. Engnell's book is devoted to a detailed study of the Canaanite texts from Ras Shamra (Ugarit), in which he endeavors to find reflections of the sacral kingship. Following the lines laid down by the reviewer in 1933, and since developed by others (notably by Scandinavian scholars like Pedersen and Hvidberg), the texts are interpreted *culticallly*, that is, as cult-dramas reflecting and embodying actual ceremonies and usages at festivals. Typical of this approach are the following words:

> The texts are obviously just a "taking down" of a cult drama in ancient Phoenicia-Canaan. It is (*sic*!) a writing down of words and actions, as they occurred at the festival in which the world was created and experienced "salvation." It is "the programme of the play" (Gronbech) we have before us. It reproduces "history as it really happened, *viz.*, as it was enacted on the ceremonial stage during the festival" (Gronbech). . . .
>
> As to the motifs of the drama, they are properly the agricultural functions: the death of Al'iian Ba'lu representing the dying off of vegetation, the death of Mot: the harvest; the building of the temple and its culmination in the opening up of the roof shutter: the rain; the triumph of Al'iian Ba'lu: the return and victory of vegetation the ἱερὸς γάμος festival: copulation and parturition, i.e., the occurrences of the day from the viewpoint of the farmer, but raised into the sphere of immortality as eternal and dynamic (pp. 102 f.).

This, it may be added, is the view which the reviewer has consistently maintained when he has spoken of the texts not only as the *libretti* of sacred dramas, but also as myths projected from ritual. Dr. Engnell appears to misunderstand this view by assuming that what is meant by the latter expression is a literary story suggested by ritual practice. Such, however, is not the sense in which the words "myth" and "projected" were used. To the reviewer, "myth" is the spoken or written expression of the ritual pattern—not merely the collection of words which accom-

pany the several rites, not merely the liturgy and not merely the spoken explanations, but the consistent "tale" in which the totality of ceremonies are comprehensively ratiocinated and the theme of which forms the articulate expression of the "ritual pattern."

In his exposition of the various texts Dr. Engnell seems to this reviewer to indulge in far too much fanciful speculation. The sacral kingship becomes something of a King Charles' head, and the plain meaning (where, indeed, it can be made out) is too frequently distorted in order to find latent "cultic" significance. This amounts to reading *into* the texts instead of *out* of them. A case in point is the explanation of the text usually called BH. Fragmentary and difficult as it is, all scholars agree that it describes how Baal went out hunting and was set upon by demoniacal monsters. Apparently, he was left to lie in a swamp (?), suffering a malarial infection, until rescued. The text says that "he fell like a bull" (ii, 54-5), and it concludes with certain obscure lines in which mention is made of the king in connection with the exercise of judgment. On the strength of these slender allusions, Engnell concludes that "the only possible explanation of our passage is . . . that we have before us an expiatory sacrifice, where the god-king, substituted by a bull, brings about the atonement by his 'vicarious suffering' " (p. 127). It should be observed, however, that the expression "fall like a bull" recurs in Classical literature as denoting no more than a heavy fall; cf. Odyssey, vi, 535: ὥς τις τε κατέκτανε βοῦν ἐπὶ φάτνῃ; Ovid, *Met.* v, 122: *praecubuit terrae mactati more juvenci.* Moreover, Engnell's translation of the obscure concluding lines (II, 57-62), on which likewise he bases his argument, is actually untenable:

ittpq can scarcely mean "I pay heed," nor can *lm tthn* be rendered "over them thou art established," since this would require *'lhm tštkn*. Furthermore, if *mšlt bt hrš* denotes "the roof of the craftsman's house," it is probable that the parallel *qr bt il* means "rafter (Heb. *qorāh*) of the temple" rather than "fount of the house of El."

Dr. Engnell's construction of this text therefore rests on extremely dubious premises.

Scarcely more successful is the attempt to find traces of the sacral kingship in the co-called *Poem of the Birth of the Gracious Gods.* Here it is similarly introduced by misconstruing two crucial passages. The first occurs in the opening prologue (line 7) where a blessing of peace is in-

voked upon the votaries in the words, "May peace (*šlm*) reign! May peace truly reign!" Taking the word *šlm* as the name of a god (Shalem), Dr. Engnell at once concludes: "here the implication of the whole thing is revealed: Šalem's taking over the royal dignity" (p. 131)! In the second passage—a prelude to the scene of the sacred marriage—two maidens are said to offer themselves to "El and his *'lm*" (lines 46, 49). Here Dr. Engnell explains the phrase as "a *hendiadyoin* . . . implying a unity of *Il* (El) and *'lm*, 'the god and his servant,' 'the servant of god' —i.e., the king." (*ibid.*) But the word for "servant" is *ǧlm*, not *'lm*, which means "eternity," the phrase meaning simply that the women offer their services "to El and his eternity," i.e., "to El for all time."

In the *Story of Aqhat (Dn'il)* Dr. Engnell also seeks to discover allusions to the sacral kingship; and here again his conclusions appear to depend upon doubtful exegesis. The reviewer will shortly present a new analysis of this text elsewhere, so that only brief comment is here needed. Dr. Engnell lays emphasis on a passage (II, vi) in which the goddess 'Anat offers Aqhat immortality on condition that he will surrender to her the divine bow presented to him by the artificer-god, Kōṯar-w-Ḫasis. Following Virolleaud and the present reviewer, he translates the crucial passage (II, vi, 26-28), "I will grant life unto thee, Aqht-*ǧzr*, I will grant life and I will make thee immortal, and I will render thee mighty," and then comments: "It strikes me that we have here a declaration of the usual kind of the king's 'eternal' life, an inherent element in the kingship ideology" (p. 138). But a closer reading will reveal that this passage really describes how the goddess tries to bribe the youth, first with silver and gold and subsequently with immortality. There is no question of his being "made mighty," since this is a misreading (*ašlṭk* for *'ašlḥk*). We should render: "Rather choose (*lit.* desire) life, O doughty Aqhat, choose life and I will give (it) to thee, deathlessness and I will grant (it) thee" (See Albright, *BASOR*, 94: 32-33). There is thus also no question of royal status.

A further reference is found in the passage (I:29-48) wherein Aqhat's sister, Paghat, weeps and "the robe of Danel is rent" in token of mourning over the blighted fields and the (as yet unidentified) victim of murder, the spilling of whose blood has resulted in infertility. Danel curses the land. According to Engnell, "King Danel here appears endowed with power over the succession of the seasons, over rain and

fertility. Or, more exactly, in this case in the negative: he has not his usual power, owing precisely to the trick with his robe" (p. 139). It is apparent that there is not a word of this in the text. There is no trick with the robe; it is rent simply in token of mourning, while Danel's imprecation is sufficiently illustrated by the parallel of II Samuel, 1:21. (cf. Ginsberg, *JBL*, LVII, 209 ff.).

Of especial interest is Dr. Engnell's detailed treatment of the *Poem of Keret* (pp. 142-70). On the face of it, this poem describes how a hero called Keret (or Karit?), hearing that his city is being reduced to dire straits, its women humbled and its menfolk decimated, weeps and wails until El reveals to him in a dream that his line will be perpetuated if he contracts a union with the maiden Ḥry (Ḥoriya?),[2] the comely daughter of the rival king Pbl, ruler of the two cities, Udumu the Great and Udumu the Small. He is instructed to lead an expedition against these cities, to beleaguer them for six days without actually attacking them, and then to accept no sort of weregeld from Pbl other than the hand of his daughter. The text is in two parts: the first relates the course of events as foretold by El, while the second repeats it in narrative form.

It is needless to repeat here the mistaken construction of this text advanced by some of us in the first flush of discovery, or to recapitulate the wild speculations about Terah, Asher, and Zebulun which resulted from the original mistranslation of certain passages. Suffice it to say that there is no Terah, Asher, or Zebulun in the Ras Shamra texts. Nevertheless, the historical background of this poem poses a problem. Dr. Engnell solves it by the ingenious suggestion that the entire document has been misunderstood. Far from being the record of a historical war, what it describes, he thinks, is a series of ceremonies connected with the autumnal feast of ingathering. The "host" which is said "to go out" is not a military expedition, but a pilgrim caravan. The fight against King Pbl is not a historic battle, but simply a version of the typical combat or contest in harvest ceremonies. The mating of Keret with the maiden Ḥry reflects the sacred marriage. The preliminary destruction of his city and people is but the communal eclipse which invariably precedes the festal celebrations.

2. The name of Pbl's daughter is given by most scholars as Mtht-ḥry. It should be observed, however, that Mtht is simply a title meaning "mistress, lady," as in the analogous Mtht Dnty, "Mrs. Dan'il," in the Poem of Aghat. The word *Ḥry* in I Keret 203 is thus the name of the bride, and all difficulties disappear!

All of this is extremely clever and *geistreich*, but scarcely convincing, since it depends too greatly upon a cavalier treatment of philological points. In the first place, it is difficult to understand why a peaceful caravan should be described as an "army" (*ṣbu*), nor why one of its divisions should be called *ḫpš*, a term which (whatever its exact meaning may be) is clearly identical with the Accadian *ṣab ḫubši*, definitely *a section of the army*. Secondly, one feels that Dr. Engnell strains philology in trying to evade the clearly military implications of the lines (85 ff. = 176 ff.) describing the launching of the "host." On the face of it, the texts says that

> The host went forth
> . . . . . .
> in great strength,
> three hundred myriad strong,
> *ḫubšu* beyond number,
> *thnn*[3] beyond computation;
> They went in thousands,
> (Innumerable as the drops of) a shower,
> And in their myriads,
> (Innumerable) as raindrops they marched;
> Two by two they went,
> They marched in threes.
> Every man of them closed up his house;
> The widow hired out her services,
> the nobleman carried the litter,
> the blind man told fortunes by the stars.

What is described in the last four lines is clearly a state of wartime emergency: family life is disrupted; women "take war jobs"; there is a shortage of "domestic help," so that even the "socialites" have to do their own chores; everyone—even the blind—turns prognosticator or "commentator." Engnell, however, translates differently; he thinks the lines describe the carefree abandon which accompanies the celebration of the pilgrim-festival:

> Everyone of them closes his house,
> the widow verily gets drunk,
> the bridegroom forgets the (wedding-)couch,
> the blind one surely "divines."

3. For typographical reasons, *th* is used to represent the Ugaritic letter which answers to Arabic thau.

But this is scarcely possible, because pilgrimages were sacred occasions marked by a *castimonium*, not by abandon. That only came later, when the period of communal mortification gave way to re-invigoration. Moreover, the rendering of *zbl* by "bridegroom" (on the strength of Accadian *zubullu*, "bride-gift") is untenable; while "forgets" would be *yšy* (from *n-š-y*) rather than *yšu*.

Equally dubious is Engnell's interpretation of the second crucial passage (110 ff., 212 ff.) describing the advance of the host. According to the usual translation, the passage relates that, before they reached the cities of Udumu the Great and Udumu the Small, the forces of Karit

> sojourned in the cities of Š-r-n,
> in the towns of S-'-t;
> in the fields (they found) women hewing wood,
> on the thresting-floors gathering grain of S-'-t;
> at the well drawing water,
> at the spring filling (their pitchers).

Engnell, reading these lines in a "cultic" sense, thinks they describe "the erecting of the 'reed hut' and water-fetching rites" connected with the autumn festival!

The reviewer believes that not only Engnell's but also the standard translation is wrong, and that the words *šrn* and *s't*, usually taken as proper names of places, are really verbs. The meaning of the latter — something like "are swept away" — is uncertain, but the former is the Accadian *šâru*, "march, proceed," here parallel to *grnn*, which is the Accadian *garû*, "campaign against."[4] Thus, the translation would be:

> And they campaigned against cities,
> marched against towns;
> Swept away (?) from the field were the women hewing wood,
> from the spring the women filling (pitchers).
> Swept away (?) from the well were the women drawing water,
> from the spring the women filling (pitchers).

The next episode (114 ff. 218 ff.) is likewise misunderstood. The army of Karit is ordered by El not to attack the cities of Udumu the Great and Udumu the Small for the space of six days:

4. In line 213, we should read *šrnn* (balancing *grnn*) rather than *šrnn*. The verb may be recognized in this military sense in the corrupt text of Judges 5:14. *hpšt* is to be explained from the Accadian *ḫabāšu ša še'im*, or from the Arabic *ḥ š ſ*, "messuit segetes."

Call a halt for one day and a second,
for a third day and a fourth,
for a fifth day and a sixth;
Send not thine arrows against his city,
Neither the slingstones flung from thy hand;
And behold, on the seventh day, at sunrise,
King Pbl will surely change
his bull-like roaring to a grunt,
his ass-like braying to a human voice,
his snarling (?) cur-like yelping
to the (contented) lowing of a ploughing ox,
and he will send envoys to thee.

What is described is obviously a "war of nerves." Engnell, however, misunderstanding the construction in the last few lines, thinks that he "contribution of the animals would seem to hint at our being in the sphere of omens." His translation of *lyšn Pbl mlk* as "king Pabil will surely pay attention" is untenable. The alleged verb *š-n-n* of the Ta'anek letter 1:21-22 is probably non-existent and due to a misreading; cf. Albright, *BASOR*, 94:18.

Space forbids a detailed discussion of the rest of Engnell's interpretation; the above specimens may be taken as representative. There is one point, however, which demands comment. Engnell asserts (after Villa) that King Pbl is really none other than the god Resheph, god of pestilence, who functions as the adversary in the characteristic ritual combat. He identifies the name with the Sumerian PA.BIL.SAG. But PA.BIL.-SAG is Saggitarius, not Resheph, and if the element SAG was Semitized as *mlk* (king), it is difficult to see why PA.BIL was retained in the original Sumerian. Moreover, it is to be feared that Engnell has misinterpreted the Sumerian name, for SAG in the complex PA.BIL.SAG means "head" not in the sense of "chief" but of "tip," the expression meaning "Spear with the fiery tip."

Despite all of these objections, however, it seems to the reviewer that behind Dr. Engnell's theory lies a truth which he himself has not perceived. We may reject the view that the Poem of Keret directly and overtly describes the ceremonies of the autumn festival, yet still maintain that it became the cult-text of such a festival because its several episodes corresponded with the stages of the festal ritual. If the war against King Pbl was an historical fact, and not a mere description of the ritual combat, it may nevertheless have been recited (perhaps even en-

acted) at the festival because it ran parallel to that combat. Similarly, if the winning of the maiden Ḫry was not simply the myth of the sacred marriage, it may still have suggested that marriage. In other words, we may modify Engnell's hypothesis and say that although the story was not written originally to describe the festal ritual, it was nevertheless recited therein because it so strikingly corresponded to it. There are many analogies to this process. One thinks, for example, of the way in which the saga of the Exodus became the cult-legend of the Israelitic Festival of Passover because the various details of that event corresponded with those of the more ancient Pesaḫ-ritual. One thinks, indeed, of the historical transmutation of ancient festivals in all religions everywhere.

It remains to add a few comments to various minor points in Dr. Engnell's volume:

p. 56. It is somewhat odd to speak of the Hittite high god as head of the *puḫur ilāni,* which is an Accadian term. The Hittite word for *pantheon* (as for *assembly*) was *pankus*.

p. 57. There is no adequate proof that the Hurrian goddess Hepa(t) was of solar character.

Regarding the human origin of Hittite kings, the illuminating passage, KUB VI 29, rev. 26 ff. (Muwatallis) should have been cited.

p. 59. It is scarcely correct to quote the Mitannian Tushratta's statement that Amenophis IV "is seated as a god on the throne of his father" as a "hint of the divinizing import of the coronation within the sphere of Hittite culture." The tertium quid of the comparison is simply the notion of splendor and dignity; the Pharaoh is said *to be seated* like a god; it is not implied that the installation deifies him.

p. 60. In connection with the identification of Hittite kings with the sun, reference may be made to the terms *su/o-na-a-ya* and *su-nà-nà-la-as,* "suns," as a royal title in the hieroglyphic inscription from Boybepunari, as interpreted by Hrozný in *Archiv Orientální,* VII (1935), 135, n. 5; 152, n. 1.

p. 61. There is no authority for assuming the cult of the living king at the Hittite AN. TAḪ.ŠUM festival. The ritual (KUB XI, 29) merely prescribes certain acts by and for the king and queen, and no more is implied than by the sacrifices *pro salute imperatoris* in the later Asianic Attis-cult.

p. 70. The Hittite word *arkuwessar* means "prayer, entreaty," not "lamentation," which is *mukessar*.

p. 75. Professor S. A. Cook is described as "the late." Fortunately, this is "a gross exaggeration."

Canaanite coronation patterns in Psalm 110 were already pointed out by the reviewer in JMEOS, 1937.

p. 84. Why is the Amarna formula *ana kaša lu šulmu,* "Peace be unto thee," described as "the special royal salutation"? It was the usual form of greeting.

p. 86. It is scarcely probable that the title $^{\text{ame}}$*ruḫi* in the Amarna letter 288 should be the Hebrew *ro'eh,* "shepherd," since this is elsewhere written *re'u* in these documents.

p. 90. Widengren's reference to the marriage of King Idin-Dagan with the goddess Innana as evidence that the king played the bridegroom in the *hieros gamos* has been anticipated by Zimmern; cf. S. Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar,* p. 26, n. 2.

p. 93. The expression *mlk ṣdq w-mlk yšr* ("rightful and legitimate king") in the inscription of Yeḥawmilk (not Yeḥimilk) of Byblus does not characterize him as "messianic." It merely proclaims his title to the throne. Cp. *atht ṣdqh and mtrḫt yšrh,* "rightful wife" and "legal bride," in I Keret, 12-13.

p. 111. In the passage quoted from the Ras Shamra text V.Ab, A, the words *'l B'l* cannot mean "Ba'lu ascends," since this would require *'ly* or *y'l.* Moreover, the parallel passage, II Aqhat vi, 33 has *'lh,* which shows that *'l* is a preposition, to be construed with the preceding line. Render: "A sweet lad proceeds to sing, the cymbals in his hand; a sweet-voiced stripling chants over Ba'al" (The reviewer abandons his interpretation in OLZ, 40: 671 f.).

p. 113. The Ugaritic *šd il* cannot mean "the mount of El," firstly because Ugaritic elsewhere uses the word *hr* for "mountain," and secondly because the common expression *alp šd rbt kmn* shows that *šd* is the Accadian *šiddu,* "tract of territory," *kmn* being the Accadian *kumanu,* a land-measure.

p. 116. It is most unlikely that in II AB, col. v, fires were lit in the newly-built sanctuary to symbolize lightning. The text says distinctly that their purpose was to melt the ingots of gold and silver.

p. 117. The Ugaritic text, II AB, vii, 42 ff. seems to be mistranslated. The words *arṣ drkt yštkn* cannot mean "the earth of my realm has rest," since *arṣ* is feminine, and would require *tštkn.* The reviewer believes that *u-mlk u-bl-mlk* means "either king or commoner"; cf. *kl mmlkt w-kl adm,* "every king and commoner," in the Eshmun'azar inscription from Sidon, line 4. The sense is: "Nor king nor commoner shall install himself in the land of my dominion!" Similarly, the translation of *yqra Mt bnpšh, ystrn Ydd bgngnh* as "M(o)t is to be found in his tomb, Idd hidden in his cavern" is hardly right. We may render, perhaps: "Let Mot cry out from his tomb, the Darling (of El) raise his rebellion (*rt.srr*) from his vault, (saying) "I alone am he that should reign o'er the gods, that should fatten gods and men, satisfy the multitudes of the earth." (The time-honored identification of *gngn* with Accad. *gigunu,* "bower," is by no means certain. The reviewer connects the word with the root *g-n,* "be dark, hide," in the Syriac and Arabic sense of "covert").

p. 118. Engnell perpetuates the old error that the text called *The Death of Baal* speaks of the teraphim; but Albright has shown that *ttrp* is a verb meaning "thou becomest flaccid." (The review anticipated this in an unpublished

essay in 1936). Moreover, the teraphim were, in any cases, anthropomorphic images, and cannot be described as "tablets."

p. 120. The translation of the passage in I AB, col. vi describing the mourning for Aleyan-Baal appears to have been misunderstood. *lpš yks mizrtm* cannot be rendered "*lpš*, he tears asunder the girdle," since *lpš* occurs elsewhere in the sense of "garment" (Hebrew *l*^{e}*būš*, etc.) and the rites of mourning required the donning, not the removal, of the loincloth; cf. A. J. Wensinck, *Some Semitic Rites of Mourning and Religion* (Amsterdam 1917), pp. 56 ff. Engnell seems also to miss the agricultural metaphor employed in this passage. *ythlth* may be explained from the Accadian *šalāšu* in the sense of "to plough a place three times over"; it is thus a proper parallel of *yhrth*, "he ploughs." *aplb* cannot possibly mean "autumn fruit" (*apl* and *ib*, Nyberg); being parallel to *bmt*, "belly" (not "heights"), it must denote part of the body, and the reviewer suggests tentatively that it is *appê libbi*, "the surface of the chest."

p. 123. The expression *lys' alt thbtk*, in I AB vi, does not mean "He will uproot the *tent* of thy throning," but "He will pluck up the mainstay of thy dwelling"; *alt* is the Arabic *a-l-th* on which see Lane, *s.v.* Cp. exactly, Job 4-21: "Is not their tent-peg plucked up?"

The reviewer would not like to close this extended notice without pointing out that the above criticisms are not intended to detract from the positive merits of Dr. Engnell's important study. As a digest of the literature on the subject, it will prove indispensable to all students, while its frequent reference to works not yet generally accessible in this country will lend it further value. Moreover, the criticism of the several schools of thought is everywhere careful and judicious, and mark a distinct contribution to a difficult theme. Furthermore, the work is distinguished by a lucidity of style and exposition in the best traditions of Scandinavian scholarship. And although one may not agree with his conclusions, there is no doubt that the author has brought to them a vast amount of reading and research and—above all—an awareness of the wider horizons demanded by the study of ancient Near Eastern Religion. All students in this field will congratulate him on a noteworthy achievement, and look forward eagerly to the promised continuation in which he will deal more specifically with Old Testament material.

COMMUNICATIONS

ARCHBISHOP ANDREY SHEPTYTSKY

CLARENCE A. MANNING

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THE FUNERAL OF ANDREY SHEPTYTSKY, Uniat Archbishop of Lwow, announced by a despatch from Moscow as having taken place on November 5, 1944, brings to a close an unusual career in both the religious and political spheres. In a way that is strangely reminiscent of the religious leaders of the Middle Ages, Archbishop Sheptytsky was not only a statesman but a great religious thinker and reformer. He was the centre of almost every movement that took place among the Ukrainian or Ruthenian population of Eastern Galicia during his lifetime, and was easily the outstanding ecclesiastic among the Roman Catholics of the Byzantine Rite, as they are formally called.

He was born in 1865 of a noble family that had been largely Polonized, and his mother was a daughter of the Polish writer Fredro, but the boy was influenced by the traditions of his family which had given in past centuries many distinguished bishops to the Uniat Church, and he decided to follow in their footsteps. This was so unusual that the young man, a physical giant, rapidly received advancement, and, in 1900, he was appointed Archbishop of Lwow and Metropolitan of the entire province.

From that time on, he identified himself fully with the efforts of his people to gain political and cultural independence. He used his large personal fortune only for the good of his people, and in the secular sphere he supported the Ukrainian National Museum and developed the Seminary at Lwow into a Theological Academy with the hope of making it the first unit of a definite Ukrainian university. For his opposition to the Russians he was deported in 1914, when they occupied Galicia and was not allowed to return to his home until 1919. Yet, after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, he was able to organize in Petrograd a Synod of the Russian Uniats. His opposition to the Poles led again to his internment for a number of months in Poland. He made two visits to the New World to organize the Ukrainian dioceses in the United States, Canada, and South America. Little is known of his movements since the outbreak of the Second World War, and there have

been many rumors that he was deported or killed by the Soviets or the Germans, but he appears to have remained at his post and to have died there this autumn.

Imposing as all this political and national leadership was, he combined it with great religious activity. He had been educated himself at Dobromil, a monastery of the Order of the Basilians. This represented in its origin the principles of Eastern monasticism, but the difficulties under which the people had existed for centuries had led to a general breakdown in the order and, in 1882, it was revived and reformed under the influence of the Jesuits. These influences adapted it to the Western conceptions of monasticism. Archbishop Sheptytsky found a group of peasants trying to practice the monastic life and, taking them under his protection, he developed their activities into the creation of a Monastery of Studites, over which he placed his brother as hegumen. The rule of this order was based not on Western models, but directly upon the rules of St. Theodore the Studite, the reformer of monasticism at Constantinople in the eighth century.

This act revealed one of the salient features of the work and thought of the Archbishop. A firm supporter of the Papacy and a personal friend of Pope Pius XI, long before he became Pope, Archbishop Sheptytsky was a strong supporter of the traditions and rites of the Byzantine Churches, and repeatedly declared that no practice of the Orthodox should be condemned which had been accepted in the period ending with the Seventh General Council, and that Rome could impose no practice which came into existence after that time. It was his sincere belief that the common practice of the Roman Catholic Church in sending missionaries to work in Russia and other Orthodox countries was only creating prejudice, and that the proper method of procedure was the method of reunion that had been tried without success in the Conciliar movement and which had brought to union with Rome the largest part of the Orthodox of Galicia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This foreshadowed ultimate unity through the reconciliation of a diocese or a church to Rome by its absolution from the sin of schism and the acceptance by Rome of all local rites and customs, wherever they were canonically permitted. In case of success in this, he foresaw that the Metropolitan see of Kiev would become again the mother see of all the Russians under Ukrainian domination.

The idea won little favor, although it was received more than sympa-

thetically by Pope Pius XI, for it was a two-edged weapon and was resisted by the strongly Orthodox elements, and also by the adherents of the Latin rite. Yet the Archbishop had perhaps more friends among the Orthodox than he did among the Poles, who disliked his personal power in Eastern Galicia and his strong opposition to any attempts to crush the Orthodox Church in eastern Poland by political charges.

With his strong nationalistic sympathies for his people and his far-reaching ideas for a reconciliation of the Orthodox East to the Papacy, Archbishop Sheptytsky proved himself an able administrator and an excellent pastor and teacher. The Second World War destroyed much of his work, but his ideas cannot be disregarded, and his pastoral letters are well worth consideration as the outstanding examples of the Uniat position during the twentieth century. A striking figure physically, intellectually, and spiritually, he was the best product of the Uniat movement and was a splendid example of the old noble-ecclesiastic, devoted to modern democratic principles and methods of working.

BOOK REVIEWS

Hatha Yoga. By Theos Bernard. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. xii, 68 pp. 37 plates. $3.50.

The work under consideration is a book on "Yoga," a subject which has been much exploited and also much misunderstood. While this exploitation argues for its usefulness and demands the clarification of its true nature, this has not been done to date except in one or two cases. Both Indians and Americans under the high-sounding title of "Swami," have published many books in English on Yoga during the last fifty years or so. Although most of these have conformed to the well-known Sanskrit texts, none of them have brought conviction to the student of the real validity of the various exercises and practices prescribed in Yoga.

The text under review is probably the first work to bring to the student the validity of Yoga practices. Yoga is an experimental science as truly as physics or chemistry. Like them it is based on experiment and the logic applied thereto. There is no basis for idle speculation in Yoga, and what appears to be such is presumed to be based on experimental data and formulated as theory. If this were to be reduced to a formula it might be expressed as follows: $x + e = xe$, wherein $x =$ body, breathing, or mind and $e =$ energy as supplied through exercise or practices. From this it is obvious that just as phosphorus + e, produces a new form of phosphorus, so body + e produces a new form of body, mind, or breathing which is under voluntary control. Humans may be considered to be the product of interaction of the three components, body, breath (life), and mind. Human experience, then, is the result of human reaction on nature or nature's products. Obviously the more refined the human reaction, the more refined and truer will be the human experience. To achieve this was considered the end and aim of human existence according to Yoga philosophy, and Yogic practices became the beacon-light on this path.

Dr. Theos Bernard has placed the western world particularly under a debt of gratitude, by bringing to it his personally verified account of Hatha Yoga practices. In this age of science, his approach and study of the subject are to be highly commended. He, like a true scientist, is not merely concerned with the authentic translation and presentation of authoritative textual subject matter, but is primarily interested in verifying the claims of Yoga practices. Free from preconceived ideas and

prejudices, he undertakes the experiments by subjecting himself to the guidance and discipline of Yoga teachers and truthfully recites the results of such experiments. Thus his book appears more like a laboratory notebook of experiments than a pedantic text. This is seen in the following quotations: in the preface he states, "The primary purpose of the investigation was to test by personal experience the techniques of Hatha Yoga. I was in fact induced to make this practical trial of Yoga because of the disappointments I experienced in connection with Yoga theory." On page 13 he says, "Since my training has not been done under laboratory conditions, I can only report general observations."

The book is divided into six sections: (1) Introduction, (2) Asanas, (3) Purification, (4) Pranayama, (5) Mudras, (6) Samadhi. Each of the sections is again divided into broad typed main text and textual translations as small typed footnotes. The main text contains the author's personal experience and his practical hints to those who wish to study and practice Yoga exercises. The main body of the text contains many practical hints. The following quotations will illustrate this: "I have always practiced them in conjunction with pranayama and cannot report on their individual advantages" (p. 37). "I recommend the same sequence for others." "As for the effectiveness of the practice, I can report that I did notice a lack of hunger and thirst when using it" (p. 40). "Contemplation on the space between the eyebrows, is, in my opinion, best for accomplishing soon the Unmanic state" (p. 49). "In the United States it will be sufficient to practice after a sun-bath, when the perspiration has begun to flow" (p. 12). "I found that an ordinary surgeon's 4′ gauze met every requirement" (p. 15). "I found it helpful to sweeten the water." "This has happened to me, hence these words of caution" (p. 16) "An outline of the general plan I followed when developing this practice will be a helpful guide; however, it is not intended as final" (p. 20). "Pain is treated by Yogis as a stop signal" (p. 23).

The text is replete with practical hints from personal experience like the ones quoted above. From the textual translations in the footnotes, one uncovers interesting sidelines of Hindu thought. For example, Danta-dhouti or teeth cleansing, includes five distinct operations: (1) teeth-washing, (2) cleansing the root of the tongue, (3) cleansing the mouth, (4) cleansing each of the Eustachian tubes, (5) cleansing the frontal sinuses. True individual freedom considered essential for the Yoga practice meant freedom from attachment to comforts, food, opinions, rituals, religion, ambition, fame, non-equality, etc. This reminds

one of Dr. Victor Heiser's admonition, "Toughen Up America." In speaking about education in modern times, emphasis is placed on the teacher's qualifications and the system, but hardly any on the students' qualifications other than curricular. But the Hindus consider six conditions essential in the attainment of knowledge. These are: (1) firm belief that it (*Vidya*) must succeed and be fruitful, (2) having faith in it, (3) respect for the teacher, (4) the spirit of universal equality, (5) restraint of the organs of sense, (6) moderate eating.

The importance of breathing exercises is now well understood in the West. However, the importance of breathing through alternate nostrils, stressed so much in Yoga, does not seem to have received much attention. Yoga believes that the two lungs take periodical rest alternately, and, hence, breathing pressure is dominant in only one nostril at any one time. Therefore, breathing through both nostrils at one and the same time inflates and exercises fully one lung only. It is assumed that the development of both lungs equally is necessary for perfect health. That is why Yoga insists on breathing through alternate nostrils.

The author has not only made an unbiased report of Yoga practices in the light of his personal experience and observation, but has also supplied in footnotes the most authoritative translations of Sanskrit texts of Hatha Yoga. Clear proof of his attainment of mastery of Hatha Yoga practices is seen from thirty-six full page photographs of such practices by the author. It is probably the first time in the English language that such clear and practical directions have been supplied to the student so that anyone can practice these for his own personal health and well-being.

The reviewer is not an entire stranger to Yoga and its practices, although he cannot claim such mastery as shown by the author. Hatha Yoga practices are known to have interesting physiological effects and hence may be used to correct and cure certain human maladies. India has some sanitariums where Yoga practices are utilized for curing certain diseases. Columbia University is to be congratulated on the unique service it has rendered to the public by first making it possible for Dr. Bernard to study Hatha Yoga in India for a doctoral dissertation and for publishing this study in book form. Now that Columbia has an alumnus who has attained mastery in Yoga, would it be too much to hope that a Yoga clinic may be established to study the physiological effects of Yoga?

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The Arab Heritage. Edited by NABIH AMIN FARIS. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. xii, 279 pp. 18 illustrations. vii, 279 pp. $3.00.

The nine papers which make up this volume were read at the Summer Seminar in Arabic and Islamic Studies at Princeton in 1941, that being the third of such Summer Seminars. This fact gives them a unity, and also explains their very different quality, certain of them being far below the scholarly calibre of the book as a whole. The unity derives also from the fact that the civilization associated with the Arabic language and later with the spread of the Islamic empire (what we used to call the Saracenic civilization and might well so call again) can be treated as an entity, and even though its significance may not be so great as the enthusiastic language of certain of the contributors claims, nevertheless, it had an important place in the history of medieval times, and a wider and juster appreciation of that place is needed in our modern world, as we approach the settlement of a great many problems in which the Near East is vitally concerned.

The first essay, by P. K. Hitti, of Princeton, the initiator of the Summer Seminar, is an introduction to the series, and sketches the history of Arabic and Islamic studies in Western seats of learning and in particular in America, which he sees as a promising centre for the further development of such studies. Levi della Vida, of Pennsylvania, and J. Obermann, of Yale, follow with essays on the origins of this Arabic and Islamic culture. The former discusses pre-Islamic Arabia before the rise of the Arab movement under Islam, and shows us the ground out of which everything grew, but curiously directs attention to where the great gaps are in our knowledge of this period, showing us what we do not know rather than what we know. The second discusses in great detail the Jewish and Christian sources from which the Arabian Prophet derived his inspiration, and from which he drew a great deal of the material set forth in his revelations, as well as the form in which he set them forth.

Since the one great original contribution of the Arabs was their poetry, G. von Grünebaum, of Chicago, devotes an essay to the growth and structure of Arabic poetry, and gives some account of the rise of literary criticism in the Muslim Schools, illustrating his types by a number of select English translations of passages from the poets.

The editor himself follows with an essay on al-Ghazzali, one of the outstanding figures in the history of Muslim thought, who was equally famous as a logician, a theologian, and a mystic. John la Monte, of Pennsylvania, and Henry L. Savage, of Princeton, who follow, keep us in the medieval period, but look at the question from the European point of view, the former from the standpoint of the Crusades, and the latter from that of a medieval pilgrim to the Holy Land. Discussing Crusade and Jihad, the former assembles evidence to demonstrate that religious fanaticism played but a minor role in the period of the Crusades, despite the fact that they are ostensibly wars of religion. He seeks to show, on the basis of the documents themselves, that both Crusaders and Muslims were more interested in personal aggrandizement and acquisition of territory than they were in matters of religion, being to this end quite as ready to attack their fellow believers as to attack unbelievers, and never averse to an alliance with the unbelievers if such would serve their ends. The reviewer must admit to having passed over with very little attention the *Saint Voyage de Jherusalem* of Ogier, eighth baron d'Auglure, but the account of it given here reveals that it contains much of interest for the study of the situation in both Cairo and Jerusalem in the fourteenth century.

The least satisfactory essay in the book is Edward Jurji's account of "The Course of Arab Scientific Thought," but it leads up to the subject which usually attracts most interest from Western students, namely, Islamic art, and the final essay on "The Character of Islamic Art," by Richard Ettinghausen, of Michigan, deals with some aspects of this fascinating question. The strict limitations imposed on Islamic art by the poverty of the Prophet's own cultural background, and the narrow outlook of orthodox theology are rightly insisted on, and a very interesting account, fortified by chosen illustrations from some of the famous collections of Islamic art, is given of how a remarkable and distinctive art developed in spite of those limitations.

The book has been very well printed and tastefully presented, and as a whole represents a useful addition to our all too small collection of books popularizing an area of studies that is of growing importance.

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Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov i Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina. Sbornik Tserkovnych Dokumentov. Moscow: Moskovskaya Patriarchia, 1943.

This second volume issued by the Moscow Patriarchate is a kind of appendix to *The Truth about Religion in Russia.*[1] Like its predecessor, it is beautifully printed with handsome chapter headings and endings and decorative capitals. It contains a striking photograph of the late Patriach Sergius and is bound in azure and gold. It presents a series of documents, some of which have already appeared in *The Truth about Religion in Russia,* some of which are new.

The main purpose of the collection is to show the close co-operation of the Orthodox Church with the Soviet State in the prosecution of the war. The element of obvious propaganda in this is less important than the facts: (1) that the Church has not only recognized but is actively supporting the Soviet Government and (2) that Russian patriotism and Russian religious sentiment have again fused. From this point of view, the most important section of the book is the last, which reprints a series of telegrams exchanged between high-ranking ecclesiastics and Premier Stalin on the ocassion of substantial contributions made to the Red Army by the faithful through the Church. I append a translation.

Telegrams printed in the newspaper *Pravda,* No. 313, Nov. 9, 1942, and in *Izvestia,* No. 264, Nov. 10, 1942:

Moscow. Kremlin. To Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin:

On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Soviet Republic in the name of our clergy and laity of the Orthodox Russian Church, faithful children of our native land, I send you hearty and prayerful greetings as the divinely appointed leader of our military and cultural forces, who is leading us to victory over the barbarous invasion and to the peaceful revival of our country and the future development of its peoples. May God bless with success and glory your great undertaking for our country. Patriarch locum tenens Sergius. Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna.

To Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin:

The faithful people of the Ukraine, suffering grieviously under the heel of the German brigands as on the day of the Passover, await their liberation and return to a peaceful and happy existence, once the enemy is destroyed. Knowing well these hopes of my own Ukrainian flock, I beg you to accept from me and the faithful of the Ukraine our warm and prayerful wishes that God may preserve you in health for many years, and may God through your leadership

1. Reviewed in this journal, May, 1944.

speedily purge our dear country from German filth. Together with our whole country, we believe that once we have rid ourselves of the enemy, our holy land will soon again flourish like the unburned bush. Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev and Galicia.

Telegram from Metropolitan Sergius to Joseph V. Stalin, Jan. 5, 1943, and J. V. Stalin's reply telegram (*Pravda*, Jan. 5, 1943):

Moscow, Kremlin. To Joseph V. Stalin:

I greet you cordially in the name of the Orthodox Russian Church. I pray for your good health in the new year and for success in all your undertakings for the welfare of our native land entrusted to you. By special letter I am requesting the clergy and laity to give money for the formation of a tank column with the name of Dimitri Donskoi. As a beginning the patriarch is contributing 100,000 rubles, the Elochovskii Cathedral in Moscow, 300,000 rubles, and the rector of the church, Kolchitskii Nikolai Fedorovich, 100,000. I shall ask to have a special account opened in the Gosbank. May our common cause under your leadership be crowned with victory over the dark powers of Fascism. Patriarch locum tenens Sergius, Metropolitan of Moscow.

To the Patriarch locum tenens Sergius, Metropolitan of Moscow:

I beg to present to the Orthodox Russian clergy and laity my greetings and the thanks of the Red Army for their concern for the armored tank forces of the Red Army. Permission for the opening of a special account in the Gosbank has been granted. J. Stalin.

Telegram of Metropolitan Sergius to Joseph V. Stalin, Feb. 25, 1943, and the reply telegram of J. V. Stalin (*Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1943):

To Joseph V. Stalin:

On the anniversary of our victorious Red Army I send you greetings as its supreme commander, in the name of the clergy and laity of the Russian Orthodox Church, and pray that you may enjoy complete victory over the enemy and see the rebirth of our ravaged country. The faithful, desirous of helping the Red Army, have willingly responded to my appeal to collect means for the formation of a tank column bearing the name of Dimitri Donskoi. In all about 6,000,000 rubles have been collected and, in addition to this, a number of gold and silver objects. The clergy and laity of the city of Moscow and of the Moscow District have proved especially responsive in collecting 2,000,000 rubles. The city of Kubyshev has contributed 650,000 rubles, besides gold and silver objects; the city of Kazan has collected 350,000 rubles in money and one phunt of gold and silver objects; the city of Saratov 350,000 rubles, Molotov 300,000 rubles, Penza 500,000 rubles, and the Leningrad diocese 500,000 rubles. The canvass is still continuing. Accept these sums as a gift from the clergy and laity of the Russian Orthodox Church on the anniversary of the Red Army. Patriarch locum venens Sergius of Moscow and Kolomana.

To the Patriarch locum tenens Sergius, Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna:

I beg to convey my sincere greetings and thanks of the Red Army to the Orthodox Russian clergy and laity who have collected 6,000,000 rubles, together with gold and silver objects, for the formation of a tank column bearing the name of Dimitri Donskoi. J. Stalin.

Telegram of Metropolitan Aleksi to Joseph V. Stalin, Jan. 15, 1943, and the reply telegram of J. V. Stalin (*Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1943):

Moscow, Kremlin. To Joseph V. Stalin:

The Orthodox Russian Church together with all the peoples of the Soviet Union burns with one desire: to help the Red Army on the march in every way. The diocese of Leningrad, clergy and laity, animated by the patriotic impulse of the whole Soviet Nation, from the first days of the great national war for our fatherland against the hateful German-Fascist invaders, have supported the military and political measures taken for the construction and reinforcement of the defense of the U. S. S. R. and of our city-frontier which have heroically preserved their integrity. On my recommendation the diocese of Leningrad, though in a state of siege, has to date contributed to the fund for national defense 3,182,143 rubles in cash, as well as offerings of valuables. At the request of the Patriarch locum tenens Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow, the diocese now contributes to the formation of a tank column bearing the name of Dimitri Donskoi 500,000 rubles. The canvass is still continuing in the firm confidence in an early victory of the right over the bloodthirsty madness of Fascism. I heartily pray God to help you in your great historic vocation: the preservation of the honor, freedom, and glory of our native land. Metropolitan of Leningrad.

Leningrad. To Aleksi Metropolitan of Leningrad:

I beg to convey to the Orthodox Russian clergy and laity of the Leningrad diocese my greetings and the thanks of the Red Army for their concern for the Red Army. J. Stalin.

It must be admitted that the sums contributed by the Church to the Red Army are a substantial guarantee of the good faith of the contributors, most of whom could have gained more popular favor by contributing equal amounts through secular, rather than ecclesiastical channels. The fact that, as Christians, they chose the harder and less rewarding way, is an indication that the achievements of the national army and the government in directing it had given them a sense of welcome security, and that they were willing to throw in their Christian resources, not merely in a desperate venture to save their skins but in a cause which they were willing to affirm and identify as their own.

It will be obvious to anyone sensitive to diplomatic usage that the

form and tone of the telegrams exchanged between Sergius and Aleksi and Stalin suggest circumspection and certain reserves on both sides, but where national interest was involved those reserves were cast aside, and behind the formal phrases of recognition of Stalin as chief of the state and supreme commander of the armed forces lies the conviction that the safety and welfare not only of Soviet territory but of Holy Russia are being guarded by the state. It is important to emphasize the similarity between the *carmen saeculare* of Horace and the mood of these effusions. The security offered by the state is a real security, and the emotional reaction to it is sincere and unequivocal. It is significant that broader commitments are avoided on both sides. It is, however, equally clear that an institution which has survived the brutal persecution meted out to it by the Bolsheviks in the past twenty-five years, and which is still prepared not only to pray for its persecutors but to contribute 6,000,000 rubles to the maintenance of its armed forces cannot be a negligable factor in the policy of a stable and forward looking government. There are deep forces at work here, and it is clear that their contribution could go far in the direction of genuine religious freedom within the structure of a socialist state. The recent trend of government action in church affairs and its more conservative, less tentative ethical position on such fundamental issues as marriage and the family, point hopefully in this direction.

Two sets of documents illustrate the firmness with which politically intransigent movements within the Church are dealt with. The first concerns the case of Polycarp Sikorskii, reviewed at length in *The Truth about Religion in Russia*. From the Patriarch's pronouncements, Sikorskii appears as an ecclesiastical adventurer who attempted to take advantage of a confused military situation to establish an autonomous Ukrainian Church and, with German help, to preside over its brief destiny. The second involves an unhappy incident of the German invasion of Latvia and Esthonia. A group of misguided clergy, headed by the Lithuanian metropolitan, Sergius Voskresenskii, met in Riga and sent greetings to Hitler. Since these persons were within the jurisdiction of Moscow, Sergius demanded that they furnish an immediate explanation of their conduct to the press. They should also employ every means to counteract the effects of their wrong doing and send evidence of this to the ecclesiastical court. In the meantime, Voskresenskii was removed from his post in the Church of the Transfiguration in Moscow.

The pastorals of Sergius are a welcome addition to those already published in *The Truth about Religion in Russia,* and are marked by the same simplicity, directness, and eloquence as those already published in the previous volume. Peculiar interest attaches to the communication of Alexei, former Metropolitan of Leningrad, who became patriarch locum tenens on Sergius' death. In conclusion, I append a translation of a passage containing his message to his diocese at the outbreak of the war, entitled, "The Church calls for the defense of the Homeland":

The message of Metropolitan Sergii to the pastors and flocks of the Russian Church summoned all the faithful in this terrible hour of danger which envelops our fatherland to a united defense of our great country, everyman to the full measure of his strength. In this message, it was said in the name of the church that it, Holy Church, "blessed with a heavenly blessing this common enterprise." And this voice of the first arch-pastor of the Russian Church proved to be no "voice crying in the wilderness." All the faithful responded to this appeal. All united without differences at the moment of the common peril, as citizens of one great Union, in one effort to determine how each one might help share in the common task of defending the fatherland. Upon this undertaking, blessed by the Church, entered not only youths not yet called to military service but men past their prime, and even old men as volunteers at the front, fully prepared even to lay down their lives for the integrity, honor, and welfare of their beloved country.

The Te Deums in the churches and the petitions for a Russian victory found an echo in the heart of every worshiper. These now have but one thought, one prayer, "God grant that we conquer the bloodthirsty and wicked enemy, crush Fascism, which has brought misery and destruction upon all mankind, and may He restore us all to cheerful living and to happy productive work."

Wishes have been expressed on the part of the faithful of various churches that the considerable sums deposited in the churches, in some very considerable, as much as 100,000 rubles, be given to the government for the defense fund for war needs. To these needs were also diverted various small sums contributed by the faithful.

The following incident occurred recently in a church in Leningrad. Some unknown pilgrims brought in a package and placed it before the ikon of St. Nicholas. In this package were nearly 150 gold 10-ruble coins of pre-revolutionary money. They were immediately deposited in the bank for defense needs.

Does not all this show that the sentiment of love for the mother-country has been roused in everyone, and that the terrible danger which Fascism has brought with it has been sensed by all, so that they have directed all their forces to one goal, that of saving the country at whatever cost?

The Russian people saw and knew from the example of Germany enslaved by Fascism, and from other countries unwillingly betrayed, to what a pass their

Fascism has brought them. They perceived that Fascism was the ruin of everything which has been won by centuries of effort by humanity as a whole, of everything cheerful and productive. And now it sees plainly and senses the whole horror which the merciless enemy brings with him, falling treachously on our land and attempting to overthrow and destroy the gains we made by hard work.

Actually there has fallen on us what the Psalmist describes as "the iniquity of the proud," who could not look quietly at the acquired riches of our country and, judging us by themselves, were unwilling to believe in our righteousness; and their suspicion and hatred of us caused them to embark upon a course ultimately destructive to themselves; by arms and bloodshed they attempted to enslave and subject us.

It is needless to say much about the barbarism with which the enemy operates and which everyone can see. It is unnecessary to dwell upon that purely Teutonic *Schrecklichkeit* with which it tries by every means to intimidate its victims. Many clergy and laity who have escaped from the terrors of Fascism have spoken on this subject. These living witnesses relate how Hitler organizes the destruction of women, children, and the aged in occupied districts, kills off the severely wounded, bombs hospitals, and towns full of peaceful citizens and dwelling houses. All this is a peculiar form of psychological warfare, an inhuman, bestial kind of conflict.

He has fallen on us with special fury, for he particularly hates us, not only as Slavs but as representatives of a form of culture and progress eradicated by the Fascists in every sphere. And he covers all this beastliness and horror by the false and blasphemous formula "Christian Crusade," disregarding the fact that, by the frightful obstruction of everything held dear by the people who are already his slaves in both the national and spiritual spheres, he has long shown the world that in Fascism there is nothing holy, no ideals of any kind except universal treachery and enslavement.

From its attitude to the Church, to Orthodoxy (in Yugoslavia), to Catholicism, to the representatives of all confessions in enslaved countries, it is possible to judge what would be its policy toward the Orthodox Church in view of the special hatred it has for our country. It would mean the Church's total extinction just because it has enjoyed complete freedom not only theoretically, in accordance with our Soviet law, but also in fact up to this time.

It is no novelty in history that madmen should arise with dreams of conquering the whole world. The *Pax Romana,* as Roman imperialism called itself, in the course of centuries attempted to realize this proud vision. It had on its side technical skill, force, power, education, superiority in numbers, cruelty, pillage, enslavement. Everything was converted into weapons for conquering the world. But how did this dream end? The world was not conquered but the *Pax Romana* crumbled to dust. It is no novelty to our native land to be attacked by a foe dreaming of conquering us. Napoleon dreamed of it and seemed close to his goal in tearing out the heart of Russia, Moscow. But, precisely at this point, he

was destined to find not victory but defeat and decisive defeat, for the whole nation arose against the enemy. So it is now. The whole nation is fighting, and its victory is assured. It is assured by the common will to victory, by the unflinching courage of the troops, with their complete contempt for death and willingness to lay down their lives for their country, by an unswerving faith in the triumphant power of a righteous cause.

War is a terrible and devastating thing for anyone who undertakes it needlessly, unjustly, in the expectation of plunder and the enslavement of others. Upon such falls the contempt and the wrath of heaven for the blood and suffering they have caused their own and other people.

But war is a holy thing for those who undertake it of necessity, in defense of the right and of their native land. In taking up arms in such a cause, they are comrades for the right, and when they are wounded and suffer and lay down their lives for their kin and country they follow in the martyrs' footsteps to an inperishable and immortal crown. Therefore the Church also blesses these undertakings and everything which every Russian does in defense of his country.

The undoubted successes of our troops, acknowledged by the enemy themselves, against a powerful but already weakening foe, speaks for the fact that our faith in victory is not vain. The immutable law that he who unjustly draws the sword will perish by the sword actually suspends a sword of Damocles over the head of criminal Fascism, and the time is at hand when this sword of punishment will let the whole weight of its inevitable fate fall upon the enemy and will crush it.

The Church calls aloud for the defense of the mother-country. Filled with faith in God's help in a righteous cause, it prays for the full and final victory over the enemy.

ROBERT P. CASEY

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People, Church and State in Modern Russia. By PAUL B. ANDERSON. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. vii, 240 pp. $2.50.

This is the freshest and most independent study of the contemporary phase of Russian religion since MacCullagh's *Bolshevik Persecution of Christianity*. Mr. Anderson has had long experience with Russian ecclesiastical affairs, is remarkably sensitive to the complexities of Russian character, has had a wide and close acquaintance with many leaders of contemporary Russian religious thought, and, what is perhaps most important, has kept close contact with Russian youth. Unlike MacCullagh's book, Anderson's is not primarily a story of persecution but a remarkably vivid and sympathetic account of the interplay of the forces friendly and hostile to religion in Russia since 1917.

One of the most important features of the book is Mr. Anderson's use of sources inaccessible or unfamiliar to the general reader. Apart from copious extracts from *The Truth about Religion in Russia* (cf. *Review of Religion,* May 1944, p. 37), the legal attitude of the Soviet state toward religion is explained, the "Solovetsk Document" ("a memorandum prepared by bishops in exile in the Solovetsky Monastery, in the White Sea, for presentation to the government" in 1927) is summarized, impressive statistics of the surviving church and of the atheistic movements are given along with quotations from the anti-religious literature of propaganda and their proposed educational curricula. A Russian account of the anti-religious trials in 1937 is translated. The views of Patriarch Sergius on reunion with dissident bodies are described from an article on "The Meaning of the Apostolic Succession," by the Patriarch in the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* (1935). The change of Soviet religious policy after the outbreak of the war with Germany is illustrated from Russian sources. The present position of Protestantism in Russia is defined. There are interesting notes on the ideas of distinguished theologians of the emigration, Bulgakov, Berdyaev, Florovsky, etc.

This list gives us some idea of the voluminous material on Russian religion in the last twenty-five years, as yet almost wholly unexplored and unexploited by West-European and American students of religion. Most fascinating, however, is the information derived from Mr. Anderson's book concerning his memory of events and conversations with others who have themselves experienced the great change in Russian religious life. These are often unobtrusively combined with printed facts. This illuminating passage is characteristic:

> From time to time since the Revolution there have arisen spiritual movements and groupings which attracted numerous adherents, but which subsided in influence or were suppressed. Such movements are characteristic of the Russian Church. They arise in connection with the profound spiritual experience of a person or parish, such as a wonder-working ikon, a response to prayer when in deep distress, or the revelation of spiritual power, usually apart from book-learning, in a simple monk or peasant. Throughout the Soviet period there have been reports of events of this kind, which have greatly moved the population, interfered with local anti-religious efforts, and led to investigation by the authorities, usually accompanied by a pseudo-scientific and highly cynical interpretation.
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> Similarly, the appearance of a wandering priest in a village where the priest

has been exiled and the church probably taken over for a granary or other use, excites the latent religiosity of the people. Children are baptized, and the liturgy is celebrated in some private dwelling, while marriages are blessed and funerals conducted in absentia. The drop in the number of local parish churches from about 50,000 in 1917 to less than 10,000 in 1938 occasioned many such illegal expressions of religious life in the country. The Russian News Service in London on August 22, 1941, stated that 8,338 places of worship were open, of which 4,225 were Orthodox (p. 16).

With regard to the present condition of affairs, Mr. Anderson is convinced of the government's sincerity in permitting the election and enthronement of Sergius to the patriarchate and draws attention to the new commission on church affairs as "a special liaison between state and church." The importance of this commission in shaping a new ecclesiastical policy has since become clear. He also points out the great significance of the new freedom to open theological schools for the training of clergy. In general, he feels that the period of acute danger to the church is over, because the state no longer regards the church as a danger to its structure and social aims. Religion can now be tolerated as a private inclination, or turn of mind the social implications of which are not of a kind to require more than a benevolent supervision by the state. Russian society, too, has become more unified and more tolerant of differences within that unity. The Communist Party is less an aggressive vanguard of revolution than a constant ferment in the body politic. The dream of world-revolution seems to be changing to a vision of world-evolution.

Mr. Anderson concludes:

> In the momentous era before us, there will be great need for kindness, friendliness, mutual helpfulness, and we may hope that neither the Marxists nor the liberals will take intransigeant positions, but rather live and let live. After all, Christians are prone to sin, and Marxists are neither impeccable nor infallible. Each needs to be humble in approaching the other. Each can learn from the other.
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> There will remain certain essential and fundamental differences, particularly the respective assumptions regarding God and man. Yet the Orthodox Church in Russia has shown how even these apparently incompatible views can be reconciled in actual life. Christians and atheists have a common ground in which to work. Cooperating in this field, results will be credited, by the Marxist, to the inner dialectic of historic processes, and by Christians to the creative hand of God. The future belongs to Christians, Marxists, and many others of quite different ideas and ideologies, and it will contain elements which no one

can now foretell. As Professor Florovsky has well said, "The future is not something to be sought or hoped for, but something to be created" (pp. 235 f.).

ROBERT P. CASEY

Brown University

Vladimir Solovyev on Godmanhood. Translated with an Introduction by PETER PETER ZOUBOFF. New York: International University Press (227 W. 13th St.), 1944. 233 pp. $3.75.

Solovyev later abandoned the thesis of these lectures, the belief in a universal realization of Christ's Godmanhood on earth, this realization being the last stage in the long succession of theogonies and theophanies in the progressive revelation of Divinity in all Creation, and imminently embracing all mankind. After the delivery and publication of the *Twelve Lectures Concerning Godmanhood* (1877-1884), the thesis assumed in the mind of Solovyev a more pragmatic formulation of a peculiar Christian policy which he advocated for a number of years. In that universalization of Christ's Godmanhood on earth, which constituted the chief pathos of his earlier philosophical belief, the Church was to be headed by the Bishop of Rome, and the State, mankind, and culture were to be governed and administered by the Russian Tzar. But in subsequent years, those of Solovyev's philosophical maturity, the Russian Newman definitely deflated his imaginative reading of Christianity and evolution as the inevitable deification of all men and every creature, in *this* world's sense and lifetime (and Mr. Zouboff's publication leaves no doubts about that), so that there remained merely the ordinary, humble Christian hope for an individual share in the post-Judgment Godmanhood of Christ for those few that will be chosen. The vision of the *mangodhood* of the entire humanity (cosmos included) as the mundane scope of Christ's Godmanhood to be realized here and now, vanished even more decisively than the vision of the "Imperishable Purple" of the "Eternal Feminine," which Solovyev saw in that not particularly edifying incident in the Egyptian desert, when "Sophia" counseled him to take a good sleep; for the vision of the philosophical utopia did not reappear.

. . . liberated from the sociological terms of his earlier aspirations, freed from his excessive idealization of the external forms of the Church and State organization, and cleared of the pantheistic mysticism of his metaphysics, the utopia

of a Christian Theocracy [and that is precisely what the idea of Godmanhood meant for Solovyev, nothing less than that] . . . gave place in the matured mind of Solovyev to a calm expectation of the Second Advent (p. 22).

Thus Godmanhood was *not* the main idea of Solovyev's philosophy taken as a whole.

A few more words may elucidate and complete the picture of this philosophy:

To justify the Faith of the fathers, to elevate it to the highest level of rational consciousness, and to show how this ancient Faith, freed from the chains of inner seclusiveness and national self-love, coincides with the eternal and immutable truth (p. 77), to integrate the philosophical verity of the mind with the religious truth of the faith—this was, in Solovyev's own words, the aim of his life.

But that integration, it ought to be noted, was not merely a task for philosophical theory: only after the liberation of the ancient "Faith of the fathers" from its inner seclusiveness and national self-love, could it be shown to coincide with the immutable truth, according to Solovyev. The full integration of the truths of Christianity with the logical verities of philosophy required, in other words, a preliminary integration of Christianity within itself—and that meant a *practical* reformation of at least the Orthodox attitude towards the other Sees. The reformation required a philosophical re-orientation of the general ecclesiastical point of view; for the task of the Church is not merely the salvation of its people, and not only a faithful stewardship of this or that church or church tradition, but also the restoration of the original oneness of the whole Christian Church.

This theoretical integration Solovyev achieved (for himself) in his philosophical-religious conception of Godmanhood as the union of Logos and Sophia in Christ. And in that thesis of Godmanhood, and even more so in the articles attendant upon it as well as in his passionate crusade for the Universal Theocracy, he pleaded for the unification of the Churches as necessary, not only because the very meaning of Christianity—nay, the nature of God Himself also—is unity; not only because the spirit of denominational or national exclusiveness is fratricidal in the true Christian sense, i.e., manifests, definitely, the spirit of Antichrist; but also because the Church must be one when it confronts the world—a complete Christianization of which is the Church's main task.

In the reality of actual experience, however, Solovyev found that his

Sophia—either as the Church or as mankind—was far from unity. He was especially aware of the conflict implied in the contrast between Russia and Europe, or the "East" and the "West," in the language of the Russian writers of the time; from the time of Napoleon and the Holy Alliance Russian thought was wrestling with the manifold problems presented and evoked by that contrast. In his attempt at an appraisal of the contrast, however, Solovyev was misled from the start by the peculiar formulation which it received in the so-called Slavophile—Pro-Western controversy. The Slavophiles happened to be religious people; the Pro-Westerners, agnostic or atheistic students of sociology. The conflict, unwittingly, came to be envisaged primarily as that between the Russian Monarchical Orthodoxy on one hand and the rationalism, empiricism, socialism, and industrialism of Europe, on the other—i.e., in essence, as the contrast between the religious principles of Russian Orthodoxy and European civilization and philosophy. The categories were confused. True enough, the Slavophiles—and Solovyev after them—did write about Catholicism and Protestantism also, and wrote about Catholicism as the basic evil or error of the West generally, back of all its other wrongs. But, properly speaking, there was no clear formulation of commensurate polarities—when they thought of Russia, they thought of its Orthodoxy, its Orthodox Church, its Orthodox Tzar and peasants; when they thought of Europe, they had in mind not Catholicism and/or Protestantism, but the European industrial civilization, socialism, empiricism, and rationalism.

Thus, in the *Lectures Concerning Godmanhood,* Solovyev came to formulate the whole historical meaning of the East and the West as the thesis and antitheses in the development of humanity, and that thesis was for him the Christianity of the Orthodox East, whereas the antithesis he defined as the sociological-philosophical progress of the civilization of Europe.

From the point of view of logic, of *logos,* that irrelevance of categories inevitably had to bring about a reaction, a revolution, in the further development of Solovyev's thought. It was the logical necessity of righting that logical incommensurateness of his earlier (the Slavophile) formulation of the contrast between Europe and Russia which forced the reconstruction of his philosophical conclusions concerning the "historical functions" of the East and the West, presented in the lectures on Godmanhood. When he became interested in the Western Church, in

weighing the contrast between the East and the West again, Solovyev formulated correctly, if unconsciously, the polarity of Eastern Christianity versus Western Christianity. But, in re-assigning their historical functions in his Universal Theocracy, he merely reversed the original incongruity of the logical categories; now the Bishop of Rome represented the religious principle in humanity, and the Russian Empire, Christianized mankind and culture.

The integration of the problem before him, in other words, was not complete until he had fully perceived the truth of Christ Crucified. His Christianity was still the pantheistic Christianity of the world—"of the world" and for the world; when he sought to bring all mankind under the scepter of Christ the King, even though that Kingship (represented for him by the Russian Empire) was to enter into full partnership with Christ's Priesthood (represented, in the Universal Theocracy, by the Roman Church). Only after Solovyev had gained a more correct understanding of Christ's teaching, did he come to understand that Christ's Dominion was won by his *Sacrifice*—that his scepter was gained only by his agony and death on the cross, and that thence follows the logical and mystical pre-eminence of the cross over the scepter, of the altar over the throne, of the church over the state.

And when he attained the fuller understanding of the Scriptures, he perceived that the condition for this world's theosis is its own imminent crucifixion—its "baptism with fire"—and that, even in the case of the Collective Bride, the criterion will be a qualitative choice rather than the quantitative totality.

It is unfortunate that the book should have made a rather uncultured appearance, not to speak of the footnotes, which are a bit too strongly suggestive of the Old Russia's anarchical predilections.

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The Doctrine of the Trinity. By LEONARD HODGSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. 237 pp. $2.50.

This book comprises the seven Croall lectures given in Edinburgh in 1943, together with eight appendices of varying importance. The attitude in which Dr. Hodgson approaches his topic is made abundantly clear in the first sentence of his opening lecture. He is about to discuss

"the Christian doctrine of God," and this means "the doctrine of the Trinity." The heretics are thus put firmly in their place at the outset, and there they are kept throughout the entire series of lectures. As the present reviewer happens to be one of these heretics, and to sympathize with Channing's conviction that the Son's equality with the Father is "the darkest of all doctrines," it is perhaps as well that the reader should be immediately apprized of the fact, to be on the alert for any anti-trinitarian bias which the following observations may reveal. Let it be said at once, in all fairness, however, that this is a valuable book—not so much, I think it safe to say, because of its author's constructive ability as because of the sincerity with which he advances his views and because of the intimate relation in which he believes them to stand to his own religious experience. Dr. Hodgson is no sanctimonious Sabellian masquerading under a Trinitarian mask; he whole-heartedly believes in his theology. Hence the book is good medicine for the unorthodox reader.

Dr. Hodgson begins with a discussion of revelation. He succinctly states St. Thomas's theory of the separate fields of philosophy and theology, but finds it "wrongly drawn," inasmuch as the two fields actually overlap. Moreover it is precisely in the area where they do overlap that the doctrine of the Trinity is located; thus the exploration of both fields becomes essential. Dr. Hodgson associates himself with the Archbishop of Canterbury[1] in the contention that revelation consists, not of propositions, but of the deeds of God and the illumination of men's minds by the Holy Spirit so as to appreciate these deeds. The witness of the Spirit is, of course, good Calvinistic doctrine. What is novel is the fact that the Scriptures are viewed as a book of history rather than as a repository of doctrines, and that the Spirit bears witness with respect to deeds, not to propositions. How much is gained, one wonders, by this change of outlook? Is this new theory of revelation more defensible than the older view? Certainly its superiority is not immediately apparent. Perhaps M. Lecerf and the Calvinists of the Sorbonne are wiser, after all, in their adherence to the traditional position.

It is, of course, the case that not all men are illumined so as to appreciate the deeds of God aright. To meet this unhappy situation Dr. Hodgson introduces a distinction between saving and justifying faith. Belief in the Christian revelation is essential for the former. Honest loyalty to truth as one sees it suffices for the latter, whereby man is enabled to

1. See *Nature, Man and God,* Lecture XII.

avoid damnation. This is, indeed, a merciful provision, for, if all of us had to believe in Dr. Hodgson's Trinity in order to escape damnation, it is to be feared that many of us would join

"that immortal fry
Of almost everybody born to die"[2]

which the theologians of former generations contemplated with an equanimity which Dr. Hodgson cannot emulate.

Beyond asserting that the New Testament, taken as a whole, regards the Holy Spirit as personal, our author makes no attempt to extract the doctrine of the Trinity from texts of Scripture. In this, possibly, he shows good judgment. The Unitarian, when he wants to know what Christianity is, goes straight to the New Testament, above all to the teachings of Jesus, and his standing challenge to the orthodox is to do likewise. Many Trinitarians, having rashly accepted this challenge in the past, have encountered a devastating barrage of biblical quotations. Dr. Hodgson is not to be enticed into engaging upon so unfavorable a *terrain*. "Christianity," he tells us, "began as a trinitarian religion with a unitarian theology" (p. 103). Consequently our concern is not with the beliefs which the primitive disciples inherited from Judaism, nor yet with the Pauline doctrine of the pre-existent Christ, nor once more with what Jesus "felt, thought or said about Himself," but rather with "what must have been the truth about Him to account for His having said and done what he did" (p. 61).

Since the Christian revelation consists of deeds, it is historical and empirical in character, and the function of theology is not "to proclaim standing truths about God derived either from the *a priori* deliverances of human reason, or from revelation received in the form of ready-made propositions"; as an "exposition of standing truths about God" it

> is derived from reflection upon those Divine acts. But this reflection is an activity of the reason, and whilst the first duty in accurate thinking is to accept the given material without denying it, distorting it, or explaining it away, and whilst it may be necessary to acknowledge an element of mystery beyond our understanding, the mystery must not be one which is essentially irrational (p. 109).

Clearly this emphasis upon historicity is reminiscent of Professor

2. Byron's *Vision of Judgment*, XV.

Brunner's distinction between "special revelation" and "universal religion," whereas the concession to reason is diametrically opposed to the Brunnerian point of view. What are the empirical data which must not be explained away? In the first place they are the life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ—probably also the Atonement, since this, too, is an historic fact with respect to which all " 'subjective' " doctrines of "the Abelard-Rashdall type" are inadmissible (p. 214). All these events are qualified by the Brunnerian characteristic of "once-for-allness" (*loc. cit.*). Equally important is the believer's adoption into a divine sonship whereby he is permitted to share in "the divine life of the godhead" (p. 56). It is true that the average baptized Christian is not experientially aware of his changed *status*, but this does not matter, since the change has taken place all the same. Moreover, in the altered lives of the disciples after the phenomena of Pentecost, as well as in the interest of many of our contemporaries in theories of the "divine spark," Dr. Hodgson finds some empirical confirmation of his view. On no point, however, is he more apt to encounter opposition than on this very doctrine of adoptive sonship, since to many investigators it seems clear that Jesus actually taught that all men are sons of God by nature. Again, his assumptions that Jesus claimed to be the Messiah, and that the worship of Jesus had already begun in the Apostolic age, while there is doubtless much to be said for them, are certainly disputable. Thus it is apparent that we must grant Dr. Hodgson a great deal in the way of empirical data.

Having established to his own satisfaction his point of departure, our author now takes a long leap which lands him on the other side of the Athanasian controversy. His reason for so doing is that the intervening period is infected by theories of the metaphysical subordination of the Son and the Holy Spirit to the Father, which theories Dr. Hodgson regards as unsound. Consequently he prefers to give us a summary of the views of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and Calvin, where subordination is reduced to a minimum. Unfortunately, however, it is still present in the form of a subordination of order. Indeed, it ultimately turns out that nobody had really got the matter straight before Dr. Hodgson himself appeared upon the scene, and he is able to straighten it out only because of a new secret weapon in his arsenal which the classical theologians lacked. Their difficulty was that they thought of God as a

mathematical unity,[3] and, consequently, to preserve the divine unity were compelled to subordinate the second and third Persons of the Trinity to the first. "It is just this notion that unity is a simple thing that is exploded by the empirical evidence which is the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity" (p. 173). Whatever one may think of the "empirical evidence," one may at least rejoice in the explosion of a notion which has done more than anything else to befuddle traditional theology. Dr. Hodgson's secret weapon, which he now brings into play, is the idea of an "organic" or "internally constitutive" unity; a unity such as that which holds together the elements of an atom or the various aspects of the self. And it is in the light of this idea that we are to think of Dr. Hodgson's emphatically social Trinity, each Person of which constitutes a "He," and in which no subordination of any sort is to be found.

Naturally we should like to conceive of the unity more definitely. If our author had had recourse to the thought of McTaggart, whom he mentions on page 128, he would have found, in the *Hegelian Cosmology*, the conception of a unity which is in each of the individuals which compose it, and is *in* them by being *for* them—a unity which is as real as the individuals themselves. Had he applied this notion to the Persons of his Trinity he would not, indeed, have escaped the charge of tritheism, but, since he is sure to be accused of this in any case, he might have done worse than avail himself of it. What he does, as a matter of fact, is to play with the idea that the unity may itself be a Person. But, although he admits that this is a possibility, he refuses to commit himself. His reason

3. This assertion is repeated throughout the fourth, fifth, and sixth lectures. On p. 98, for instance, we are told that "both in Hebrew religious thought and Greek philosophical thought it was commonly assumed that the only real kind of unity is of what I have called the mathematical type, unity which is free from internal complexity." Yet Dr. Hodgson is clearly on very hazardous ground here, for Plotinus in the fifth Ennead (5.4) sharply distinguishes between the unity of the One and numerical unity. Aquinas, again,—to name no other Christian theologian—roundly asserts (*Sum. Theol.* Ia. q. 11. a. 3. ad2^{m}) that one as the principle of number is not predicable of God, but only one as convertible with being. God, of course, for St. Thomas is not one in the sense that he is the first member of any real or conceivable series or order; he is essentially unique. But he is also simple in the sense that he is without multiplicity. Does Dr. Hodgson mean to identify his mathematical unity with the principle of number or with the divine simplicity? Or does he intend to identify it with both, and thus to imply that St. Thomas has given back with his left hand what he has taken away with his right? Some further elucidation is clearly in order. Too hard things can scarcely, I think, be said of the doctrine of the divine simplicity, but is this simplicity identical, after all, with the *principium numeri*?

is that "we can only know God through the Persons severally; we cannot know His unity directly."[4] We can only believe in it "by an act of faith which is thoroughly rational"; yet we can be sure that it is a higher degree of unity "than any unity known to us on earth" (p. 142). So we come back to the ancient principle of analogy, that principle which covers so many philosophic sins.

In his concluding chapter on Trinitarian religion—the most significant, I believe, in his book—Dr. Hodgson dwells upon the relation between the doctrine of the Trinity and the life of devotion. Is this chapter, perchance, an unconscious reply to the trenchant challenge of Channing:

> One God, consisting of three persons or agents, is so strange a being, so unlike our own minds, and all others with whom we hold intercourse,—is so misty, so incongruous, so contradictory, that He cannot be apprehended with that distinctness and that feeling of reality which belong to the opposite system. . . . To commune with such a being must be as hard as to converse with a man of three different countenances, speaking with three different tongues. The believer in this system must forget it when he prays, or he could find no repose in devotion."[5]

To Dr. Hodgson's credit be it said that he does not forget it when he prays. What, then, does he do? "As we kneel to pray," he writes,

> we pause to recollect who we are and what we are doing. Moved by the Holy Spirit we are coming into the presence of our heavenly Father, brought in by the Lord Jesus whom we adore and worship as He takes us by the hand and presents us to our Father. . . . There is nothing that sounds new in all this—and yet to many of us it may be something quite new if we are clearly and consciously realizing our direct relationship to each Person of the Blessed Trinity. We may sometimes address ourselves to the Spirit or to the Son as well as to the Father, for each is a He, none is an it. But we shall not be confusedly addressing ourselves sometimes to One and sometimes to Another without knowing when or why. We shall speak to the Spirit as to the Lord who moves and inspires us and unites us to the Son; we shall speak to the Son as to our Redeemer who has taken us to share in His sonship, in union with whom we are united to His Father and may address Him as our Father. We shall be entering into the meaning of that old English saying, "God encompasseth us." (pp. 179-80).

4. Dr. Hodgson's attitude is somewhat reminiscent of that assumed by Martin Luther in opposition to the position of Duns Scotus. See M. Paul Vignaux's *Luther Commentateur des Sentences.*

5. *Works,* p. 390.

This interesting passage suggests three questions which may fairly be asked. The first is obvious. Are not Dr. Hodgson's three Persons as truly three gods as any three of the deities of Olympus? And, in the second place, what of Channing's contention that "to multiply infinite objects for the heart is to distract it," that "to scatter the attention among three equal persons is to empare the power of each."[6] Is it true, or is it not true, that, as the New England theologian has asserted, "he whose mind is thoroughly and practically possessed by this system, can hardly conceive the effulgence of glory in which the One God offers himself to a pious believer in his strict unity"?[7] And, lastly, is Dr. Hodgson's religious experience really as closely related to his theology as he thinks? "Some suppose," observes Channing, "that Trinitarianism consists in believing in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But we all believe in these; we all believe that the *Father* sent the *Son,* and gives, to those who ask, the *Holy Spirit.* We are all Trinitarians, if this belief is Trinitarianism."[8] Would Dr. Hodgson's actual experience, as distinct from his theoretical interpretation thereof, be genuinely different were he an Arian or a Samosatian? It would be interesting to know.

In conclusion, let me call attention to the valuable discussion in the first appendix of the treatment of reason and revelation in St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica* and Calvin's *Institutes,* and also the resumé in the fifth appendix of an unpublished paper by Professor J. A. Smith on the meaning of *Logos* in Greek thought. Dr. Hodgson has written a book which will repay study, and, even though his orthodoxy turns out to be a new and very individual "doxy," it constitutes a significant indication of a certain trend in contemporary theological thought.

ROBERT LEET PATTERSON

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Worship and the Common Life. By ERIC HAYMAN. Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. viii, 155 pp. $2.50.

The Genius of Public Worship. By CHARLES S. HEIMSATH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. ix, 204 pp. $2.50.

Eric Hayman is a prominent English Quaker, who has been, "with

6. *Ibid.,* p. 387.
7. *Ibid.,* p. 391.
8. William Henry Channing's *Life of William Ellery Channing, DD.,* p. 211. n.

deepening pacifist conviction," a member of the Society of Friends for more than thirty years. The Society is, for him, not a thing apart, but one of the members of the universal Church of Christ.

His opening pages review with measured consent the now familiar thesis, proposed by Berdyaev, Maritain, *et al.*, that we are seeing the end of an age. In retrospect he concedes to the Middle Ages the excellence which inhered in the formal unity of civilized society. Despite the errors and abuses of that earlier time it had, as against our time, the merit of a single generally accepted framework within which human life was lived.

The undoing of that unity, which has now yielded us only confusion worse confounded, must be attributed to the disintegrating effects of humanism. The modern humanist, instead of being a man who seeks to glorify God and enjoy him forever, has become a person intent on "glorifying man and enjoying himself today." Mr. Hayman's indictment is, at this point, rather too severe. Bishop Barry's appraisal of our situation is more accurate and more generous: "Formerly people may have believed on intellectual grounds in a God who made no difference in their lives. Now we have an intense and sincere religious outlook minus belief in God."

Mr. Hayman has no slightest inclination to recover the lost unity of life by putting his spiritual treasure in the keeping of any totalitarian order. Despite the fact that both Fascism and Communism are quasi-religious in their tempers, they are "world-wide associations of the human spirit in its darkest collective forms" which have "degraded the normal decencies of the human spirit." In particular, the fact that modern Russia has achieved certain reforms in education and public hygiene, should not blind our eyes to the basic nature of a state which is confessedly atheistic and irreligious.

Our author understands the modern theological reaction against liberalism, i.e., humanism, toward some neo-orthodoxy. He cannot, however, accept the letter of Barth and much prefers the modified Barthianism of Brunner. But here, again, he finds no inevitable city of refuge.

His experience and his observation persuade him that the Society of Friends still has the heart of the matter, if it can only remain true to its genius. There is in the authentic Quaker a compound of mysticism and practicality which issues in "worship and the common life—a total worship which will relate all the affairs of common life to one centre."

Mr. Hayman holds that "the Quaker witness to the Inner Light is at

the heart of the Gospel," but he fears the tendency manifest in certain circles of Friends to withdraw from the world into some elusive and esoteric piety. Conversely, he is equally aware of the peril to the principles of the Society presented by the large number of non-mystical persons who are, at present, attracted to it by what seems to them its promise of "short-term political principles." Neither mystical inwardness alone, nor shrewdly pious common sense addressed to outward affairs, can suffice to save the Society for the service of the world, but only a life of devotion to both God and man in an undivided experience. The book is incisive, penetrating, and sure-footed. In both its doctrinal and its ethical judgments there is that sensitiveness which we have always associated with the Quaker at his best. These pages may well be read not merely for their subject matter, but as an example of delicate and precise moral strategy addressed to a crude and confusing situation in our social environment.

Charles Heimsath's brief volume concludes with a bibliography of fifty-one works, most of them recent, on the subject of public worship. He does not profess to be a pioneer in the field. The wide world is still large enough to "contain the books that should be written" on this subject, but the shelves of a professional library are beginning to be a little overcrowded. The modern author working in this field must face the fact that he is rather in the position of the writer of *Ecclesiasticus*, "I awaked up last of all, as one that gathereth after the grapegatherers."

Mr. Heimsath accepts what has been done by his predecessors, and makes no claim to novelty. His work has, however, genuine independence. He is not hypnotized by pages already printed. The major merit of the book lies in its candid comments, both pro and con, on the more familiar recent studies in this general area. To this extent he does the cause good service by saving the subject from becoming conventionalized and standardized. Thus, he comments candidly upon the objective-subjective patterns, and the supposed psychological sequences which are said to determine our orders of worship.

By far the most interesting pages in the book, however, are those in which he describes his impressions as a visitor and worshipper in churches other than his own, many of them far removed from his own tradition. He admits that his judgments are those of an outsider, but they are always those of a sympathetic observer rather than a hostile critic. He is a Baptist, but mentally not a "fenced" denomination-

alist. He goes with eager interest "from Spiritualist to Christian Scientist, from Quaker to Roman Catholic, from Jewish to Greek Orthodox." Chapter by chapter, he tells us what he finds in the corporate worship of these communions. His informal and candid reporting on his pilgrimages to these services should be very useful for study groups in churches and colleges.

Harvard Divinity School WILLARD L. SPERRY

Basic Verities. By CHARLES PÉGUY. Prose and Poetry, with Translations by ANN and JULIAN GREEN. New York: Pantheon Books, 1943. 282 pp. $2.75.

Men and Saints. By CHARLES PÉGUY. Prose and Poetry, with Translations by ANN and JULIAN GREEN. New York: Pantheon Books, 1944. 303 pp. $2.75.

Charles Péguy was one of those French Catholics who resist the stereotypes formed from observation of members of their faith in other parts of the world, and who doubtless cause as much disquietude to the Vatican as bewilderment to secular liberals and radicals. He was converted about 1908, when he was thirty-five, and, unlike most late converts, he did not become more papist than the Pope. *Croyant mais pas pratiquant,* his allegiance was to a Church Invisible, whose entrance requirements he conceived uniquely. In 1913 he wrote, in a passage with which his editors have wisely opened their selections:

> Here, we are catholics who don't cheat; protestants who don't cheat; Jews who don't cheat; freethinkers who don't cheat. That is why we are so few catholics; so few protestants; so few Jews; so few freethinkers. And in all, so few of us. And against us we have the catholics who cheat; the protestants who cheat; the Jews who cheat; the freethinkers who cheat.—And that makes a lot of people.

The story of Péguy's conversion remains to be written, and perhaps cannot be written at all, so reticent does he seem to have been about himself. But it is clear that formal theology had little to do with his access of faith. Whatever may have been the efficient cause, there was continuity between his ethos as a freethinker and his ethos as a Catholic in at least two respects: his admiration for the Maid of Orleans—about whom he wrote two plays, one before and one after his conversion—and his social attitudes.

The capacity of Frenchmen to identify themselves with Joan of Arc

(which with Péguy did not amount to paranoia) has on other occasions evoked the incredulity of English-speaking folk. Julian Green explains it here by saying that Péguy was at heart a peasant; and he retained his simplicity through his student days at the *École Normale* and his trade as *avant-garde* publisher in Paris, carrying on his little printing shop as a labor of love rather than of profit. But we may suspect that in such a man the identification was aided by the histrionic gifts of his nation. The term "histrionic" is not used here invidiously: role-taking, as we sometimes call it, is a normal means of spiritual development, and it comes easily to the French. Besides, Péguy was a poet, and a poet must have ancestors.

His verse is liturgical in form, devotional in tone, and of the people in its language and imagery. The speaker is often God, whose chosen people are the suffering, the poor and those who cherish their craft; God's chosen land is France. Péguy himself has well characterized his strength as a writer: "A word is not the same with one writer as with another. One tears it from his guts. The other pulls it from his overcoat pocket." He has, I believe, earned the implied claim to inclusion among the first group.

The selections from Péguy's prose show that from the beginning his socialism was moralistic in its inspiration; it could easily assume a religious form. Six years before his conversion we find him preaching a type of socialism which fights destitution (*misère*) while extolling poverty. We may be rightly suspicious these days of those who preach the gospel of poverty, since we have observed that most of them belong to and remain in the upper income brackets. But Péguy also practised it. He does not say how many francs a year one must have in order to be poor, but we are told that one must be content with "the real necessities, with bread and books," and that one must have a job and ply it with dignity. The economics is vague and the history questionable. The Old France was "poor" until exactly 1880; then it was divided into two nations, the rich and the destitute. Péguy has a similar nostalgia for the heroic, the saintly days of the republican and socialist movements, which did not become wholly extinct for a couple of decades after the demise of poverty —not, in fact, until what Péguy holds to have been Jaurès' betrayal of the revolution for politics.

Upon the theme that "everything begins in mysticism [this is a dubious translation of *mystique* here] and ends in politics," Péguy based

his wariness of a Church without saints and his contempt for a socialism that devoted itself to staying in office. His political doctrines passed into action during the heroic days of the Dreyfus affair; then: "We are defeated. . . . Founders come first. Profiteers come after."

Péguy died in the first battle of the Marne, carrying, perhaps, an imaginary Cross of Lorraine in his single-handed charge into the teeth of a German machine gun. In the light of political events during the thirty years that have passed since then, it would be easy to discern a parallel quixotry in a form of socialism which distorts history and scorns economics and practical politics, in a republicanism which is dedicated to fraternity, indifferent to equality, and (so far as these selections show) almost silent on liberty. Recent developments have shown too fine a line for comfort between the radicalism of Péguy and the reaction of Vichy. But events in France, and elsewhere, have also made it necessary to look more than occasionally at Péguy's side of the medal: "The socialist revolution will be moral or it will not be."

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Christianity and Democracy. By JACQUES MARITAIN. Translated by DORIS C. ANSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. 98 pp. $1.25.

Maritain's *Christianity and Democracy* is in "homage to the people of France" with pleasant references to the people of the United States. It announces the liquidation of the modern world—the world of Luther, Descartes, the deists, Jefferson, Rousseau, Hegel, the bourgeoisie, capitalism and nationalism—*born of Christendom*. How reminiscent of the American Catholic orator who said, "We are living at the end of an era, ushered in by the Protestant Revolt four hundred years ago—a revolt that denied authority, so that as a result we have been living without God, we have tossed Him out of His own world"!

The tragedy of democracy, it is alleged, has been the repudiation of the Gospel and Christianity in the name of liberty, but this occurred because the modern apostles of social emancipation could not discover Jesus within the Church, because religious orthodoxy appeared to the workers of Europe to be political and social oppression so that Pope Pius XI had to go on record with "the great scandal of the nineteenth century was that the Church lost the working class." As for fascism—it

"dechristianized the Church herself." And the winning of the peace involves team-work between democracy and Christianity.

One wonders how vagrant democracy, the antithesis of Christianity, can be synthesized with the Gospel. For at present "democracy" includes self-determination, a denial of the authority of the Church. The answer is that democracy is nevertheless "a *temporal* manifestation of the inspiration of the gospel." To be sure, the labor movement of 1848 in France was opposed by the Church; it was the rationalists in France who proclaimed the rights of man; it was the heretical Puritans who struck the last blow at slavery in America; it was atheistic communism which abolished private property in Russia; it was Locke, Rousseau, and the Encyclopedists who did the actual pioneering work in behalf of democracy—all beyond the Church and not of the Faithful—yet the hidden leaven of Christianity must be assumed as producing the necessary inspiration for all this progress so opposed by the Church!

This invisible underground movement within the medieval and early modern way of life, this "hidden work of evangelical inspiration" is assumed to have deposited seven values upon the "secular conscience"; namely, faith in progress, faith in the rights of the individual, the sense of human equality, the postulate that the authority of earthly rulers derives from the people, the condemnation of power politics, the sense of the inalienable freedom of man, and the brotherhood of man. But the "true essence of democracy" comes from the Gospel and cannot continue without it, *mirabile dictu.*

For, argues Maritain, was it not "individualistic liberalism" which perverted democracy into a "power without authority," into failure to recognize the rights of minorities, into lack of interest in the common task and the common good? The new democracy must burn out these poisons, destroy ancient interests and inherited economic privileges, establish a new international order, liberate Europe, China, and India, and introduce the brotherhood of man principle into the management of colonial empires. The leadership must be found within the layer of the plain people for "the leading classes have gone morally bankrupt."

Turning now to communism, Maritain observes that three attitudes toward it are possible: its destruction by force (really?); the formation of a united political front with it; co-operation with it while preserving complete autonomy. The third method of dealing with communism is approved, since the sacrifices of Russia deserve both appreciation and

support. Moreover, theoretical communism is disintegrating in Russia.

The volume ends with an avowal of faith in the French people purified by pain and in the rejection not only of the Vichy régime but clericalism as well.

A number of Maritain's statements and implications are at variance with history. The favorite Catholic slogan that the modern age is ended and the return to Aquinas and Aristotle has begun is kindergarten stuff. The claim on page 62 that slavery is sanctioned only by non-Christian religions and that liberty weakens with the weakening of Christianity is contradicted today by statements in Christian text-books that the modern Negro cannot escape from the curse pronounced against Ham by God. The Catholic Church was strongest in the age of absolutism, when liberty was not and the inquisition held sway. On page 59, Maritain gives his opinion of Kant. Should not Kant be heard in rebuttal? In Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone,* the following appears:

> So from this period to the time when Christendom could furnish a learned public of its own, its history is obscure, and we remain ignorant of what effect the teaching of Christianity had upon the morality of its adherents—whether the first Christians actually were moral men or just people of the common run. At any rate, the history of Christendom, from the time that it became a learned public itself, or at least part of the universal learned public, has served in no way to recommend it on the score of the beneficent effect which can be expected of a moral religion.
>
> For history tells how the mystical fanaticism in the lives of hermits and monks, and the glorification of the holiness of celibacy, rendered great masses of people useless to the world; how alleged miracles accompanying all this weighed down the people with heavy chains under a blind superstition: how with a hierarchy forcing itself upon free men, the dreadful voice of orthodoxy was raised, out of the mouths of presumptuous, exclusively "called," Scriptural expositors, and divided the Christian world into embittered parties over credal opinions on matters of faith (upon which absolutely no general agreement can be reached without appeal to pure reason as the expositor); how in the East, where the state meddled in an absurd manner with the religious statutes of the priests and with priestdom, instead of holding them within the narrow confines of a teacher's status (out of which they are at all times inclined to pass over into that of ruler)—how, I say, this state had finally to become, quite inescapably, the prey of foreign enemies, who at last put an end to its prevailing faith; how, in the West, where faith had erected its own throne, independent of worldly power, the civil order together with the sciences (which maintain this order) were thrown into confusion and rendered impotent by a self-styled viceroy of God; how, both Christian portions of the world became overrun by barbarians,

just as plants and animals, near death from some disease, attract destructive insects to complete their dissolution; how, in the West, the spiritual head ruled over the disciplined kinds like children by means of the magic wand of his threatened excommunication, and incited them to depopulating foreign wars in another portion of the world (the Crusades), to the waging of war with one another, to the rebellion of subjects against those in authority over them, and to bloodthirsty hatred against their otherwise-minded colleagues in one and the same universal Christendom so-called; how the root of this discord, which even now is kept from violent outbreaks only through political interest, lies hidden in the basic principle of a despotically commanding ecclesiastical faith and still gives cause for dread of events like unto these—this history of Christendom (which indeed could not eventuate otherwise if erected upon an historical faith), when surveyed at single glance, like a painting might well justify the exclamation: *tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.*[1]

But the principal fallacy of the author, his *deus ex machina,* is "the hidden work of evangelical inspiration" plus his view of "secularism." What the French philosopher woefully misses is that the religious democracy of the minor Protestant sects of the sixteenth century was followed by political democracy in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, and this, at last in our day, by socio-economic democracy which, while retaining the creative role for each individual in society, protects him by accurate knowledge, the best techniques, economic security, and leisure for culture, and refuses resolutely to let him be imprisoned within the medieval dogmas of revelation and authoritarianism. Now this kind of new democracy cannot hope to secure the approval of the Church whose devoted disciple Maritain is.

The issue may be clarified by summarizing the historical relation between Christianity and democracy. Christianity originated within Judaism and to this day represents that tradition. Jesus of Nazareth, its founder, was a Jew who borrowed his essential creed: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, *with all thy mind,* with all thy strength; thou shalt love thy neighbor as thou shalt love thyself" from that religion. The original glowing faith of Christianity was the supernatural establishment of the kingdom of God upon this earth. In this heaven on earth the followers of Jesus would fully enjoy God. During the interim before the descent of Jesus upon the clouds of heaven they would live in separation from the evil world. For they had accepted love, had undergone a change of heart involving suffering, self-purification, self-dedication, self-transformation, separa-

1. Quoted from Hudson and Greene Edition, 1934, pp. 121 f.

tion from the world, ecstatic experience, and concentration on the coming heavenly kingdom.

Alas, the descent of Jesus from heaven did not take place. Hence the Christians of the second generation had to begin to compromise with their environment. The original faith marched off in many directions until finally the kingdom upon earth became the overworldly heaven or the Catholic Church. Of course there would still be a final assize but not a renewed social order on this earth. "Love" sought compensation in immortality, became selfish, sentimental, petulant, domineering. It no longer refused to judge but proceeded to impose its views and will on others.

The almost complete transformation of original Christianity came in the acceptance of the mythology, theology, and philosophy of the non-Christian world. Paul had transferred Christianity from Asia to Europe and had imposed upon it the Hellenistic faith in a dying and rising Savior. And Christianity became the religion of Europe. The Roman imperial totalitarian set-up was adopted by and adapted to Christianity. For example, in the Roman empire, marriage was secular; the Church made it a sacrament. In the later Roman empire the ceremony of inauguration of the emperor was secular; medieval Christianity made it sacramental. For was not Constantine "equal to the apostles"? Did not Romans 13 teach that the authority of the ruler was from God? Did not Gregory the Great in the sixth century, as Calvin in the sixteenth, "warn all subjects against criticizing the conduct of their rulers even when they do wrong"? Was not the king the Lord's "anointed," the Lord's "messiah"? The sacrament of unction made the ruler divine. At the coronation in Rome to Hildebrand's day the emperor received both the symbol of sovereignty and the ring of faith, ordination as subdeacon, communion in two kinds. Had not a dove brought down from heaven the miraculous oil for the baptism of Clovis? Was not the unction of the king then the fifth of twelve sacraments? Has the Eastern Church ceased to anathematize on the first Sunday in Lent those "who say that orthodox princes do not ascend their thrones by the spiritual grace of God, and do not at their unction, receive the gift of the Holy Ghost for the discharge of their great office"? Did not the coronation oath in England from William the Conqueror to James II contain: "the king is the Vicar of the Supreme King in order that he may govern the Kingdom of the people of the Lord and *above all that he may govern Holy Church*"?

As the papacy went totalitarian, Thomas Aquinas aristotelized Christian thought. Some centuries later came geographical discovery, the new astronomy, the colonization of the Americas, capitalism, Protestantism with its surrender of marriage, of supervision of interest and economic progress, and education to the State. All this made medieval totalitarianism mortally ill. Protestantism tried to graft early modern thinking upon a branch or two of the medieval Christian tree only to find itself prevented by inherited medieval dogmas and its own too early formulated dogmas from making peace with the modern age. The Westminster Confession of 1647 was also discovered to be out of date before 1776. Then the sun of the power age rose one day. Here were the I Amendment guaranteeing freedom of religious opinion, the machine, science, technology, steam, electricity, chemistry, physics, evolution, the automobile, the airplane, good roads, and a new age based on science and the democratic faith had indeed been born. During the last 150 years these twins have come to maturity and refuse mothering by the churches.

What then, is the twentieth century Christian inheritance? Simply the "magnificent tension" between tradition and "scientific intelligence," between inherited theories and contemporary facts, between the "historic faith," sense of detachment, supernaturalism, authority, dogma, Aquinas, Barth, the neo-orthodoxy and individualism, invention, rocket gun, rocket plane, psychology, sociology, biology, historic method, history of religions. Whence the gravest problem of modern life has become the "problem of restoring the integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct." The proposal to return to Aquinas and Aristotle merely obscures further the situation and tables all attempts to solve the problem.

Roman Catholicism must tolerate modern democracy and progress, but can it ever officially accept it and endorse it? In the *Catholic Encyclopedia* there is no article upon democracy as such, only upon "Christian democracy" which turns out to be "popular Catholic action" where "popular" signifies the "fourth estate." Contemporary Catholic action seems to be directed against socialism, communism, and the liberal spirit with too many Protestant professors of theology taking the tasty bait. The only democracy which has been officially approved by the papacy is a "movement which proceeds along Catholic lines under Cath-

olic leaders and whose Magna Charta is *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno.*"

In theory Catholicism is *semper ubique idem,* or as Maritain says, "irreducibly formed in its structure and doctrine." Early English "Wesleyanism was as much opposed to Democracy as to sin . . . the whole spirit of its mission was unfavorable to the Democratic movement and the growth of the Trade Union spirit." But in the American environment, Methodism slowly accepted American democracy. Is there no hope that modern Catholicism can ever wholeheartedly support the democracy of the twentieth century? Many in the American Catholic laity and some members of the hierarchy as well have long since accepted democracy. In the *Spirit of Catholicism,* the Catholic Professor Karl Adams states in opposition to Maritain that

> Catholicism cannot be identified simply and wholly with primitive Christianity, nor even with the Gospel of Christ . . . thousands of years hence Catholicism will probably be even richer, more luxuriant, more manifold in dogma, morals, law and worship, than the Catholicism of the present day. A religious historian of the fifth millennium A.D. will without difficulty discover in Catholicism conceptions and forms and practices which will derive from India, China and Japan. . . . Catholicism is a union of contraries. . . .

And a papacy that can co-operate with Berlin—Rome—Tokyo would not risk American Catholic condemnation by protesting too loudly against American democracy. Instead of weakening what is called "pseudo-democracy" in Europe since 1922, the Vatican would have been wiser to have supported the democratic trend; instead of establishing Vatican City with the consent of Mussolini, it should have found its life by opposing Franco. "Democracy cannot win over Fascism until the attempt to maintain and extend an imperialist church-state is ended." Indeed, Maritain should have asked the prior question: How could fascism and nazism develop in Catholic Europe? Then his interpretation of European democratic trends would have been able to survive the test of history.

It is generally granted that there is a moral heritage from Christianity which it would be stupid to discard, and that the contemporary social and cultural life demands reconstruction. But that reconstruction must be based upon the use of scientific intelligence because of its ability to co-operate, to be objective and to accept the developmental interpre-

tation of life. Since reconstruction must be guided by reverence for human life, science must always remain sensitive to human values. Hence the moral imperatives of the past should be continued as working hypothesis and not as "irreducibly" fixed, static dogmas. Religion delivered from the restraints of growth-preventing dogmas might then contribute to man's emancipation from fear and superstition.

Maritain's courage in daring to call attention to the weaknesses of his church is commendable, but democracy is not of the structure of Catholicism. As Samuel Whelpley put it in 1820,

> the government of the United States seems to be without a parallel. . . . It is, perhaps, the only government which, in all its parts, was the result *of plan . . . in our case, a number of men, competent to so great a work sat down and planned our government. . . . The plan they formed was dictated by their knowledge of our circumstances; and it is probably the ablest and best plan of government, ever formed by man.*

And Benjamin Franklin's motion to open the sessions of the Constitutional Convention with prayer received the support of only three or four persons, "the Convention, except for three or four persons, thought prayers unnecessary" and adjournment was taken without any vote on the motion.

Conrad Henry Moehlman

The University of Rochester

BOOK NOTES

Sumerian Mythology: A Study of Spiritual and Literary Achievement in the Third Millenium B. C. By S. N. KRAMER. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1944. xiv, 125 pp. $2.00.

A reviewer has few greater scholarly satisfactions than seeing a polularization of a little known field done by an outstanding expert in that field. Sumerian is one of the most difficult and ill-explored of the languages recovered in the last century from the tablets of Mesopotamia, and there are probably not more than twenty first-class Sumerologists in the world today. Dr. Kramer, one of the best of this small company, combines great linguistic competence with considerable literary skill and clarity of thought; it is therefore a matter of congratulation that he has made accessible to the non-expert the most important texts in the field of Sumerian mythology that have so far been published, reconstructed, and interpreted.

The present volume is the first of a projected seven-volume series of *Studies in Sumerian Culture,* which will give the chief religious and mythological texts and a systematic exposition of Sumerian religion.

In his Introduction, Kramer gives an excellent though brief survey of the progress of his science, making clear the difficulty of analyzing the contents of the thousands of literary tablets in museums and private collections, and in matching broken pieces widely scattered, many of them belonging to tablets divided between Philadelphia and Istanbul. By virtue of reading and collating several hundred of these, the author has suceeded in reconstructing twenty-four Sumerian epics and myths dating from the third millenium B.C. Anyone who has had occasion to deal with the archeology and literature of the Ancient Near East and realizes the survival power of ancient mythical motifs and art-forms, will be grateful for the extension of familiar Babylonian material to an earlier period, and will agree with the author that the Sumerians played the dominant role in the culture of the early Bronze Age.

The bulk of the book is taken up by the Myths of Origin, describing the creation of the universe, its organization by the gods, the invention of culture-tools of farmers and shepherds, and of early cultural institutions.

Next, the author translates the important dragon-slaying myth and the descent of Inanna (prototype of Ishtar) to the Netherworld. Finally he gives us the fragment of a Sumerian poem on the Deluge, the original of the famous Babylonian deluge-story found in the tablets of the Gilgamesh epic, and some miscellaneous myths.

Kramer briefly summarizes Sumerian cosmogonic concepts as follows (pp. 73-75): first there was the primeval sea; the sea engendered a united heaven and earth; heaven and earth were separated by the air; the heaven produced the moon, which in turn produced the sun; finally there came plant, animal, and human life, probably from the union of air, earth, and water, and with the

co-operation of the sun. He correctly points out that the idea that the son, the begotten one (Utu, the sun-god) becomes stronger than the father or begetter (Nanna, the moon-god) "is native to the philosophy and psychology of the Near East." He might easily have found parallels further afield, but is rather unfortunate in choosing the parallel of Christ and God the Father, rather than, say, John the Baptist and Jesus.

A paraphrase or prose synopsis of the various poems interpreted by the author could hardly do justice to the conscientiousness and skilfulness of his renderings. As the book is compact and inexpensive the reviewer ventures to urge all those interested in ancient Near Eastern culture to read it for themselves. It will be an invaluable book of reference for the teacher of the history of religion. The value of the translations and discussions is greatly enhanced by excellent repoductions of mythological motifs on ancient seals.

R. M.

The Babylonian Talmud in Selection. Edited and translated by Leo Auerbach. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1944. 286 pp. $3.00.

It is the merit of this collection of excerpts from the mass of material comprised in the Babylonian Talmud that an attempt is made to indicate the wide range of the original. It is not a collection of "gems," nor a compendium of pleasant anecdotes. Its author has no design to show how applicable Talmudic law is today nor to encourage adherence to its precepts by the wavering modern Jews. The purpose, so far as may be judged, is to reveal a civilization.

Because Auerbach is concerned with giving a cross-section of the Talmud, his selections frequently lack intrinsic interest, merit, and applicability. What is lacking in these directions cannot be atoned for by smooth and fairly idiomatic translation, since the literary form of the Talmud hardly makes for easy reading even under the best of circumstances. Then, too, it seems fairly pointless to present a volume of selections at a time when a complete and excellent translation is in progress under the sponsorship of the Soncino Press of London. Those who really want to study the world revealed in the Talmud will do so in the full edition.

This volume of selections does not, then, have much point or value.

Joseph L. Blau

The Challenge of Israel's Faith. By G. Ernest Wright. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944. ix, 109 pp. $1.50.

Professor Wright, who is known mainly for work in the realm of Palestinian archeology, has now written a little book from the standpoint of a theologian, concerned with contemporary faith and problems. He has made Israel's message relevant to our time in a forceful and often eloquent manner (see for instance the Pascalian development of pp. 18-19). By analyzing in turn the concepts of

the Word of God, of God's intervention in history, of Divine Kingship, of Covenant, and of Eschatology, the author has presented nothing less than a concise treatise of biblical theology.

Yet, such a work might not satisfy theologians and historians alike. While Professor Wright's interpretation of the Old Testament is accurate, his application of Israel's faith to our day will convince only those who already share his theological position. As for the others, it is apparently assumed that they will hear the Word of God, *hic et nunc,* through some kind of spiritual contagion emerging from the Prophetic books themselves.

To be sure, the message of Israel's prophets is timely, but no simple parallelism can be drawn between their world and ours. When the author paraphrases Isaiah 10:5, "Ho, Berlin, you, rod of my anger" (p. 2), he succeeds in shocking the American reader's apathy, but the use of this homiletical device is dangerous, for it implies that the moral and religious state of such European nations as Norway, Denmark, and Holland in 1940 was comparable to that of Judah in the eighth century B.C. The suggestion might even be that Norway, Denmark, and Holland were guilty nations which deserved their fate, while Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, and Turkey have escaped a military invasion on account of their righteousness. Obviously, the authority of Israel's faith, real as it is, requires not only a subjective feeling of appreciation, but also an objective criterion of application.

The author, of course, is aware of this fact, and he seems to accept Luther's view of the Scripture as well as Calvin's doctrine of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit (pp. 12 ff.), but he might have tried to win his readers to his position by discussing more fully the notion of Scriptural authority, and particularly the problem of revelation and inspiration. Being a Christian student of the Old Testament, Professor Wright spiritualizes the promise of an "everlasting covenant" (pp. 89-91), and he emphasizes the prophetic type of religion at the expense of priestly ritualism. In the name of what authority? A study of the Bible's unity and of the relationship between the Old Testament and the New Testament would not have been superfluous.

Finally, the author might have shown more historical impartiality when he hastily stated that "so much of the current writing and teaching about Israel's prophets appears so stereotyped, platitudinous and dull" (p. 28). Depreciating the work of the older generation is a Barthian weakness, and neo-orthodox enthusiasts should not indulge in the tendency to condemn Schleiermacher (pp. 49 ff.) without taking into account the theological and philosophical milieu in which he wrote.

The preceding remarks are not made in order to minimize the value of this book. Professor Wright has rendered a genuine service to the cause of the Old Testament in contemporary America.

SAMUEL L. TERRIEN

The Saturday and Sunday Lessons from Luke in the Greek Gospel Lectionary. By Bruce M. Metzger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944. v, 101 pp. $1.50.

The problem of the Gospel text in the lectionaries of the Eastern Church is so complicated that preliminary analysis of small portions is necessary before any general conclusions can be drawn. Such a task Dr. Metzger has performed with meticulous thoroughness for the material indicated in the title of his monograph. The result he reaches is that, most probably, the lectionary text was derived from a text predominately "Caesarean" (or, more precisely, pre-Caesarean) and was gradually brought into conformity with the prevailing Byzantine text. He wisely adds, however, that it is too early in the study of the history of the lectionary text to determine when and where the various parts of the synaxarion had their origin. But his work has advanced the final solution of the problem by an important step, while many of his incidental results are of importance for the progress of textual criticism in general.

Burton Scott Easton

Contemporary Thinking about Jesus: An Anthology. Compiled by Thomas S. Kepler. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944. 429 pp. $3.50.

With balance, insight, and fine scholarship, Professor Kepler has provided a much-needed anthology of what fifty-five qualified scholars think about Jesus. College students, clergymen, and intelligent laymen will find this miniature library a gold mine of reliable information. The material is familiar to scholars, but this book was not edited for them. The volume is a valuable companion to the same compiler's *Contemporary Religious Thought* (reviewed in *The Review of Religion*, May 1942, pp. 465 ff.).

Each writer is represented but once. There are five divisions of from ten to twelve selections: on the Synoptic problem, the Fourth Gospel, Jesus and history, eschatology and ethics, and evaluations of Jesus. There is some Christology in the third and fifth sections, but the center of emphasis is on the Jesus of history. All schools of thought are represented (e.g., Torry's and Goodspeed's articles on the language of the Gospels appear side by side), and lesser opinions (such as the Christ-myth school) are mentioned if only to be refuted.

There is probably more confusion concerning the facts of Jesus' life and the problems of Christology than in any other area of Christian thinking, especially among amateurs. This volume will not necessarily dispel the confusion, but it will provide the latest facts and theories upon which college students, clergymen, and informed laymen can build more satisfactory opinions. Jesus is dealt with as an historical person; there is some agreement as to what he taught and what he thought about himself, and there is a mild Christology in some of the reports. Perhaps it is the lack of comprehensive Christological theories which is the weakest element in the compilation.

There are only a few serious omissions, due in part to difficulty in clearing

copyright; and some books appeared too late for selection or notice in the bibliography (such as Bowman's *The Intention of Jesus* and Pittenger's *Christ and Christian Faith*). There is no excuse for including Merejkowski among the top fifty-five interpreters of Jesus. The restriction of each writer to one appearance means that some excellent contributions have been deleted in the interests of a wider catholicity, but most of the topics are representative of the writers: e.g., Grant writes on form criticism; Streeter and Taylor on the Fourth Gospel; Tory and Goodspeed on the original written language of the Gospels; McCown on Jesus and a philosophy of history; Bennett and Neibuhr on Christian living; Dodd on realized eschatology; and Dibelius on the Sermon on the Mount. Distribution between countries is also fair, although Americans outnumber the rest.

A comprehensive bibliography, a biographical index, and a brief index of titles completes a workmanlike and helpful compilation.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

The Religious and Philosophical Aspects of van Helmont's Science and Medicine. By WALTER PAGEL. (Supplements to the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, No. 2.) Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1944. ix, 44 pp. $1.00.

John Baptist van Helmont (1577-1644), distinguished Belgian scientist and natural philosopher, has been known for his contributions in the fields of chemistry, biology, and medicine. Whereas most historians of science have tended to stress those contributions in the light of later scientific developments, and to detach them from the context of philosophical and religious ideas in which they were originally set forth, Dr. Pagel, resuming and developing his former studies on the same author, emphasizes the close connection between those two aspects. The scientific achievements of van Helmont were the direct consequence of his natural philosophy, which was in some points related to that of Paracelsus, and the former cannot be understood without the latter. This approach is certainly fruitful and should be applied to many other chapters in the early history of science. From this general point of view, Dr. Pagel surveys van Helmont's criticism of previous philosophies, as well as the various parts of his own thought. Of particular interest are van Helmont's concept of biological time (pp. 41 ff.), and the comparison between his system and Leibnitz' monadology. Several points remain somewhat obscure to the uninformed reader, and van Helmont's opposition to Aristotle and to Galen might be understood in the light of a broader intellectual trend during the sixteenth century. Yet the attempt to give a unified picture of van Helmont's system, in which his religious, philosophical, and scientific ideas, or the "old" and the "new" elements of his thought, are integrated, will certainly be welcomed by all students of intellectual history.

PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER

Austrian Aid to American Catholics, 1830-1860. By BENJAMIN J. BLIED. Milwaukee: (Published by the author), 1944, 205 pp. $2.50.

The book contains more than the unassuming title indicates. In a way, Austrian financial and personal aid to American Catholics is taken only as a starting point and as a limitation for reviewing the history of American Catholicism during the period from 1830 to 1860.

Three missionary societies had turned their interest to America: The French "Society for the Propagation of the Faith" (1829), the Austrian "Leopoldine Society" (1829), and the Bavarian "Ludwig Society" (1839). The reports of the Leopoldine Society broadened the interest in America aroused first by only a few Austrian writers—particularly among Austrian Catholics, and the same society organized their support for compatriots in the New World. They met, however, with difficulties in America, where Austria was regarded as a center of political reaction and the Leopoldine Society as a tool of papal policy; these ideas were fostered particularly under the influence of Italian and Hungarian political refugees from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

As to the various missionary fields, the activities of Austrians in the Catholic Church in the United States neglected almost completely the Negroes. They had a relationship of friendly and successful competition with the Protestants. During the first half of the period discussed, Indian missions attracted much interest, and linguistical works of some importance are the literary testimony of this period. Afterwards pastoral work among German immigrants became the main task of Austrian priests and religious. Without distinguishing whether the stock of the parishoners came from Austria proper or from Bavaria or Westfalia or elsewhere, the Leopoldine Society gave willingly its support. There existed, however, at certain times some friction between German and Irish Catholics over funds, seminaries, and schools.

The chapters on Austrian secular priests and on Austrians in religious orders give many very interesting life stories, contributing to a colorful picture of that time and proving the substantial support American Catholicism received from Austria.

J. MOKRE.

American Catholic Opinion in the Slavery Controversy. By MADELEINE HOOKE RICE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. 177 pp. $2.50.

Dr. Rice's admirable study presents "representative opinion" of American Roman Catholics regarding slavery, not formal ecclesiastical actions, because no such actions were taken. The chief reason for this appears in a brief but well-grounded statement of the authoritative tradition. The Roman Catholic Church has not held slavery to be evil in itself, but has surrounded it with mitigating humane requirements. This theological position underlies all the utterances of prelates and church periodicals which constitute most of the material of this book. It was in the 1830's, when abolitionist agitation rose high, that slavery became a live question for Roman Catholic leaders. Then it was

complicated by oppositions, Dr. Rice's account of which illuminates conditions of the time. Protestantism was strong in the abolition movement; the 1840's and 1850's saw embittered Protestant-Roman Catholic controversy. Some leading abolitionists, such as Channing and Parker, were heretics and others skeptics. Continental European radicals and revolutionaries upheld the anti-slavery cause; from their movements American Roman Catholic leaders wished to dissociate their Church. Irish Roman Catholics were unfavorably affected by British abolitionist activity. They also were inclined to the Democratic party, and they were fearful of Negro competition in the labor field. The Church's teaching regarding private property bore on slave ownership. There was doubt of the wisdom of any emancipation except very gradual.

All this was general. Besides, there were differences North and South, to which Dr. Rice gives interesting chapters. Southern Roman Catholics, influenced by their region, generally supported the "peculiar institution." Bishop England, of Charleston, their chief spokesman in this, emphasized "the acceptance of the system by scriptural and church authority—with emancipation as a very remote possibility." In the North a few Roman Catholics were opponents of slavery, and, as the war came on, more of them, Orestes Brownson for example, supported emancipation. But the majority opinion, expressed by Archbishop Hughes, of New York, who controverted Brownson, denied intrinsic wrong in slavery, condemned abolitionism and was, to say the least, indifferent toward emancipation. Dr. Rice questions whether Roman Catholic leaders were not "evading what was actually a moral issue," made such by "the inequities of the slave system" and by racial discrimination which violates fundamental Church teaching.

The bibliography and footnotes show through reading in Roman Catholic sources and the general literature of the slavery controversy; but, strangely, Helper's *Impending Crisis* is not listed. The author's discussion is fair-minded, competent, and discerning.

ROBERT HASTINGS NICHOLS

The Trail of the Florida Circuit Rider. By CHARLES T. THRIFT, JR. Lakeland, Fla.: Florida Southern College Press, 1944. 168 pp. $2.00.

The Trail of the Florida Circuit Rider has been prepared as a part of the centennial celebration of the founding of Methodism in that State. It gives vital facts about the beginnings of that denomination in Florida; but it does far more than that. This reviewer laid the book down feeling that he had been introduced to the people, the denominations, the geography, politics and social conditions, as Methodism met them in Florida one hundred years ago, and as they have developed since that time. It is a new way of writing history; and it is a good history. Both Florida Methodism and Dr. Thrift are to be congratulated.

ROBERT W. GOODLOE

In Quest of a Kingdom. By LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944. 268 pp. $2.00.

This is one of the hardest books to review because there is so much quotable material in it that selection is exceedingly difficult. It is written as tersely, compactly, and directly as though it were journalism, yet beautifully written, and with genuine depth of feeling. The book itself, is in a sense a "review"—of a great theme. There can be no question about it being a challenging book or one for our times. It lays down the disturbing proposal that we put into practice what we believe academically, such beliefs, for instance, that we should overcome evil with good and actually love our enemies.

It is a moving book. I doubt that many can read it without experiencing an inner change, a change for the better and a better understanding of the Gospel and of Him who gave the Good News. It is, in this writer's opinion, Dr. Weatherhead's best book, and that is saying very much, indeed. In it he advances beyond Judaism, as Christianity someday must, because the New Testament does and Jesus did. The poignant evangelism of *In Quest of a Kingdom* is the evangelism of love. The trouble with too great an insistence on preaching the "wrath" of God is that we are in danger of the temptation to become instruments of that wrath, "legalistic" in our attitude.

> The rigid code of legal duty, with its endless enactments and obligations, gave place to a new liberty, in which service was no longer demanded but seemed the natural, spontaneous expression of the new relationship between God and man, which, in turn gave birth to a new relationship between man and man. Because they *loved*—not dreaded—the Lord their God with heart and mind and soul, they *loved* their neighbors as themselves.

Dr. Weatherhead's contention appears to be that "punishment" is far less an act of God upon the "sinner" than a loss of the Kingdom and the joy of it, by our indifference toward it or our failure to see it and to enter it; and he sees entrance into the Kingdom as a "relationship" with God and with our fellows.

> There cannot be any doubt remaining that God's plan is to bring the whole world, every nation in it, every community in it, every individual in it, into a family, bound together by the family spirit, sharing the privileges and the needs, the joys and the sorrows. I think it was to teach this great truth that Jesus talked so much about the Kingdom of God.

That is his thesis, which he develops in twenty-three brief but tremendously suggestive chapters.

The best comment this reviewer can possibly make is, "Read it." If there is such a thing as a "must" book, this is surely one of them, because it is stimulating, provocative and inspiring.

RAIMUNDO DEOVIES

Wind of the Spirit. By G. de Purucker. Covina, Calif.: Theosophical University Press, 1944. x, 254 pp. $2.50.

This "Selection of Talks on Theosophy as related primarily to Human Life and Human Problems," by the late leader of one branch of the theosophical movement in America, reveals the essential strength of this type of "esoteric wisdom" as well as its essential weaknesses. On the credit side, there is calm serenity of spirit in the face of world-crisis, a broad tolerance of human frailty and human vagaries, and a lofty detachment from the grosser aspects of life, reminiscent of the teachings of Epicurus. On the debit side, there is a lamentable lack of realism, an almost fanatical faith in what can be called "thought-magic," that is, a belief that the world can be saved by merely "taking thought," instead of taking action, and an unfortunate effect of complacency. The author says, "Personally I consider politics as being too futile a waste of time. . . . In other words, politics are not interesting enough. We Theosophists, I repeat, as an organization do not bother with these things." (p. 17). And this in a democracy! Philanthropy also seems to be a futile waste of time. "Why don't we Theosophists all go out and take lunch-baskets around to the starving, and go to the bedside of the people who are smitten with disease, and dying? Many of us do it and have done it. But our main work in life is to try to *do away* with poverty, rather than tinkering with the needs of the poor; and this will gradually be accomplished by changing men's minds so that our civilization will be an enlightened one." (p. 45). But in the meantime, what about human suffering? The doctrine of *Karma* takes care of that nicely.

M. B.

American Jewish Yearbook, 5705: 1944-1945. Vol. 46. Edited by Harry Schneiderman. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1944. xxx, 620 pp.

Besides a great number of useful items such as calendars, statistics, directories and lists, and an index to volumes 1-45, this volume contains a group of special articles worthy of note. Among these are two biographical sketches: "Julian W. Mack," by Horace M. Kallen; and "Herbert Friedenwald," by Harry Schneiderman. The section entitled, "Review of the Year, 5704 (1943-44)," contains a vast amount of useful information from all over the world. The book may be highly recommended as a reference work (especially to editors).

Soldiers' Bibles through Three Centuries. By Harold R. Willoughby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944. vii, 43 + (16) pp. $1.00.

This small, but impressive work by an eminent scholar, was inspired by an exhibition of Soldiers' Bibles in Chicago, and was issued in celebration of the tricentennial of the Cromwellian Soldier's Bible, of which it contains a facsimile reproduction. The booklet is composed of two chapters, "English Soldiers' Bibles," and "American War Bibles," together with a comprehensive biblio-

graphy, and the above mentioned facsimile. A thoroughly annotated, scholarly piece of work, and, incidentally, most excellent reading matter.

Soldiers Also Asked. Edited by the Rev. Ronald Selby Wright, C. F. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. x, 149 pp. $1.75.

The Chaplain Serves. Issued by Office, Chief of Chaplains, Army Service Forces, War Department. 77 pp.

Render unto Caesar. New York: Lewis Publishing Company, 1943. 233 pp. $2.00.

These three small books present a vivid picture of the effect of war on the religious life of our young men. The first book contains answers to the questions of soldiers by such eminent English churchmen as Archbishop Temple, the Bishop of Durham, Principal D. S. Cairns, and Professors John Baillie, A. E. Taylor, and Edwyn Bevan. The Army pamphlet is full of fine photographs of our army chapels, altars, and religious services on every front, accompanied by a well written running text. *Render unto Caesar,* as its title implies, deals with the ever crucial problem of conflicting duties.

Beyond the Night. By Elmore M. McKee. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. ix, 243. $2.50.

An excellent book by the Rector of St. George's Church, New York City, written especially for those who, in these dark days, "suddenly face pain, separation, bereavement, death, loneliness, indecision, hatred, and the full force of evil." The book, the author says, grew out of his own experience in meeting the wartime needs of his parish, and it is certainly a worthy product of the high tradition of one of our country's greatest liberal churches.

We Preach Not Ourselves. By Gordon Poteat. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944. 185 pp. $2.00.

In this homiletic study of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, Professor Poteat demonstrates his own method of using the Bible to bring its wisdom and inspiration to bear on contemporary problems.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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Bhavana: Self-becoming. By Christmas Humphreys. *Middle Way,* XIX (1944), 51-53.

Buddhism as Personal Religion. By B. M. Barua. *Maha-Bodhi,* LII (1944), 54-68.

Is Buddhism Agnostic? By Gunaseela Vitange. *Maha-Bodhi,* LII (1944), 69-72.

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Common Sense about Karma Yoga. By Swami Pavitrananda. *Prabuddha Bharata,* XLIX (1944), 336-42.

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Is a Jivanmukta Subject to Ignorance? By Swami Prajnanananda. *Prabuddha Bharata,* XLIX (1944), 330-36.

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Making the Spiritual-Practical. By Evelyn Samras. *New History,* XIV (1944), No. 2, 7-10.

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The Story of a Forgery and the Mēša Inscription. By A. S. Yahuda. *Jewish Quarterly Review,* XXXV (1944), 139-64.

The Psalms in Jewish Liturgy. By Louis I. Rabinowitz. *Historia Judaica,* VI (1944), 109-22.

Prolegomena to a Bibliography of Jewish Music. By Eric Werner. *Historia Judaica,* vi (1944), 175-88.

The Status of the Jews in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt. By Angelo Segré. *Jewish Social Studies,* vi (1944), 375-400.

Jewish Converts in Provence from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century. By Adolf Kober. *Jewish Social Studies,* vi (1944), 351-74.

The Rediscovery of the Jew in Christianity (with Special Reference to Pascal). By Hans Ehrenberg. *International Review of Missions,* xxxiii (1944), 400-6.

The Wandering Jew in Fiction and in Fact. By Leo M. Franklin, *Current Religious Thought,* iv (1944), No. 9, 7-10.

Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy: An Introduction to their "Letters on Judaism and Christianity." By Alexander Altmann. *Journal of Religion,* xxiv (1944), 258-70.

A Christian Looks at the Christian Mission to the Jews. By James Parkes. *Theology,* xlvii (1944), 218-24.

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